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FOREWORD
This document constitutes the final report of the Current Technology ACT Control
System Definition and the Advanced Technology ACT Control System Definition Tasks of
the Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic
Transport Project. The report covers work performed from July 1978 through October
1980 under Contracts NAS1-14742 and NAS1-15325.
Volume I contains the principal results of the study, and supplementary technical data are
contained in Volume II.
The NASA Technical Monitors for these contract tasks were R. V. Hood and D. B.
Middleton of the Energy Efficient Transport Project Office at Langley Research Center.
The work was accomplished within the Preliminary Design and the Engineering Technology
Departments of the Vice President-Engineering organization of the Boeing Commercial
Airplane Company. Key contractor personnel who contributed were:
G. W. Hanks Program Manager
H. A. Shomber IAAC Project Manager
H. A. Dethman Design Integration
L. B. Gratzer Technology Integration
A. Maeshiro Task Manager (Current Technology ACT
Control System Definition)
D. Gangsaas Task Manager (Advanced Technology
ACT Control System Definition)
J. D. Blight Flight Controls Technology
S. M. Buchan Flight Controls Technology
C. B. Crumb Flight Control Design
R. 3. Dorwart Product Assurance
C. C. Flora Flight Controls Technology
U. Ly Flight Controls Technology
K. A. B. Macdonald Product Assurance
D. C. Norman Flight Controls Technology
E. T. Reiquam Systems Technology
J. Shen Flight Controls Technology
R. D. Smith Flight Control Design
T. D. Verrill Flight Control Design
T. B. Cunningham Honeywell Systems and Research Center
3. C. Larson Honeywell Avionics Division
E. R. Rang Honeywell Systems and Research Center
R. K. Mason Hydraulic Research Textron
O. A. Walkes Hydraulic Research Textron
During this study, principal measurements and calculations were made in U.S. customary
units and were converted to Standard International units for this document.
Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this report does not constitute an
official endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either expressed or implied, by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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1.0 SUMMARY
This report documents both the Current and Advanced Active Controls Technology (ACT)'
System Definition Tasks of the Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC)
Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport Project.
The first part of the report discusses development of an ACT system architecture, based
on current technology system elements, that best meets the reliability and availability
requirements. The balance of the report discusses use of optimal control theory for
analysis and synthesis of the ACT multivariable control laws and the implementation of
the same ACT functions as the current technology work with advanced system
components.
The objectives of the Current Technology ACT System design were to:
• Define a highly reliable, low technical risk ACT control system for the IAAC
airplane configurations using current technology
• Support assessment of the benefit associated with the ACT airplane by evaluating
reliability, cost, and weight of the current technology system
• Identify technical risk areas and recommend system development and testing
The system architecture work addressed implementation of all potentially beneficial ACT
functions, not just those employed on a particular airplane configuration. The approach of
the current technology work was to define and evaluate two extreme system architecture
forms, then define a "Selected System" that used the best features of extreme forms. The
principal differences among these systems are the number and organization of the digital
computers. The Selected System employs three redundant computers to implement all of
the ACT functions, four redundant smaller computers to implement the crucial pitch-
augmented stability function, and a separate maintenance and display computer. The
Q
reliability objective of probability of crucial function failure of less than 1 x 10 per
flight of 1 hr can be met with current technology system components, if the software is
assumed fault free and coverage approaching 1.0 can be provided. There is no generally
accepted method to prove the software to be error free. However, a disciplined approach
beginning with functional analysis and proceeding through requirements, design, coding,
verification, validation, exhaustive testing, configuration control, and documentation has
been shown, on space and aircraft programs, to be both essential and effective in
producing highly reliable real-time control software.
The objectives of the Advanced Technology ACT System design were to:
• Synthesize the multivariable ACT control laws directly, using time-domain optimal
control theory
• Evaluate the effects of actuation system nonlinearities on gust-load alleviation and
flutter-mode control
• Determine an ACT control system architecture based on advanced technology (circa
1990)
The optimal control theory approach to ACT control law synthesis yielded comparable
control law performance much more systematically and directly than the classical
s-domain approach. The ACT control law performance, although somewhat degraded by
the inclusion of representative nonlinearities, remained quite effective. Certain high-
frequency gust-load alleviation functions may require increased surface rate capability.
Finally, the use of advanced computers with bus architecture (both potentially available
circa 1990) has the promise of significant savings in airplane weight and first cost.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced
Subsonic Transport Project has three major objectives. The first objective is the credible
assessment of the benefit to a commercial jet transport airplane of the full application of
active controls designed into the airplane from the beginning of the airplane program.
The second objective is identification of the risks associated with the use of Active
Controls Technology (ACT). The third objective is reduction of these risks to a level
commensurate with commercial practice, through test and evaluation, to the degree
possible within funding limitations.
This project, a part of the NASA-Boeing Energy Efficient Transport (EET) Program, has
been organized into three major elements as shown at the top of Figure 1. The first major
element, as shown in the figure, includes establishment of the design criteria appropriate
for an ACT airplane, design of an ACT airplane configuration to meet the selected
criteria, design of an ACT control system based upon current technology, and selection
and evaluation of a Final ACT Configuration. In parallel with these tasks, the Advanced
Technology ACT Control System element included exploration of more direct control law
synthesis methods and alternative means of implementing the ACT functions using
advanced technology, as shown in Figure 2. The final major element of the IAAC Project
will address the reduction of risk associated with implementation of ACT on a commercial
transport through test and evaluation activities. Figure 3 shows this final element. A
more detailed discussion of the IAAC Project Plan is contained in Reference 1.
This report covers those parts of the IAAC Project shown shaded in Figures 1 and 2. The
Current Technology Task is discussed in Sections 4.0 through 9.0. The Advanced
Technology Task is discussed in Sections 10.0 through 14.0.
Results of the Configuration/ACT System Design and Evaluation Tasks to date have shown
that when ACT is integrated early into the design of a transport aircraft, significant fuel
savings can be realized. It was previously reported (ref 2) under this project that 6% to
6.5% block fuel savings could be obtained with ACT at the design range of about 3700 km
(2000 nmi) compared to the performance of a Conventional Baseline Airplane (ref 3) with
the same wing planform (aspect ratio 8.7). When this wing was retailored (to aspect ratio
12.0 with unchanged area), the fuel savings increased to about 10%, accompanied by
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increased estimated manufacturing costs (ref 4). These benefits are all based on current
technology ACT system implementation such as that discussed in Sections 4.0 through 9.0
of this document.
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The Current Technology ACT System Definition work proceeded under the important
constraint of using only currently available control system technology. There was to be
no dependence upon technological features that have not been demonstrated as feasible.
The approach to the current technology system definition has been to perform a
preliminary design of an ACT system that can provide all of the considered functions with
appropriate reliability. The configuration definition started with two extreme
architectural forms chosen to represent the apparent limits of system organization—first,
with the functions integrated into one set of computers and, second, with the functions
segregated into separate computer sets. This was followed with comparative evaluation
of those two systems and the use of that comparison to derive the basic form of the
Selected System. This third system was then evaluated in the same fashion as the other
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two systems. In parallel, the feasibility of certain key assumptions was checked in
computer laboratory work, simulating the digital control computers in single-channel and
redundant hookups.
The advanced technology work reported in this document focused on two areas: the use of
modern optimal control law synthesis techniques and an alternative implementation of the
same ACT functions treated in the Current Technology ACT System Definition Task. The
results of the optimal synthesis work are compared with that of the classical s-domain
work done in support of the Configuration/ACT System Design and Evaluation element.
The alternative ACT function implementation identified three approaches using varying
degrees of technical readiness; these approaches are characterized as having low,
medium, and high technical risk associated with a circa 1990 implementation. A
derivative of the medium-risk system was selected for further evaluation and cost-of-
ownership analysis.
This document is the complete report on IAAC control systems. Volume I covers the
current and advanced technology system work accomplished to date. Volume 11 contains
appendices to the material of Volume I.
3.0 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
This section contains five subsections: General Abbreviations, Subscripts, Superscripts,
Operators, and Symbols. Each subsection is arranged in alphabetical order. For ease of
reference, Subsection 3.2 is further divided into two parts—velocity and Mach number
subscripts (3.2.1) and general subscripts (3.2.2).
3.1 GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS
ac
app
A
AAL
AB
ACES
ACT
A/D
AEC
AFCS
Ah
AIL
ALU
AP
APB
APD
APFDC
alternating current
appendix
control law transfer function parameters
control law transfer function parameters
control law transfer function parameters
ampere; piston area; system state matrix
angle-of-attack limiter
address bus
airline cost-estimating system (program)
Active Controls Technology
analog to digital
Atomic Energy Commission
automatic flight control system
ampere-hour
aileron
arithmetic logic unit
autopilot
auxiliary power breaker
avalanche photodiodes
autopilot flight director computer
APU
AR
ARCS
ARINC
ASYM
ATDP
ATE
A
a
Au
A
w
AO
A0
X1'A2
bps
brkr
bi
B
B'
BIT
BTB
BPCU
B
a
B.i
B
auxiliary power unit
analog reversion
Airborne Advanced Reconfigurable Computer System
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
asymmetry detection electronics
air-turbine-driven pump
automatic test equipment
airplane state matrix
actuator state matrix
wind state matrix
steady aerodynamic stiffness matrix
steady aerodynamic stiffness matrix associated with control
surface deflection
unsteady aerodynamic stiffness matrix
unsteady aerodynamic stiffness matrix associated with control
surface deflection
bits per second
breaker
unsteady aerodynamic lag coefficients
control input distribution matrix
transformed control distribution matrix
built-in test
bus tie breaker
bus power control unit
airplane control distribution matrix
bending moment at the ith station
actuator input distribution matrix
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BB.
B-
c
eg
cm
c
c.
C
C'
CARE
CARSRA
CAS
CB
CCDL
CCDT
CDC
CLB
CLP
CMOS/SOS
CONT
CPU
CQ
CRT
CRZ
CSEU
wind input distribution matrix
input to system matrix for full-state feedback system
command to input matrix for full-state feedback system
characteristic chord length
center of gravity
centimeter
mean aerodynamic chord
Kussner scaling coefficients
Celsius; state to output distribution matrix
transformed state to output distribution matrix
computer-aided reliability estimates
computer-aided redundant system reliability analysis
control augmentation system
circuit breaker
cross-channel data link
cross-channel data transfer
Control Data Corporation
climb
control law processor
complementary metal-oxide semiconductor/silicone on sapphire
continuous
central processing unit
servovalve spool gain
cathode-ray tube
cruise
control system electronic unit
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CSU computer service unit
CV control valve
CWS control wheel steering
CY calendar year
C airplane output distribution matrix
3.
C , plant process noise covariance matrix
C . fictitious input noise covariance matrix
C state to performance output distribution matrix
C actuator output distribution matrix
C measurement noise covariance matrix
C state to wind output distribution matrix
CQ quasi-steady aerodynamic stiffness matrix
CQ quasi-steady aerodynamic stiffness matrix associated with
control surface deflection
C, quasi-steady aerodynamic damping matrix
C, quasi-steady aerodynamic damping matrix associated with control
surface deflection
£ controllability matrix
d plant disturbance vector; control law transfer function
denominator
d fictitious input noise
dB decibel
dc direct current
deg degree
d. Kussner lag coefficients
D control to output distribution matrix; drag
D/A digital to analog
DADC digital air data computer
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DAST drone for aerodynamic and structural testing
DC don't care
DITS digital information transfer system
DMA direct memory access
DN down
DRO design requirements and objectives
D. unsteady aerodynamic matrices to model lift growth effects
associated with rigid and elastic modes
D. unsteady aerodynamic matrices to model lift growth effects
associated with control surfaces
D direct transmission matrix from wind to output
e base for Napierian logarithms; system state estimate error
E process noise distribution matrix; exponent; wind to output
distribution matrix
EASY environmental control analysis system
EDP engine-driven pump
EET Energy Efficient Transport (Program)
EHV electrohydrauhc valve
ELEV elevator
EM electric motor
EMA electromechanical actuator
EMI electromagnetic interference
EMP electric-motor-driven pump; electromagnetic pulse
E(p) fit error function
EPC external power contactor
f longitudinal correlation function
fig. figure
ft feet
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FFAA
FAR
FBW
FCC
FD
FH
FMC
FMEA
FO
FTAP
FTMP
FTREE
g
g-dump
*i
gal
gen
G
GCB
GCU
GG
GLA
GMPS
GPIB
GPM
Fahrenheit; FMC; force; measurement noise distribution matrix
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Aviation Regulations
fly by wire
flight control computer
failure detection
flight hour
flutter-mode control
failure mode and effect analysis
fiber optic
fault tree analysis program
fault-tolerant multiple processor
fault tree computer program
acceleration due to gravity; structural damping coefficient for
neutral stability; transverse correlation function
normal acceleration autopilot disconnect
unsteady aerodynamic lag coefficients
gallon
generator
feed forward gain; feedback gain matrix
generator circuit breaker
generator control unit
device type identifier
gust-load alleviation
general-purpose multiplex system
general-purpose interface bus
gallons per minute
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GPS global positioning system
G(s) transfer function
G. constants associated with representation of unsteady
aerodynamic forces
hr hour
H feedback gain; Hamiltonian
HOC device type identifier
HDP device type identifier
HMOS high-performance metal-oxide semiconductor
HPU hydraulic power unit
Hz hertz
in inch
ips inches per second
I identity matrix; input
IAAC Integrated Application of Active Controls Technology to an
Advanced Subsonic Transport Project
IAP integrated actuator package
IAS indicated airspeed
IB input bus
1C integrated circuit
IDG integrated drive generator
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ILD injection laser diodes
ILS instrument landing system
INBD inboard
INOP inoperable
INS inertial navigation system
I/O input/output
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IOC input/output controller
IRS inertial reference system
ISO International Standards Organization
2
I L integrated injection logic
IA,Ip,,Ip input current
J cost function
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
kg kilogram
km kilometer
kn knot
kPa kilopascal
kVA kilovoltampere
kW kilowatt
k. gain at the ith control input
K counter value; gain; gain matrix; state estimate error
covariance matrix; thousand
KA amplifier gain; angle-of-attack gain
KAM model amplifier gain
KG servovalve monitor gain
KD demodulator gain
KE elevator gain
KF flutter-mode control gain
KFB feedback transducer gain
KG gust-load alleviation gain
KL feedback gain; lever ratio
KM maneuver gain
KMA maneuver-load control aileron gain
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KME maneuver-load control elevator gain
K ops thousand operations per second
KQ pitch-rate gain
KSV servovalve gain
KSVM model servovalve gain
KTD transducer gain
KU speed gain
K, filter gain
K steady-state solution to matrix Riccati equation
oo
) modified Bessel functions of the second kind of order 1/3
) modified Bessel functions of the second kind of order 2/3
Kg pitch angle scaling constant
Ib pound
Ibf pound-force
Ib/in pounds per inch
Ib/in pounds per square inch
L dynamic load vector; length; lift; transverse turbulence
scale length
LAS lateral/directional-augmented stability
LAT lateral
LE leading edge; left elevator
LED light-emitting diode
LIA left inboard aileron
LIF left inboard flaperon
LOAI left outboard aileron, inboard
LOAO left outboard aileron, outboard
LOF left outboard flaperon
17
LR
LRU
LSI
LSIC
LVDT
L.
v,w
£
£
m
mA
max
min
mm
ms
/us
M
MARG
MCU
MCV
MEL
MG
MHD
MLC
MMU
lower rudder
line replaceable unit
large-scale integration
large-scale integrated circuit
linear variable differential transformer
three-component vector of L consisting of shear, bending moment,
and torsion of the ith station
longitudinal turbulence scale length
transverse turbulence scale lengths
liter
Laplace transform
meter
milliampere
maximum
minute
millimeter
millisecond
microsecond
feedforward gain matrix; Mach; mega; motor
marginal, one failure away from function loss
modular control unit (ARINC dimension specification)
main control valve
minimum equipment list
main gear
magnetohydrodynamic
maneuver-load control
memory management unit
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MOS
M/R
MTBF
MUX
MVL
MW
MZFW+F
Mq
M
Ma
nmi
ns
rrm
n.
n
z
N
NAV
NDP
NG
NMR
No.
Nl
ops
oz
°B
metal-oxide semiconductor
maximum range to its resolution
mean time between failures
multiplexer
midvalue logic
megawatt
maximum zero fuel weight plus fuel (including full reserve tanks)
dimensional variation of pitching moment with pitching rate
dimensional variation of pitching moment with speed
dimensional variation of pitching moment with angle of attack
dimensional variation of pitching moment with angle-of-attack rate
dimensional variation of pitching moment with elevator angle
nautical mile
nanosecond
Markov transition rate, stage n between states m and p
control law transfer function numerators
vertical acceleration
dummy vector; newton; ultimate normal load factor
navigation (mode)
numerical data processor
nose gear
nuclear magnetic resonance
number .
speed of the No. 1 rotor
operations per second
ounce
body axis coordinates
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OOAI
OB
OEM
OMP
OUTBD
ff
A
P»P
psi
pwr
P
Pa
PAS
PBW
PCU
PCM
PF
PIN
PLIM
PM
PROM
P/S
PSD
PR
inertial axis coordinates
output
outboard aileron (inboard section)
output bus
original equipment manufacture
output monitor processor
outboard
observability matrix
Lagrange's multiplier
pounds per square inch
power
inertial-to-body transformation matrix; probability; pump
pascal
pitch-augmented stability
power by wire
power control unit
power conditioning module
pump and filter
p-layer intrinsic n-layer
nonlinear actuator position limit
permanent magnet
programmable read-only memory
parallel/serial
power spectral density
pressure, return
pressure, supply
hydraulic supply pressure, hydraulic system 1
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P2 hydraulic supply pressure, hydraulic system 2
q dynamic pressure; perturbation value of pitch rate; rigid
and flexible modal coordinates
q rigid and flexible mode rates
q rigid and flexible mode accelerations
q- unsteady aerodynamic states associated with q
Q pitch rate
QA device type identifier
QSAE quasi-static aeroelastic
Q?QpQo cost weighting matrices for performance variables
r yaw rate
rad radian
ref reference
rms root mean square
r. ith gust input reference coordinate vector
R cost weighting matrix for control inputs; receiver
RADC Rome Air Development Center
RAM random-access memory
RAT ram air turbine
RE right elevator
RIA right outboard aileron
RIF right inboard flaperon
RLIM nonlinear rate limit
ROAD right outboard aileron, outboard
ROAI right outboard aileron, inboard
ROF right outboard flaperon
ROI return on investment
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ROM
RPS
RT
RTS
Ri
R..
R
x'
Ry'Rz
RO
R,
R-
s
sec
subsec
5
SAS
S/C
SDEU
S/H
SIFT
SKC
S/P
SRI
ss
SSFD
read-only memory
rotor position sensor
remote terminal
real-time counter
unsteady aerodynamic force matrix associated with wind
disturbance
cross-correlation function between gust states i and j
Laplace transform of R-.
rotations about x, y, z axes
steady aerodynamic force matrix associated with wind disturbance
hydraulic return pressure, system 1
hydraulic return pressure, system 2
cross-correlation matrix with time lag
Laplace variable; second (same as sec)
second (same as s)
subsection
Kalman filter gain matrix; standby
stability augmentation system
short circuit
servodrive electronics unit
sample and hold
software-implemented fault tolerance
Singer-Kearfott Corporation
serial/parallel
Stanford Research Institute
signal selection
signal selection and failure detection
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SVDED
SYNC
5i
T
TD
TE
T/0
T-R
TRU
TTL
TX/RCV
T.
T
T ,T ,Tx' y' z
u*,u*
g
un
UART
UPI
dead band
synchronization
shear force at the ith station
time limit; time setting; time variable
final time
ith column of the transformation matrix T
initial time
cycle time; sampling period; similarity transformation matrix;
threshold; transistor
Teledyne
trailing edge
takeoff
transformer-rectifier
transformer-rectifier unit
transistor-transistor logic
transmitter-receiver
torsion at the ith station
control effectiveness scaling matrix
translations along x, y, z directions
incremental value of forward-speed component; control input
vector
optimal control solutions
control input command
longitudinal turbulence (output of Dryden model)
white noise process for longitudinal turbulence (input to
Dryden model)
universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter
device type identifier
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UR
USART
UTIL-1,-2
U,V,W
v
v.i
V-.1J
VA
V ac
VC
V dc
VFB
VHSIC
VLSI
VLSIC
V/N
VOR
VPB
VPC
V/V
VWRS
VYRO
biasA
upper rudder
universal synchronous/asynchronous receiver/transmitter
utility bus
positive integer
measurement noise vector
ith system eigenvector
cross-variance between the ith and jth output variables
variance of jth output response to ith control input
steady-state airspeed; true airspeed; variable displacement;
velocity; volt
volt-ampere
volt alternating current
actuator position command voltage; voltage, common; volts,
command
volt direct current
volts, feedback
very-high-speed integrated circuits
very-large-scale integrated
very-large-scale integrated circuit
volts per Newton
very-high-frequency omnidirectional radio range
volts, pitch, channel B
volts, pitch, channel C
verification and validation
vibrating wire rate sensor
pitch-rate sensor (trade name)
bias voltage of channel A
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VbiasB
Vbiasc
VA'VB'VC
Vl
w, wg
wps
wc
wg
'g
W
WLA
Wn
A
X
W
W
XB
XI
X
XAH
XBIAS
XDED
Xq
x
u
bias voltage of channel B
bias voltage of channel C
voltage of channels A, B, C
forward velocity
wind input vector
words per second
white noise wind input
transverse turbulence (output of Dryden model)
unsteady gust states
vertical-speed component; watt
wing-load alleviation
white noise process for transverse turbulence (input to Dryden
model)
system state estimate vector; system state vector
estimated state vector
airplane state vector
initial state vector
actuator state vector
wind state vector
state vector, body-fixed axis coordinates
state vector, moving-inertial axis coordinates
index
actuator displacement
null bias
feedback dead band
dimensional variation of X force with pitch rate
dimensional variation of X force with speed
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X intermediate state variable for transverse turbulence in Dryden
wz
 model
Xa dimensional variation of X force with angle of attack
X- dimensional variation of X force with elevator angle
°E
Xf state vector for standard controllable formo.
_ i
X state covariance matrix
X' covariance matrix for x(t)
X initial state covariance matrix
—o
y output; output positions; output vector
y output rates
y output accelerations
y estimated sensor output vector
y. component of y
Y output covariance matrix
Y' covariance matrix for y(t)
z system modal vector
z vertical velocity
z unsteady aerodynamic states associated with z
Z Z transform variable; modal response covariance matrix
Z vertical acceleration at body station 922.7 (eg)
Z dimensional variation of Z force with pitch rate
Z dimensional variation of Z force with speed
Zft dimensional variation of Z force with angle of attack
Z^ - dimensional variation of Z force with angle-of-attack rate
Zg dimensional variation of Z force with elevator angle
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3.2 SUBSCRIPTS
3.2.1 Subscripts Related to Velocity V or Mach Number M
B gust penetration
D dive
e equivalent airspeed
MO maximum operating
3.2.2 General Subscripts
a airplane model
A aileron; amplifier
c command inputs
eg (at) center of gravity
com command
COL control column
D demodulator
E elevator
f final time
FB feedback
g gust model state
i initial time
m implicit or explicit model
max maximum of
ML) minimum unstick speed condition
n white noise
OAI outboard aileron (inboard section)
OAO outboard aileron (outboard section)
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R reduced-order model
ss steady-state value of
SCS steady aero control surfaces
SM steady aero model
SV servovalve
SW steady aero wind gusts
u control actuator model
UCS unsteady aero control surfaces
UM unsteady aero model
UW unsteady aero wind gusts
w gust model
3.3 SUPERSCRIPTS
T transpose of
-1 inverse of
A
 auxiliary variable; Kalman filter estimated quantity
auxiliary variable
~ auxiliary variable
3.4 OPERATORS
Det(-) determinant of
E(-) expected value of
exp(-) exponential function
Im(-) imaginary part of
Re(-) real part of
sgn(-) signum or sign function
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8(-) impulse function
derivative with respect to time or rate of change (superscript)
acceleration or second derivative with respect to time
(superscript)
3.5 SYMBOLS
0 zero matrix
(^ centerline
a. angle of attack; prescribed degree of stability
a difference between airplane angle of attack with respect to the
air and ideal model angle of attack
0 sideslip angle
F disturbance distribution matrix, gamma function
T, P gust distribution matrix
a
8 control surface command; control surface vector
8 steady aerodynamic states associated with 8
5 . commanded aileron angle
8 A outboard aileron command
c
8 column angle; control column deflection
8 ith control surface command
i
Sj: commanded elevator angle
8g' intermediate state variable elevator actuator
8c elevator deflection command
c
8- ith control surface position
•
8j ith control surface rate
8j ith control surface acceleration
8. . Kronecker delta
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A change in quantity
AP difference in pressure
e state estimate error vector
$ damping ratio
TJ fraction of semispan (2 y/b)
0 incremental pitch angle; input matrix in modal coordinates
(discrete time); pitch attitude; pitch-rate sensor output;
surface angular position
0. phase at the ith control input
0. unsteady aerodynamic states associated with 0
X failure rate
\. ith system eigenvalue
A, A diagonal or block diagonal state matrix
3,
ju micro
£ spatial separation vector
£. flexible mode displacements
o mean rms turbulence intensity
a, discrete gust intensity
a- real part of the complex eigenvalue X .
a longitudinal rms gust intensity
a transverse rms gust intensity
T time lag; time constant
rf time constant of filter
0 roll attitude
$ mode shape matrix at ith station; output mode shape matrix;
state transmission matrix in modal coordinate (discrete time)
$ load distribution matrix
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frequency, radians
imaginary part of the complex eigenvalue X.
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4.0 CURRENT TECHNOLOGY ACT SYSTEM DEFINITION: TASK OVERVIEW
Section 2.0 described the relationship of the Current Technology Active Controls
Technology (ACT) System Definition to the Integrated Application of Active Controls
(IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport Project as a whole. This section
provides a brief overview of the current technology control system work, showing its
foundation, organization, approach, and progress. Sections 5.0 through 9.0 cover that
same work in greater detail. Section 5.0 states the rules under which the study was
performed. Section 6.0 describes the Integrated and Segregated Systems and their
evaluation leading to the Selected System. The Selected System is defined in more detail
in Sections 7.0 and 8.0, and its evaluation is reported in Section 9.0.
4.1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the Current Technology ACT System Definition are as follows:
• Define a highly reliable and low technical risk ACT control system for the ACT
airplane configuration using current technology
• Support the assessment of the benefit associated with the ACT airplane by
evaluating reliability, cost, and weight of the current technology system
• Identify technical risk areas and recommend hardware development and testing
The ACT functions are designed to be transparent to the flight crew except for mode
control in the presence of ACT system faults. Certain functions are critical and some
may be crucial, as those terms are defined in Subsection ^.3. These safety factors and the
consequent dispatch implications make reliability a key requirement of this equipment.
The system design was aimed at incorporating all active control functions that could
contribute significantly to fuel savings in a transport airplane design. Concurrent with
this "worst case" system evolution, specific current technology systems were defined to
support the Initial ACT Configuration (ref 2) and the Wing Planform Study Configuration
(ref 4).
33
4.2 GUIDELINES
The following guidelines were established early in the current technology system work:
• Assume a set of ACT functions and control surfaces
• Provide maximum function survivability
• Isolate hardware and software by criticalities, where feasible
• Test all dispatch-critical ACT functions prior to takeoff
• Provide in-flight operation similar to conventional airplanes
• Use on-condition maintenance
In identifying ACT functions for this project, all active control functions that would add
to airplane efficiency were considered. Thus the control system definition work identified
a broad list of functions, including some that could require new control surfaces. These
assumed functions are listed in Subsection 4.3.
Reliability is the key feature. The ACT functions are of varying criticality; isolation of
any function requiring very high reliability is very desirable. All functions must be tested
at preflight. The problem is to keep the incidence of delays and cancellations below an
acceptable maximum level while meeting the reliability standards corresponding to the
criticality of the functions.
Because active controls are transparent to the crew, normal in-flight operation will
involve no special attention to the active controls, thus permitting pilots to fly the
airplane in the customary manner.
The policy of on-condition maintenance (that which arises from "flight squawk" or other
fault report, as opposed to scheduled maintenance) is essential to minimize the ongoing
maintenance cost.
An important corollary to these guidelines is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the
time-phased relationship of the tasks of the Configuration/ACT System Design and
Evaluation element of the IAAC Project. In normal control system design, airplane
performance characteristics are the basis for determining the control system require-
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ments. As Figure 1 shows, in the IAAC Project the current technology control system
work began before there was an ACT airplane configuration and therefore had to proceed
substantially independent of the airplane design work. For that reason, the control system
work has not been tied to any specific airplane configuration; rather, it is aimed at
providing all the active control function capability that might reasonably be required by a
most-demanding ACT airplane design, which is one that can use all of the ACT functions
assumed.
tt.3 ACTIVE CONTROL FUNCTIONS
The active control system will use all of the Baseline Airplane primary control surfaces,
as shown in Figure 4. In some instances, changes will be made to adapt them to active
control use while retaining their function in primary control. An example is the split
outboard ailerons, in which the Baseline Airplane outboard ailerons each become two
panels, with the smaller inboard panel serving the high-frequency active control function
of flutter-mode control (FMC), in addition to normal lateral control and wing-load
alleviation (WLA).
Single-surface, dual- -
hinged elevator (PAS,
MLC, AAL)
Split outboard
ailerons (same
totaI area as
Baseline)
Dual rudder
(LAS)
Stick
pusher
(AAL)
Outboard aileron •
inner segment
(WLA, FMC, and
lateral control at
low speed)
Horizontal
stabilizer
(PAS)
Flaperons (WLA)
Outboard aileron
outer segment
(WLA and existing
lateral control
at low speed)
Figure 4. Assumed Active Control Surfaces
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Flaperons also are shown as a feature of the active control system. They were assumed
necessary for the ACT control system task, whether or not they will ultimately be
required.
The active control functions are assumed to be required in the current technology ACT
system to meet the specification cited in Subsection 4.2.
The two categories of function criticality represented in Table 1 are defined as follows: a
crucial function is one whose complete loss results in an immediate unconditional flight
safety hazard. A critical function is one whose complete loss results in a potential safety
hazard that can be averted through appropriate pilot action. Using these definitions,
reliability requirements for each of the ACT functions have been set based on statistical
data on airplane system failures and the FAA Advisory Circular (ref 5).
Table 1. Assumed ACT Function Criticality and Reliability
Requirements
Pitch-augmented stability,
short-period (pASg^QR-p
Pitch-augmented stability, speed
(PASSREED)
Angle-of-attack limiter
(AAL)
Lateral/directional-augmented
stability (LAS)
Gust-load alleviation (GLA)
Maneuver -load control (MLC)
Flutter-mode control (FMC)
Criticality
Crucial
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Critical
Reliability
requirement,
probability of
failure per 1-hr
flight
10'9
10'5
10'5
10"5
10-5
10'5
10-5
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The allowable failure rate of a crucial function makes its reliability essentially equivalent
to that of primary flight controls in present-day aircraft. The critical function
probability of failure of 10~ per 1-hr flight has been fixed by consideration of
dispatchability and in-flight operability requirements.
HA ORGANIZATION OF WORK
Work on the ACT control system has included a number of tasks; Figure 5 shows them as
they relate to one another. The central horizontal row of boxes may be thought of as the
mainstream effort, with the smaller boxes above and below representing supporting
operations. The arrows are only partly indicative of the interrelationships; in particular,
the evaluation work and the boxes representing the supporting tasks apply to all three of
the system studies and not just to the Selected System.
The choice of two extremes of control system form (fig. 6) is based upon the recognition
that this would identify the limits of most of the major variables that must be considered
in forming the system concept. The Integrated System depends upon a single set of
control computers to perform all active control functions. Digital flight control
computers that have speed and capacity adequate for this central computer task are in
production now.
The Segregated System depends upon multiple individual sets of control computers, one
set for each active control function. This results in more computers, although they can be
lower performance machines using microprocessors.
The third system is the Selected System, a merger of features of the Integrated and
Segregated Systems. It represents the best compromise of advantages and disadvantages
of the first two systems studied.
*.5 STATUS AND PLAN
The system work accomplished to date shows that it is feasible to implement these ACT
functions using current technology system components and meet the reliability require-
ments. Considerable development and test work must be completed before the perceived
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risks of such systems are reduced to a level commensurate with current commercial
practice. The major unresolved issue with respect to digital implementation of these
critical systems is software verification and validation. There is no generally accepted
method to prove the software to be error free. However, a disciplined approach beginning
with functional analysis and proceeding through requirements, design, coding, verification,
validation, exhaustive testing, configuration control, and documentation has been shown
to be both essential and effective in producing high-reliability real-time control software.
During the course of this project, a number of risk areas have been identified that require
specific development and test for resolution. The final element of the IAAC Project
(previously shown in fig. 3) will address this work.
It is expected that piloted simulations of the ACT airplane will be required to ensure that
these systems are appropriate for a commercial transport and exhibit acceptable
characteristics in the presence of failures.
Technical risk concerns may well surface in many different areas of an ACT system, and
some of these concerns may not be resolved without flight test. Boeing intends to
proceed toward that goal with the developmental activities identified for this project
element to the maximum extent permitted by available resources.
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5.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND DESIGN GROUND RULES
This section presents the ground rules imposed on the system design task and the
assumptions made for the Active Controls Technology (ACT) airplane performance
capability. The first ground rule of this task was to design the ACT system using only
currently available hardware technology. Other ground rules were derived from
Appendix A of Reference 2.
In addition to the ground rules, this section presents the various assumptions made for the
characteristics of the ACT airplane. Knowledge of the detailed airplane characteristics is
a prerequisite of normal flight control system design. However, because this system
design proceeded in parallel with the airplane configuration design, it was necessary to
estimate many airplane characteristics to support the system design. This was done early
in the project history by a group of experienced engineers representing the several
technical disciplines involved. Their collective engineering judgment of the effect of
losing ACT functions, individually and in combinations, became the basis for the
configuration-dependent portions of this section.
5.1 ASSUMED ACT FUNCTIONS
This subsection describes the active flight control functions assumed to be implemented in
the ACT control system. These functions rather naturally group themselves into airplane
mode control and structural mode control. Airplane mode control tends to be low
frequency and involves traditional stability augmentation functions. Structural mode
control may include both low-frequency functions (maneuver-load alleviation) and higher
frequency functions (flutter-mode control and gust-load alleviation). Functions included
to protect the airplane from entering stall condition are considered a part of ACT,
although they do not operate in a continuous closed-loop mode.
The functions selected for the system design are described in Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
Subsection 5.1.3 presents the system organization.
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5.1.1 STABILITY AUGMENTATION
Inclusion of augmented stability functions allows relaxation of the inherent airplane
stability, which results in reduced empennage surface areas with attendant benefits in
performance. The following such functions are incorporated:
• Pitch-Augmented Stability (PAS)—For the design study, it is assumed that the
horizontal stabilizer surface area is reduced substantially below Baseline size, and
center-of-gravity range is chosen such that the unaugmented airplane would exhibit
negative stability characteristics throughout the flight envelope. A PAS function is
therefore required to augment airplane longitudinal stability to provide the desired
safety and handling quality. PAS includes both short-period and speed stability
modes defined in Subsection 6.1.
• Lateral/Directional-Augmented Stability (LAS)—The Baseline Airplane lateral/direc-
tional characteristics are such that a yaw damper is required for good handling
quality. It is assumed that there will be little or no reduction in the ACT airplane
vertical fin size because the size is determined by the low-speed asymmetric power
control requirement. Consequently, the handling quality improvement required
above the unaugmented airplane characteristics will be similar to that required for
the Baseline Airplane. The LAS function required for the ACT airplane will include
the yaw damper and turn coordination functions.
• Angle-of-Attack Limiter—The ACT airplane is assumed to have "locked in" stall
characteristics at high post-stall angle of attack because of the reduced T-tail
horizontal control surface area, a factor not characteristic of the Baseline Airplane.
The AAL function consists of two subfunctions:
• Stick Shaker—The stick shaker warns the pilots by shaking the column and
providing audio warning when the airplane approaches a stall.
• Stick Pusher—The stick pusher prevents the ACT airplane from entering a deep
stall condition by sensing angle of attack and adding an airplane nose-down
force on the control column.
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5.1.2 STRUCTURAL LOAD CONTROL
Control of structural loads in the ACT airplane is limited to the wing loads. There is no
plan to incorporate systems to control fuselage or empennage structural loads.
• Wing-Load Alleviation (WLA)—The WLA functions have the objective of redistrib-
uting and/or reducing loads by suitable deflection of control surfaces. The resultant
benefit is wing weight reduction through reduced structural design loads. WLA
consists of two submodes:
• Maneuver-Load Control (MLC)—load redistribution in response to maneuvering
flight and flight through atmospheric turbulence, principally in the low-
frequency spectrum
• Gust-Load Alleviation (GLA)-alleviation of loads generated by flight through
atmospheric turbulence, principally in the high-frequency spectrum
• Flutter-Mode Control (FMC)—FMC suppresses wing flutter from dive speed Vn/M~
to 1.2Vn/Mn by commanding appropriate control surface motions. The ACT
airplane will be flutter free to Vp./M~ without FMC. The FMC system increases
modal damping at the flutter frequency and actively suppresses the flutter mode.
5.1.3 ACT SYSTEM ORGANIZATION
A block diagram of the system incorporating the preceding ACT functions is shown in
Figure 7. The control laws upon which it is based were developed as part of the airplane
design using traditional design technique.
5.2 GENERAL DESIGN GROUND RULES
5.2.1 DEFINITIONS
This subsection defines those terms concerned with criticality of function and system
failures.
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5.2.1.1 Flight Criticality
The following terms define flight criticality.
• Flight Crucial—that function whose complete loss inevitably results in loss of the
aircraft. The consequence of complete function loss cannot be averted by procedure
change or flight envelope restriction.
• Flight Critical—that function whose complete loss in a specific portion of flight
could result in loss of aircraft, but such loss could be averted by proper flight crew
action.
• Nonflight Critical—that function whose complete loss has no impact on flight safety,
but the function is considered necessary for some other requirement such as
passenger comfort in rough air.
• Dispatch Critical—that function without which an airplane cannot legally be
dispatched on a revenue flight.
• Workload Relief—that function that impacts neither flight dispatch status nor flight
plan but that has convenience value to flight crews. Loss of function may affect
precision or economy of flight but has no significant effect on safety.
5.2.1.2 Failure Survivability
This subsection defines the terms concerned with system failures.
• Fail-Operational/Fail-Operational—A fail-operational/fail-operational configuration
is designed to withstand at least two independent failures and continue to function
at the specified level of performance.
• Fail-Operational—A fail-operational configuration is designed to withstand any
single failure and continue to function at the specified level of performance.
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• Fail-Safe—A fail-safe configuration is designed such that any failure, or any
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, will not cause
transients that exceed airplane structural limits or conditions from which a pilot
with average skill cannot safely recover. Control surfaces will maintain a safe
position after failure. The affected function(s) may no longer be available.
5.2.1.3 Reliability Requirement
The criticality defined in Subsection 5.2.1.1 must be interpreted in terms of reliability
figures prior to the system design. The reliability requirement of a crucial function is
explained in Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25, paragraph 25, 1309(b), as follows:
The airplane system and associated components, considered separately and in
relation to other systems, must be designed so that the occurrence of any
failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of
the airplane is "extremely improbable."
Figure 8, from the FAA Advisory Circular (ref 5), indicates that "extremely improbable"
_Q
should be interpreted as less than 1 x 10 probability of failure per 1-hr flight.
Defining the reliability requirement of critical ACT functions is more difficult. A
detailed criticality analysis is needed for the complete flight envelope under various
conditions to determine that reliability requirement. For this study, the reliability
requirement of each ACT function was determined by engineering judgment considering
the functional criticality and the data in Figure 8. In general, the failure consequence of
a critical ACT function can be defined in the range between "concern" and "emergency
procedures" in Figure 8. In some specific portion of the flight envelope, the function may
be in the "catastrophic total loss" category (e.g., FMC for airspeed above Vn). For this
study, the reliability requirement of a critical function is defined as follows:
• General reliability requirement for critical ACT functions: failure probability
= 1 x 10~5 per 1-hr flight
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• Reliability requirement for critical ACT functions at specific crucial conditions:
(probability of function loss) x (probability of encountering specific condition)
= 1 x 10"9 per 1-hr flight
5.2.2 GROUND RULES FOR SYSTEM DESIGN
The follo.wing items are ground rules for system design.
• The system shall be designed to reconfigure automatically in case of component
failures to retain ACT functions as long as possible.
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• In general, a minimum of two channels is required for operation of the ACT
functions; i.e., the cross-channel comparison technique is used to detect failures.
Single-channel operation may be permitted only under the following conditions:
• Adequate self-monitor can be provided in the system.
• In case of self-monh^r failure, the pilot is able to detect system failure by
other cues such as airplane response time, damping, etc.
• Without degrading system performance, authority and rate limits can be
applied to the actuators to prevent airplane structural damage in case of
hardover or oscillatory failures.
C As an objective, the ACT functions shall be isolated in hardware and software in
accordance with their criticalities to prevent failure propagation and to avoid
extensive requalification test of functions other than those repaired.
• Redundant hardware and software elements in the system (serving the same ACT
functions) shall be interchangeable.
• As an objective, fly-by-wire techniques shall be used wherever benefits may be
realized by the integration of primary flight control and the ACT control system.
• It shall be an objective to integrate the ACT system with other dispatch-required
flight control systems wherever benefits may be realized in terms of weight,
reliability, and cost.
• The system shall be designed for the most demanding ACT airplane configuration
anticipated from the system design point of view. Data from appendix A of the
Initial ACT Configuration (ref 2) and Wing Planform Study (ref 4) shall be used for
the system design where appropriate.
• If all ac power is lost, sufficient storage battery capacity shall be provided for
30 min of crucial function operation, and the computers shall operate properly
without their cooling system for that time.
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5.2.3 GROUND RULES FOR OPERATION
This subsection lists ground rules for operation of the ACT airplane.
• In-flight operation of the ACT airplane shall be similar to that of a conventional jet
transport airplane; i.e., the ACT systems are transparent to flight crews except for
flight mode control following function loss.
• In case of system failures in flight, the failure status and operational status in
accordance with minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions shall be displayed to the
flight crew. To assist the pilot in making his decision in response to failure,
advisory information shall be displayed in an appropriate manner.
• Degradation of system functions that requires immediate crew response shall result
in a warning display and aural signal from the baseline aircraft warning system.
• All dispatch-critical ACT functions shall be tested prior to every dispatch. The
preflight test shall detect and identify failures to the line replaceable unit (LRU).
Time required to complete the preflight test shall be minimized. As an objective,
the time for preflight test shall be less than 2 min.
• All fault data detected during flight and preflight test shall be stored in nonvolatile
memory and be available to support maintenance.
• The results of the preflight test shall be displayed in a manner that shows the failure
and operational status of the ACT system in accordance with MEL restrictions to
assist the pilot in making his decision regarding dispatch.
• The ACT system shall be maintained in accordance with the "on condition" concept.
Maintenance shall be performed on only those failures identified by preflight test or
ft
flight squawk (log book).
• Through-flight maintenance shall be restricted to only those items reported failed
and required for dispatch. As an objective, through-flight maintenance shall be
completed within a 20-min period. Any other maintenance may be deferred to an
overnight stop.
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5.3 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A primary design goal of the ACT control system is to configure a system that can be
operated safely and economically in flight and on the ground in the commercial transport
environment. This subsection describes design considerations related to safety and
operability. Subsection 5.3.1 deals with safety, where system criticality and reliability
requirements become very important. Subsection 5.3.2 describes ACT airplane
operability, which includes dispatch and flight restrictions when ACT functions become
inoperative.
5.3.1 SAFETY AND ASSUMED FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
The safety of the ACT airplane is greatly influenced by the characteristics of the basic
airplane with the ACT functions inoperative. Knowledge of structural margins and
stability and control characteristics with the ACT functions inoperative is essential to the
ACT system design. Because the system design in the IAAC Project proceeded in parallel
with the basic airplane design, airplane characteristics were estimated as noted in
Section 5.0 using collective engineering judgment. Based on these estimated character-
istics, the functional criticality and reliability requirements were defined and are
described in the following subsections.
The ACT airplane is assumed to have an aft center of gravity (eg) and a small horizontal
tail to improve lift-to-drag ratio and to reduce weight. The static and dynamic
longitudinal instability attributed to the aft eg and the small tail necessitate a PAS
function to provide acceptable handling qualities. The criticality of PAS is dependent
upon how far the eg is moved aft and how much the tail size is reduced. For this study,
the airplane is assumed to be configured so that the short-period-mode PAS is crucial;
i.e., the airplane will be lost if the short-period PAS fails completely. Speed control PAS
is critical; i.e., loss of the speed PAS may result in some safety hazard, but it can be
averted by proper pilot action or flight envelope change.
In addition to the pitch axis instability, the ACT airplane is assumed to have "locked-in
deep stall" that is attributed to the reduced horizontal tail. The AAL function is provided
to prevent the airplane from getting into a locked-in stall condition. Once the airplane is
in a locked-in stall, the pilot would be unable to recover from that condition; i.e., the
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AAL becomes a crucial function in locked-in condition. However, because the
simultaneous occurrence of complete AAL loss and excessive angle of attack because of
either a pilot's inadvertent maneuver or atmospheric turbulence is extremely improbable,
the AAL function is designated as critical. Inadvertent activation of the AAL system
could result in a disastrous condition; therefore, AAL series devices (subsec 6.1) that
prevent uncalled-for operation are designated as crucial.
Lateral control of the ACT airplane is assumed to be similar to conventional airplanes.
Thus, the LAS function of the ACT airplane is similar to the conventional yaw damper in
criticality. Complete loss of the LAS in critical flight condition could result in loss of the
aircraft, but such loss can be averted by proper crew action to restrict the airplane flight
envelope. Therefore, LAS is designated as critical.
The WLA function will redistribute and/or reduce the wing loads caused by pilot maneuver
or atmospheric disturbance. Presence of the WLA function makes it possible to reduce
wing-box structural material. However, the primary structure of the ACT airplane is
designed to have sufficient ultimate strength to sustain the design limit load even when
the WLA function becomes inoperative. This will allow continuation of the normal flight
schedule after complete WLA loss in the air. The airplane, however, cannot be dispatched
if the WLA is inoperative. WLA is defined as a critical function.
The basic ACT airplane is designed with sufficient flutter margin for safe flight to
VD/MD without FMC. FMC will keep the airplane flutter free from VD/MD to 1.2VD/MD.
Thus, FMC is a crucial function for airspeed above V^/Mp.. However, simultaneous
occurrence of complete FMC loss and airspeed in excess of Vp./M~ is extremely
improbable. Therefore, FMC is defined as a critical function.
5.3.2 AIRPLANE OPERABILITY WITH ACT FUNCTION LOSS
Failures of the ACT system may delay or cancel airplane dispatch or restrict flight or
necessitate diversion to another airport depending upon the nature of the system failure.
The effect of ACT system failures on airplane operability is one of the important
economic factors to be considered in the system design. As part of the system design, the
effect of system failure on airplane operation was analyzed.
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The assumed airplane performance capability when a single ACT function is completely
inoperative is described as follows:
• Short-Period PAS Loss—The airplane will be lost if short-period PAS is lost in the
air. If the function is lost on the ground, the airplane cannot be dispatched until the
system is repaired.
• Speed PAS Loss—The airplane must be operated within a restricted flight envelope
when speed PAS is lost in the air. If the function is inoperative on the ground, the
airplane can be dispatched with flight restriction.
• LAS Loss—The airplane must be operated within a restricted flight envelope when
LAS is lost in the air. If the function is totally inoperative on'the ground, the
airplane cannot be dispatched because LAS is required for limiting structural loads.
• AAL Loss—The airplane can continue normal flight schedule after AAL is lost in the
air; such loss does not degrade airplane handling qualities. However, the pilot will
be informed of system status and will continue the flight with special caution. If
AAL is inoperative on the ground, the airplane cannot be dispatched because of loss
of safety margin.
• WLA Loss—The airplane can continue normal flight schedule after WLA is lost in the
air because the airplane structure ultimate strength exceeds the design limit load.
If WLA is inoperative on the ground, the airplane cannot be dispatched because the
airplane structural strength is less than the design ultimate load.
• FMC Loss—Airplane speed must be reduced upon loss of FMC to provide an adequate
speed margin for upset. If the function is inoperative on the ground, the airplane
can be dispatched with flight restriction.
The ACT airplane must meet dispatch requirements as follows:
• Airplane schedule reliability must be at least 98.7%. Not more than 5% of the
unreliability shall be attributable to ACT system failure.
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• The airplane shall be dispatchable with any one ACT system component failed.
Subsection 8.4.1 contains a detailed development of the airplane operability based upon
the preceding consequences of ACT function loss; it includes multiple-function loss
effects and effects of some partial-function losses that reduce operability.
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6.0 COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGN CONCEPTS
In preparation for selecting an Active Controls Technology (ACT) system design concept,
two system architectures were studied using the ground rules and assumptions described in
Section 5.0. The first step of the study was to design an Integrated System, where all
ACT functions are processed in the same computer set. This system was designed using
currently available flight control computer hardware with minimum modification of the
basic mechanical primary control system. The second step was to design a Segregated
System, where each ACT function is processed in a separate dedicated computer set. The
Segregated System computers were designed using currently available large-scale
integrated (LSI) circuit components. In addition to computer design, an effort was made
to improve the actuation system. The third step of the study was to define the Selected
System design concept by combining good features of the Integrated and Segregated
Systems and the results of the actuation system design work. Finally, a brief study was
conducted to investigate the benefit of pure fly-by-wire (FBW) pitch axis control, because
airplane safety had already been made dependent upon the short-period pitch
augmentation, an FBW control function.
All the systems studied sense airplane motion and deflect appropriate control surfaces to
perform the ACT functions. In airplane design, selection of sensor signals and control
surfaces is an important task, requiring many iterative cycles between the airplane design
and system design. In the IAAC Project, the sensor signals and the control surfaces
needed to perform each ACT function were defined in another task, Configuration/ACT
System Design and Evaluation. The sensor signals, control surfaces, and system
organization selected in that task are shown in Figure 7. Major tasks of the Current
Technology ACT System Definition include definition of system configuration, selection
of sensor hardware, definition of computers, and definition of actuation systems to
implement the ACT functions and meet the requirements of system safety and economical
operation.
Subsection 6.1 describes the Integrated System, and Subsection 6.2 describes the
Segregated System. Subsection 6.3 compares these two contrasting concepts and
describes the Selected System design concept. Subsection 6.4 briefly describes the
Selected System. Finally, Subsection 6.5 describes the pitch axis FBW system and
compares this system with a conventional cable system.
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6.1 INTEGRATED SYSTEM
The Integrated System employs a single computer set to process the five ACT functions:
pitch-augmented stability (PAS), angle-of-attack limiter (AAL), lateral/directional-
augmented stability (LAS), wing-load alleviation (WLA), and flutter-mode control (FMC).
PAS consists of short-period and speed (phugoid) mode control. It was assumed that the
short-period PAS is a crucial function (i.e., loss of the function results in loss of the
airplane) and that the speed PAS is critical (i.e., loss of the function may result in a flight
safety hazard, but it can be avoided by appropriate flight crew actions). The crucial
_g
function must meet the failure rate requirement of less than 1 x 10 per 1-hr flight. A
reliability analysis was conducted on the short-period PAS to select appropriate
redundancy for each element to meet the reliability requirement. The results indicated
that the short-period PAS requires four channels to meet the specific reliability
requirement; this established the requirement of four central computers.
Figure 9 is a block diagram of the Integrated System. Figure 10 shows the location of
system sensors.
The system shares the triple digital air data computer (DADC) and the triple mertial
reference system (IRS) with the autopilot and display functions. These two sensors
provide multiple signals for the ACT functions via Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
(ARINC) 429 digital communication links. A dedicated pitch-rate sensor, used in
conjunction with the triple IRS, serves to implement the quadruply redundant short-period
PAS function. The remaining dedicated sensors; i.e., accelerometers at several wing
locations, provide triply redundant analog signals for WLA and FMC functions. The
sensors are coupled to their assigned digital computers, where data are then transmitted
to other computers over cross-channel communication links to satisfy the redundancy
requirement. These links are dedicated one-way, high-speed data buses. It should be
noted that all four computers receive all sensor signals via the cross-channel
communication link even though one of the computers is not directly connected to a
sensor. Triply redundant critical sensors are connected to the four computers in a manner
that minimizes the probability of multiple-function loss with two computer failures.
Each computer consolidates all input signals (analog, digital, and discrete) in a signal
selection and failure detection (SSFD) process. The signal selection process uses midvalue
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selection for three sensor signals and average value selection for two sensor signals. A
four-sensor set is treated as three with one operating standby. The failure monitor is a
dynamic and static comparison of inputs and selected signal to single out any value that is
V
inordinately different from the selected value. Because the Integrated System computers
process many ACT functions that require different redundancy levels depending upon
function criticality and failure conditions, the SSFD process is varied as necessary to
handle the different types of sensor signals.
The Integrated System computers are frame synchronized such that each executes the
same function essentially at the same time. Using the SSFD process and frame
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synchronization, the quadruple computers transmit nearly identical command signals to
the ACT actuators, reducing force fighting in the actuation system and simplifying the
failure detection algorithm for passive failures.
The architecture of the Integrated System computer retains many of the Airborne
Advanced Reconfigurable Computer System (ARCS) (ref 6) features, such as the bus-
oriented structure, autonomous input/output operation, and microprogrammed control
processing. The basic change from the ARCS to the integrated computer is in partitioning
crucial and critical functions. This change is essential because of the extremely high
reliability required of the crucial function. Comprehensive self-testing capability is
provided to meet flight safety requirements and support maintenance. Self-test features
include monitoring of internal power supplies, machine timing, processor capability,
memory operation, and input/output operation. Specific tests include program memory
sum checks, parity checks, arithmetic overflow detection, and wraparound testing of
analog and discrete input/output.
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The redundant command signals generated in the quadruple computers are sent to the
various control surfaces through the ACT actuation systems. The signals are consolidated
at the actuators to perform mechanical voting. Three actuator configurations are used in
the Integrated System design: ACT secondary actuator configuration, ACT dedicated
force-displacement summed actuator configuration, and stick pusher actuator
configuration.
ACT Secondary Actuator Configuration-A side-by-side force-summed secondary actuator
concept (fig. 11) was chosen for the elevator, rudder, and outboard aileron (outer section)
actuation systems. The output of the secondary actuator is series summed with the pilot's
mechanical control signal to form a command input to the power control unit (PCU). The
PAS and maneuver-load control (MLC) functions use the ACT secondary elevator actuator
to control the elevator. The command signals of these two functions are summed in each
of the quadruple computers before sending the signal to the actuator. Three actuators
provide sufficient reliability to meet the requirements of crucial functions when
comparison of valve spool position to that predicted by a mathematical model in the
computer is used to augment cross-channel comparison for failure detection. Similarly,
two actuators are sufficient for critical functions. Each actuator has a conventional two-
stage, low-pressure-gain electrohydraulic servovalve operating a single ram. Valve spool
and ram position are fed back to each ACT computer for servo-loop control and failure
detection. The mathematical actuator model in each computer receives the summed ram
position feedback and combines this with the command signal to compute servovalve
position.
ACT Dedicated Force-Displacement Summed Actuator Configuration—The force-displace-
ment summed actuator configuration (fig. 12) was chosen as the PCU for the dedicated
ACT control surfaces, which include inboard and outboard flaperons and the inner section
of the outboard aileron. The force-displacement summed actuator was designed to remain
fully operational with decreased dynamic performance after one electric and one
hydraulic failure. The actuator configuration is an FBW implementation in that electric
signals from the computers directly command the control surface. The command signals
from the computers are magnetically flux summed in the four first-stage electrohydraulic
servovalves, two per hydraulic system. Each group of two first-stage valve outputs is
mechanically position summed by a linkage.
59
Pilot's input
nSecondary
actuator(s)
ACT electric i
signals '
See detail below
EjevatorjDower
control unit
Computer
channel
Command
Feedback
Command
Feedback
Command
Feedback
Position
feedback
Piston
Standard
servovalve
LVDT
(for
mathematical
model only)
(Shown for PAS only)
-Override spring (pogo)
• Summing bar
Power
control unit
command
Figure 11. ACT Secondary Actuation Configuration
60
ACT electric signals
Triple
electric
inputs
from ACT
Primary
Computers
Four magnetic-
flux-summing
servovalves
(two per side,
three coils each)
Dual spool
valve
(second stage)
. Tandem power cylinders
Figure 12. ACT Dedicated Force-Displacement Summed Actuator Configuration
The second-stage valve spool is controlled by force summing the resultant mechanical
output of each first-stage linkage. The second-stage valve-to-main-output ram power
application is the same as in conventional dual-tandem actuation.
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Stick Pusher Actuator Configuration—The stick pusher (fig. 13) uses three sensors, four
computers, a dual-tandem floating actuator, and two pneumatic power sources. The
actuator exerts the same force when pressurized by either one or both sides. The
installation linkage is such that the force exerted on the control column continuously
decreases as it travels forward; 356N (80 Ibf) exerted at the full aft position reduces to
178N (40 Ibf) at the full forward position. Each dual-pneumatic power source consists of a
o
nitrogen bottle at 13 788 kPa (2000 Ibf/in ) and a regulator that reduces the pressure to
2
3447 kPa (500 Ibf/in ) required for actuation. Two series solenoids, each signaled by an
ACT computer, must be opened before either actuator is operated.
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6.2 SEGREGATED SYSTEM
The Segregated System design concept employs a separate dedicated computer set to
implement each ACT function. For the Segregated System to be cost effective, a simple,
inexpensive, and reliable computer is needed. An attempt was made to use LSI technology
extensively to achieve this goal. The majority of the sensors and all the actuators defined
for the Integrated System will remain unchanged for the Segregated System. Figure 14 is
a block diagram of the Segregated System. Nineteen computers are used to compute
control laws, provide system testing, and monitor for failures of the ACT functions. Two
ACT Management Computers are added to process crew communication logic and to store
data on detected faults.
The crucial short-period PAS is mechanized in dedicated quadruple computers to meet the
fail-operational/fail-operational requirement. Four dedicated ACT pitch-rate sensors are
provided to serve the crucial short-period control law. The dedicated pitch-rate sensors
and-dedicated short-period PAS computer essentially separate the crucial function from
the remaining ACT functions. This separation is desirable considering maintenance,
testing of the crucial function, and protection from potential propagation of noncrucial
function failures to the crucial short-period functions.
The remaining sensors shown in Figure 14 are identical to those of the Integrated System.
The interface between these sensors and the Segregated System computers is different
from that of the Integrated System. The triple IRS and DADC sensors are shared by many
ACT functions, as in the case of the Integrated System. Their signals are sent to each
segregated computer set via ARINC 429 digital communication links. The triple digital
signals from the DADC and IRS are dedicated to their respective digital computers in
each set, where data are transmitted to other channels via cross-channel communication
links. Each analog sensor is cross strapped to computers; i.e., each analog sensor is
directly connected to all of the redundant computers. The input signals (digital, analog,
and discrete) are processed by the signal selection algorithm to create a signal for
computing control laws and processing other functions. The algorithms are similar to
those of the Integrated System. Primary failure detection in the Segregated System is
provided by cross-channel comparison. Cross-channel monitors are provided for sensor
input, digital computer output, and actuator position, as in the case of the Integrated
System.
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Figure 14. Segregated System Configuration
To keep the Segregated System computers as simple as possible, monitoring is largely
done in software and additional hardware for inline monitoring is kept to a minimum. The
computers of the crucial short-period PAS system run asynchronously. Because the
computers are not synchronized, each samples the input data and computes" the control
laws at its own time. Thus, outputs of the redundant computers may differ due to time
skew between them. Feasibility of this asynchronous ACT computer operation was
studied by simulating the Segregated System in the laboratory. Test results indicate no
appreciable difference between the-outputs of the synchronous and asynchronous systems.
It should be noted that the ACT functions described in Subsection 5.1 do not have any
integrating functions, a key factor in successful asynchronous operation.
The FMC computer requires the highest sampling rate to process the high-frequency
filters with acceptable tolerance in phase and gain margin. The WLA computer has the
most computation to perform because the function has the largest number of sensors and
66
control surfaces among the ACT functions. The short-period PAS is a crucial function and
requires the highest reliability among the ACT functions. A study was conducted to
define a microcomputer with speed, word size, and memory suitable for implementing the
ACT functions. Some of the functions could be mechanized using an 8-bit microprocessor.
However, to standardize the hardware and thus reduce the overall cost, a 16-bit single-
chip microprocessor was selected as the Segregated System computer. Table 2 shows the
requirements of each ACT function computer. The segregated computer has the following
self-tests:
Power monitor
Parity check
Sum check
Table 2. Segregated System Computer Requirements
Function
PASSHORT
PASSPEED
LAS
FMC
AAL
WLA
Memory requirements
Real time
3 100 words ROM
128 words RAM
2950 words ROM
128 words RAM
3750 words ROM
128 words RAM
3750 words ROM
128 words RAM
3 170 words ROM
64 words RAM
4750 words ROM
512 words RAM
Test and mainte-
nance, words ROM
5700
5350
5400
5350
5350
5500
Sampling
rate,
ms
10
10
10
5
10
10GLA
20MLC
Minimum
CPU
performance
required, K ops
75
60
75
125
55
120
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6.3 COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED AND SEGREGATED SYSTEMS
The Integrated and Segregated Systems described in the previous subsections are
compared to identify advantages and disadvantages of the two contrasting design
concepts. From the results of the comparison, the Selected System design concept was
defined.
The following subsections describe the comparison results.
6.3.1 PERFORMANCE
Laboratory tests were conducted to evaluate the performance of the Integrated and
Segregated Systems. These two schemes were simulated in the laboratory using quadruple
General Electric MCP-701A flight control computers. Airplane and actuation systems
were simulated using a Boeing-owned ECLIPSE digital computer and an analog computer.
The tests included cross-channel communication, synchronization, and SSFD of the
quadruple Integrated System. These functions were tested open loop and closed loop with
the airplane and actuator simulator and showed satisfactory results. A study was
conducted in the laboratory to verify that the integrated computer can process all ACT
functions without degrading the response. The integrated computers serve all ACT
functions at their specified sampling rates with margins.
Asynchronous operation of PAS and FMC was studied using the MCP-701A to simulate the
segregated computers. Special attention was paid to computer drift during 1-hr flights.
There was no appreciable difference between the synchronized and asynchronized
computer outputs after computing the PAS and FMC control laws for 1 hr. If the control
laws had an integration algorithm, the asynchronous system might dr i f t and need some
equalization between the channels. The survey of available microprocessors concluded
that current models are acceptable for segregated ACT application.
6.3.2 WEIGHT ANALYSIS
Because 19 computers are used to implement the segregated ACT functions, the weight of
the Segregated System increased considerably as shown in Table 3. Four dedicated pitch-
rate sensors were used in the Segregated System, but their weight is insignificant
compared with that of the computers.
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Table 3. Comparison of Integrated and Segregated Systems
^^\^ System
Item ^^^^
Computer weight
Memory requirement
Computer reliability
(assumed)
Probability of
restricted flight
Probability of
flight diversion
Probability of
dispatch delay
Incremental cost
per airplane
(to airline)
Expected return
on investment
Integrated
System
4 control computers
at 11. 3 kg ,(25 Ib)
each
Total: 45.4kg(10Q'lb)
32K ROM
2KRAM
(128-word 8-bit non-
volatile memory for
maintenance information)
6800-hr MTBF
2.5 x 10~3per
1-hr flight
7.1 x TO"4 per
1-hr flight
3.8 xlQ-4
per dispatch
$274 000
25.1%
Segregated
System
19 control computers at 6 kg
(13.25 I bleach
2 management computers at
2.7 kg (6.0 Ib) each
Total: 119.6 kg (263.8 Ib)
16K ROM and 64- to 512-word
RAM for control computers plus
32K ROM and 1K RAM and 128-
word 8-bit nonvolatile for
management computer
6800-hr MTBF
3.3 x 10~3per
1-hr flight
2.6x10~4per
1-hr flight
1.5 xlO"4
per dispatch
$390 000
22.8%
6.3.3 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
6.3.3.1 Flight Restriction and Diversion
Subsection 8.4.1 describes the functional failure conditions that lead to various flight
restrictions. Because there are so many elements in the Segregated System, it is
extremely difficult to assess the probability of occurrence of a flight restriction. The
computer-aided redundant system reliability analysis (CARSRA) program developed during
a previous NASA-Boeing program (vol. II, app B, subsec B.1.0, and ref 6) could not deal
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with the complex problems of predicting flight restriction of the ACT airplane. Instead, a
computer program for fault-tree analysis developed at Boeing was used for the reliability
analysis of the ACT system. Subsection 9.2 presents the results of the reliability analysis
in more detail.
Table 3 shows the results of predicting flight restrictions and diversions for the Integrated
and Segregated Systems, assuming the same computer reliability for both.
Flight restrictions are caused by loss or near loss of individual ACT functions (see
subsec 8.4.1). The Segregated System, having six sets of computers, has a higher
probability that a single set will become inoperable and hence a higher probability of
flight restriction.
Diversions are caused only by the Essential PAS being one component failure away from
function loss; or by speed PAS, LAS, and WLA functions all lost; or that same group being
one component failure away from all lost (see subsec 8.4.1). Because integrated ACT
functions share one set of computers, multiple computer failures must cause multiple
function loss. This explains the higher probability of diversion for the Integrated System.
6.3.3.2 Dispatch Delay and Cancellation
The method used to predict dispatch delay and cancellation probability is to examine
dispatch experience of airplanes with components similar to those of the ACT system. If
the ACT system uses off-the-shelf components, experience delay rates are used. Where
new hardware, such as the Segregated System microprocessor, is incorporated, experience
data are modified to account for expected reduction in failure rate.
Table 3 shows the prediction of dispatch delays and cancellations caused by component
failures in the Integrated and Segregated Systems. The Integrated System has higher
dispatch delay and cancellation rates than the Segregated System.
Another requirement is that the ACT airplane must be dispatchable with any one
component failed. This requirement is not presently met by either the Integrated or the
Segregated System. When the system has failures in the crucial function, the airplane
cannot be dispatched unless the remaining system meets the failure probability
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Q
requirement of less than 10" per 1-hr flight. When the Integrated System loses one of
the quadruple computers, or the Segregated System loses one of the quadruple short-
_Q
period PAS computers, the remaining system fails to meet the 10 probability of failure
per 1-hr flight requirement. The Integrated System requires quintuple redundancy to
meet the dispatch requirement with one system element failure. The quintuply redundant
ACT system was considered impractical because of its design complexity. For the
Segregated System, the problem can be solved if the short-period PAS function is
duplicated in the speed PAS computers. This approach mixes two different levels of
criticality in defining the dispatch requirement.
Another proposed solution is to allow single-channel operation of the crucial short-period
PAS function. To do this, the system must meet the requirements of Subsection 5.2.2.
Short-period PAS cannot meet those requirements.
6.3.3.3 Individual Functional Reliability
The ACT system must meet the individual functional reliability requirements defined in
Subsection 5.1. Subsection 9.2 contains the results of reliability analysis of individual
ACT functions. All functions meet the requirements except WLA, where the requirement
is 1 x 10" probability of failure per 1-hr flight and the prediction is 1.2 x 10" .
6.3.4 COST OF OWNERSHIP
The Boeing-developed airline cost-estimating system (ACES) computer program was used
to assess cost-of-ownership differences between the Integrated and Segregated Systems
when they are installed on the Initial ACT Airplane (ref 6). The program calculates the
return on investment to the airline considering the system purchase cost, maintenance
cost, spares inventory cost, fuel burn per hour, weight, drag, etc. Table 3 compares the
return on investment and incremental cost per aircraf-t as calculated using the ACES
program. The Integrated System shows lower ownership cost. Subsection 9.3 presents a
more detailed analysis of the cost of ownership.
6.3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The Segregated System employs separate microcomputers for processing each ACT
function in the belief that the separate computers would reduce the probability of
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simultaneous function loss caused by computer failure. The comparison study indicated
that the benefit in reduction of simultaneous function loss was small compared with the
increase of purchase cost and maintenance cost, resulting in a lower return on investment
for the Segregated System, as shown in Table 3.
It is concluded that the Integrated System concept is the better concept for the ACT
control system design. There are, however, reservations concerning the Integrated
System approach (some are common to both systems); these concerns are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Software Design—Computer channels that perform identical ACT functions employ
identical hardware and software to allow interchangeability. Thus, it is essential to have
error-free software especially in the crucial short-period PAS function. The approach
adopted in this task to develop error-free crucial software is to use conventional
techniques; i.e., simplify the function, adopt appropriate software design techniques such
as top-down structured programming, conduct rigorous testing including laboratory and
flight test, and conduct rigorous software error analysis. To conduct rigorous analysis and
thorough testing, it is very desirable to isolate the crucial hardware and software. This
approach is less appropriate for the Integrated System, in which both crucial and critical
software are executed in one set of computers.
Failure Propagation—Any system that includes flight-crucial functions should be designed
to prevent noncrucial function failure propagating to crucial functions. This criterion is
not met by the Integrated System, which mechanizes both critical and crucial functions in
one set of hardware with some common software. The probability of failure propagation
is reduced by the separation of crucial computing from critical computing in the
Segregated System.
Requalification Test—Extensive and rigorous testing is required after any repair or
modification whenever crucial functions may be affected. This means any repair or
modification of the Integrated System computer hardware or software would result in a
long test time because a crucial function may be affected. This supports using separate
hardware and software to implement crucial functions.
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6.* SELECTED SYSTEM
The Selected System configuration is shown schematically in Figure 15. It combines
features of the Integrated System with the advantages of separating the crucial function
from critical functions. The system uses a triple set of ACT Primary Computers, similar
to the Integrated System computers, to implement all ACT functions under normal
conditions. An additional quadruple set of Essential PAS Computers commands and
monitors the crucial elevator servos and provides backup calculation of the crucial short-
period PAS control law. These are microprocessor-based computers similar to those used
in the Segregated System. An additional computer, the ACT Maintenance and Display
Computer, provides management and communication functions.
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Outboard ailerons, inner segment
{ 'J Active control system equipment
Figure 15. Selected System Configuration
The sensor set for the Selected System is the same as that for the Integrated System, with
the addition of four dedicated pitch-rate sensors. The Selected System uses new
actuators for the flaperon and AAL. Actuators for other surfaces are the same as in
previous systems. A detailed description of the Selected System is contained in
Section 8.0.
The Selected System was analyzed and compared to the Integrated and Segregated
Systems. The results are shown in Table 4. The Selected System yields slightly lower
return on investment than the Integrated System due primarily to higher initial cost, but
the Selected System overcomes some of the objections to the Integrated System by
separating crucial hardware and software from critical.
The Selected System still does not meet the requirement of dispatchability with any one
ACT system component failed. After failure of either an Essential PAS Computer or an
elevator secondary actuator, the short-period PAS loss probability rises above 1 x 10~ per
1-hr flight.
6.5 PITCH AXIS FLY BY WIRE
A brief study was conducted to assess the benefit of replacing the pitch axis primary
cable control system with an FBW system. Because pitch axis stabilization by the short-
period PAS function is crucial, the airplane cannot be flown with the mechanical pitch
axis control system alone. This makes airplane safety dependent upon an electric control
system and suggests the change to a full FBW pitch axis to obtain the benefits of weight
and cost reduction due to eliminating the mechanical pitch system. Figure 16 shows a
block diagram of the FBW system defined in the study. Volume II, Appendix C, describes
a pitch FBW servoactuator and its redundancy concept.
The primary cable system is replaced by quadruple electric paths. Pilot inputs are
converted into quadruple electric signals and routed to the Essential PAS Computers.
These signals are processed to generate a pilot elevator command that is summed with the
ACT signals: Full PAS (normal condition) or Essential PAS (Full PAS failure), and MLC
elevator command. Quadruple redundancy provides sufficient reliability; no backup
system for the FBW by either direct electric link or mechanical link is included because
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Figure 16. Pitch Axis Fly-by-Wire System
loss of the FBW loses the crucial short-period function that by itself would result in loss
of the airplane. The FBW and the crucial short-period PAS share the computers and the
actuation system. The conventional artificial feel computer that provides a fixed-stick
force per g is replaced by a simple spring. By an appropriate gain schedule in the
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computers, the spring system provides a fixed displacement per g. The stick pusher of the
Selected System is replaced by a pitch system signal that commands nose-down elevator
directly without moving the control column. The autopilot will be a series system as
shown in Figure 16.
Table 5 shows the decidedly favorable changes in Selected System cost and weight
parameters resulting from substitution of pitch axis FBW for the conventional mechanical
system. The lateral and directional control systems also have very complex mechanical
assemblies and should be redesigned in FBW form to obtain maximum benefit from the
concept.
Table 5. Changes Due to Pitch Axis
Fly by Wire
Purchase cost
System weight
Fuel burn per flight hour
Incremental return on
investment
-$90 100
-157kg
(-345 Ib)
-12kg
(-27 Ib)
+3.0%
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7.0 SELECTED SYSTEM GENERAL DESCRIPTION
This section describes the Active Controls Technology (ACT) system concept resulting
from the Current Technology ACT System Design Task. The concept, introduced in
Subsection 6.4, was selected by conducting trade studies of system configurations,
computer architecture, and actuation systems.
Subsection 7.1 is a concise description of the overall ACT system. Subsection 7.2 is an
overview of the flight control system of the ACT airplane and includes general
descriptions of the primary flight control system, secondary flight control system, and
automatic flight control system. Subsection 7.3 describes the general configuration and
functional configuration of the Selected System. Finally, operation of the Selected
System is presented in Subsection 7.4.
7.1 SELECTED SYSTEM CONCEPT
The Selected System normally implements all ACT control laws in a single triplex set of
computers and provides a separate quadruplex set of computers for backup crucial
function implementation. The ACT Primary Computers compute all control laws and
drive all ACT servos except the elevator servos. The Essential Pitch-Augmented Stability
(PAS) Computers compute a simple fixed-gain short-period PAS control law and drive the
elevator servos. A single ACT Maintenance and Display Computer performs general
system management, communication, and data storage functions.
The sensor configuration is the same as in the Integrated System except for the addition
of four dedicated pitch-rate sensors as in the Segregated System. A new actuator concept
has been adopted for the flaperons, with electrically commanded power control units
(PCU) force summed by the flaperon torque box structure. The angle-of-attack limiter
(AAL) actuators have been modified to operate from low-pressure engine bleed air rather
than the high-pressure nitrogen system used in previous configurations. Figure 17
illustrates the Selected System configuration.
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7.1.1 SELECTED SYSTEM COMPUTERS
The ACT Primary Computers calculate control laws for Full PAS, AAL,
lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS), wing-load alleviation (WLA), and flutter-
mode control (FMC) functions. Full PAS includes short-period PAS and speed PAS to give
the airplane good longitudinal handling qualities. The ACT Primary Computers receive air
data and inertial reference signals from the airplane triplex digital air data computers
(DADC) and inertial reference systems (IRS) over Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
(ARINC) 429 digital buses. Dedicated ACT sensors provide wing accelerations for FMC
and gust-load alleviation (GLA) functions and column force for maneuver-load control
(MLC). Other sensors include flap and slat position and servo position feedback. Dynamic
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pressure and center-of-gravity acceleration are taken directly from sensors in the DADC
and IRS and transmitted over analog lines, bypassing the computing portions of those two
sensor systems.
Each ACT Primary Computer is directly connected to only one sensor in each triplex set.
Incoming sensor data are transmitted cross channel by an autonomous input/output (I/O)
controller so all these computers see data from all sensors. The central processing unit
(CPU) is not required in this cross-channel transmission; if a CPU fails, the other two
computers still receive full sets of sensor data.
Sensor signals are monitored for failures and processed to select a single value for each
signal that is used in control law calculations. Computer outputs are monitored and all
but elevator signals are sent to servoelectronics to drive ACT servos. The ACT Primary
Computers monitor servo operation (except elevators) and shut down a servo if the servo
or the computer driving it fails. Failure detection is primarily accomplished through
cross-channel comparison augmented by inline monitoring. Because inline monitoring is
not considered 100% accurate, single-channel operation is permitted only for the LAS
function, which meets special safety requirements stated in Subsection 5.2.2.
The Essential PAS Computers drive the elevator servos and calculate a simple fixed-gain
short-period PAS control law capable of providing minimum acceptable longitudinal
handling qualities. The Essential PAS Computers receive elevator commands from the
ACT Primary Computers over ARINC 429 buses. Each of the three Essential PAS
Computers receives data directly from an ACT Primary Computer, but after cross-
channel communication all four Essential PAS Computers have data from all three ACT
Primary Computers. CPU action is required for this transfer. In addition, each Essential
PAS Computer receives signals from the four dedicated pitch-rate sensors. Each sensor is
directly connected to all four computers. In normal operation, an Essential PAS
Computer selects the midvalue of the ACT Primary Computer elevator commands (or
average value after one failure) and uses that to drive an elevator servo. If the PAS
signal from the ACT Primary Computers fails, the Essential PAS Computers substitute
their own short-period PAS command, calculated using the signals from the dedicated
pitch-rate sensors.
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The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer coordinates testing of the system and
collects fault data from the ACT Primary and Essential PAS Computers. These data are
stored to be used later by maintenance personnel; advisories and warnings are displayed to
the flight crew as required.
7.1.2 SELECTED SYSTEM ACTUATORS
The Selected System uses four different types of actuators; these actuators are described
in the following paragraphs.
*
Secondary Force-Summed Actuator (With Mechanical Primary Control System)—The sec-
ondary force-summed actuator scheme is used for elevators, rudders, and the outer
segment of the outboard ailerons where the ACT functions share the control surfaces with
pilot and autopilot inputs. The output of the ACT secondary actuator is series summed
with the pilot or autopilot mechanical input to form the total surface command. Detailed
description of the secondary actuator is contained in Subsection 8.1.3. Figure 11 is a
simplified diagram illustrating the concept. The secondary actuation concept is used for
control of the rudder (LAS), outer section of outboard aileron (WLA), and elevator (PAS
and MLC). Outputs from the ACT Primary Computers control the secondary actuator of
the rudder and the outboard aileron outer section directly.
ACT Dedicated Force-Summed Actuator—This fly-by-wire force-summed actuation
scheme was developed to meet the requirements of the flaperons, which are commanded
by WLA signals from the ACT Primary Computers. The WLA function requires two
actuators plus a mathematical model to meet the fail-operational requirement. Normally
two hydraulic systems are required to implement dual actuation systems. A major
concern of this approach is that a separated flap would cause the simultaneous loss of
both hydraulic systems. Because of this, only one hydraulic power system is directly
connected to the flaperon actuator. A hydraulic motor-pump unit is used to connect the
second hydraulic power system as backup to the normal power supply system for power
redundancy. Figure 18 illustrates this scheme. Subsection 8.1.3 describes this actuation
system in more detail.
ACT Dedicated Force-Displacement Summed Actuator-The third actuation scheme, the
dedicated force-displacement summed actuator, is shown in Figure 12. It is used to
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control the inner section of the outboard aileron, which is shared by the pilot, autopilot,
and ACT functions (FMC and WLA). It was designed to remain fully operational after one
electric failure and one hydraulic failure. The pilot input is converted into electric
signals by position transducers and summed with the FMC and WLA commands in the ACT
Primary Computers. The autopilot controls the inner section of the outboard aileron by
parallel actuators that move the cables and back drive the control wheels.
Subsection 8.1.3 describes this in more detail.
83
Dual Pneumatic Actuator-The fourth actuator scheme, the dual pneumatic actuator, is
used as the stick pusher, which provides positive stall prevention by strong, rapid forward
motion of the control column at the incipient stall point. Figure 13 is a simplified
diagram of the concept. This concept was developed to replace the high-pressure
pneumatic stick pusher actuator defined for the Integrated System, which used high-
pressure bottled gas, causing special problems in system test, maintenance, and servicing.
The new scheme uses low-pressure air from the engine bleed system instead of nitrogen
from a high-pressure bottle that must be frequently checked and refilled.
Subsection 8.1.3 describes the dual pneumatic actuator in detail.
7.1.3 ESSENTIAL PAS SYSTEM
The Essential PAS System is a highly reliable system that provides minimum acceptable
handling quality in pitch axis control. A simple fixed-gain pitch-rate feedback is
implemented in quadruple redundancy to meet the fail-operational/fail-operational
requirement. Figure 17 illustrates this system. Each of the dedicated analog pitch-rate
sensors is connected to each of the quadruple computers; i.e., cross-strapped channel
communication is used. The analog pitch-rate signals are processed in each computer by
the signal selection and failure detection (SSFD) algorithm to produce a single value for
computation of the fixed-gain short-period PAS control law. Normally, the output of the
Essential PAS Computers is not coupled to the elevator actuators. The elevator
commands from the ACT Primary Computers normally control the pitch axis. These
elevator signals are sent to the Essential PAS Computers, which continuously monitor
their uniformity. When the primary short-period PAS has failed, the fixed-gain pitch-rate
feedback takes over the pitch axis control.
The computers of the Essential PAS System are operated asynchronously as in the case of
the Segregated System. Feasibility of fixed-gain PAS has been verified in the laboratory.
Outputs of the Essential PAS Computers command the elevator through the secondary
force-summed actuators. The triple force-summed actuators plus mathematical models
implemented in the computers meet ihe fail-operational/fail-operational requirement.
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7.2 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The flight control system is divided into primary, secondary, and automatic flight control
systems based upon function. The primary control system provides the basic capability of
maneuvering, stabilizing, and trimming the airplane. The secondary control system
manipulates wing trailing-edge flaps, leading-edge slats, and spoilers to control airplane
lift and drag. The automatic flight control system provides the autopilot, flight director,
and thrust management to reduce pilot's workload.
The general arrangement of the flight control surfaces of the current technology ACT
airplane is shown in Figure 19.
7.2.1 PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS
The primary flight controls control the airplane in the longitudinal (pitch) axis, lateral
(roll) axis, and directional (yaw) axis. The following subsections describe controls for
these three axes and the primary flight control electronics.
7.2.1.1 Longitudinal Controls
Longitudinal controls consist of elevator control and horizontal stabilizer trim. The
elevator controls illustrated in Figures 20 and 21 position two single-segment dual-hinge
elevators in accordance with pilot, ACT, and AFCS inputs. Each elevator is powered by
three side-by-side PCUs. The pilots position the elevator (via PCU) by control columns
and cables. The pilots' control columns are interconnected by a torque shaft incorporating
a jam override spring and a manual disconnect mechanism. The control column is also
controlled by an AAL to prevent the airplane from exceeding a limiting angle of attack.
The electric elevator commands from the Essential PAS Computers are converted into
mechanical signals through the ACT secondary elevator actuators and then summed in
series with the pilots' mechanical input. To meet the redundancy requirement of crucial
short-period PAS, quadruple sensors and computers are provided in the Essential PAS
System. Three side-by-side force-summed secondary actuators are used for ACT elevator
control. In addition to the triple ACT elevator actuators, mathematical actuator models
are programmed in the backup computers to meet the fail-operational/fail-operational
requirement of short-period PAS. The ACT Primary Computers process the control laws,
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redundancy management, and testing function of PAS and MLC and send the
elevator command to the Essential PAS Computers. Triple sensors and computers are
provided in the ACT Primary System to meet the fail-operational requirement.
The autopilot elevator signals are converted into mechanical signals by the parallel
autopilot secondary actuators to control the elevators. To meet the category III-B
automatic landing requirement, triple electronics and force-summed secondary actuators
are provided.
The elevator control cable systems are connected to a common artificial feel mechanism
that is modulated by variable hydraulic pressure controlled by dual pressure modules.
The horizontal stabilizer trim control is illustrated in Figure 22. The stabilizer trim
actuator consists of a ballscrew and nut, upper and lower gimbals, primary no-back brake,
reduction gearing, and two hydraulic motors that drive the reduction gearing via a
differential gear assembly. Each motor is also connected to a hydraulic pressure-released
brake, controlled by a separate control module, and powered by a separate hydraulic
system. Each control module contains two valves: one to arm the module by turning on
hydraulic power, and one to control flow to one motor. The arm and control valves are
commanded either electrically or mechanically. The electric commands are controlled by
dual trim interface units. Manual electric trim commands originate at two dual switches,
one on each pilot's control wheel. The trim interface units prohibit electric trim
commands in opposition to elevator control inputs. Manual mechanical trim commands
are transmitted to the control modules by dual control cables connected to dual levers on
the pilots' aisle stand. All electric commands may be overridden by mechanical
commands. Each control module contains a stabilizer rate-limiting valve that reduces
hydraulic fluid flow as a function of airspeed. Dual electric stabilizer position indicators
are mounted on the aisle stand and connected to dual stabilizer position sensors.
7.2.1.2 Lateral Controls
Lateral controls position the inboard aileron, outboard aileron, inboard flaperon, outboard
flaperon, and five spoiler panels on each wing as shown in Figures 23 and 2k. The
outboard aileron is split into two sections. The pilot and autopilot use the ailerons and
spoilers to maneuver the airplane in the lateral axis. The FMC of the ACT uses only the
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small inner section of the outboard aileron to enable high-frequency response. The WLA
of the ACT uses the outboard aileron (including both inner and outer sections), inboard
flaperon, and outboard flaperon to control the wing loads induced by pilot maneuver and
atmospheric turbulence.
The pilots' input for lateral control is provided by two control wheels. The output of the
control wheels, through a dual cable system, positions the ailerons except for the inner
section of the outboard aileron. The pilots control the inner section of the outboard
aileron electrically through the triple ACT Primary Computers. The actuators of the
outboard aileron outer section receive their input command via cables from the inboard
aileron motion. The control inputs of the outboard aileron (including both sections) from
both pilot and autopilot are locked at neutral at high airspeed and unlocked at low speed.
However, the inner sections of the outboard aileron are controllable by the ACT Primary
Computers at cruise speed for FMC and WLA control. The control cables are connected
to a dual feel and centering mechanism at each forward quadrant.
The electric command for the outer section of the outboard aileron is computed in the
triple ACT Primary Computers and converted into a mechanical signal through the ACT
secondary actuators and then summed with the pilot and autopilot in series. Dual side-by-
side force-summed secondary actuators and the mathematical models implemented in the
triple ACT Primary Computers provide a fail-operational capability for WLA. The
electric command signal for the inner section of the outboard aileron is generated in the
triple ACT Primary Computers by summing the FMC, WLA, and pilot inputs. To meet the
fail-operational requirement of FMC and WLA, dual side-by-side force-summed dedicated
PCUs plus mathematical models are provided for control of the inner section of the
outboard aileron.
In the system selected in the Current Technology ACT System Definition Task, GLA is
assumed to use the outboard flaperon and MLC is assumed to use the inboard flaperon.
Dual force-summed actuators plus mathematical models are used to. meet the fail-
operational requirement. The flaperon actuator receives hydraulic power through swivel
joints. To avoid the simultaneous loss of two hydraulic systems in the flaperon actuation
system, only one hydraulic system is directly connected to the dual actuators.
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The spoilers are controlled electrically through the control system electronic unit (CSEU).
Flight spoilers may be used as speed brakes while continuing to provide lateral control.
The lateral autopilot manipulates the outboard and inboard ailerons and spoilers to control
the airplane during roll. To meet the category III-B automatic landing requirement, triple
redundancy is provided in sensors, computers, and actuators. Parallel force-summed
actuators are used to drive the ailerons and to back drive the control wheels.
Lateral trim is accomplished using electric switches located on the aisle stand to control
an electronically operated actuator that connects to the trim feel and centering
mechanism at the forward quadrant bus and changes the neutral position of the lateral
control system.
7.2.1.3 Directional Controls
Directional controls position the two double-hinged rudder surfaces as shown in Figures 25
and 26. Each rudder is controlled by dual PCUs. The actuators are signaled by the pilots'
rudder pedals through a common cable system coupled by separate pushrods and linkages
to PCUs in the vertical tail. The LAS of the ACT system performs yaw damper and turn
coordination originally computed in the CSEU of the Baseline system. The electric LAS
commands generated in the triple ACT Primary Computers are converted into mechanical
signals through the secondary actuators and then summed in series with the pilots'
mechanical input. Dual side-by-side force-summed actuators plus mathematical actuator
models implemented in the ACT Primary Computers provide fail-operational capability in
the LAS function. Lateral control includes rollout guidance, which is a part of category
III-B automatic landing. Triple rollout guidance actuators are provided to meet the fail-
operational requirement.
Separate rudder ratio changers are installed in the upper and lower rudder control
linkages. A fixed-gradient, artificial feel mechanism is connected in parallel to the
control cable system common to the upper and lower rudders. The neutral position of the
feel mechanism is varied by an electric trim actuator.
94
26.5 deg
Power control unit (four)
Side view of rudder
I
Up
- Forward
Centering spring
From ratio changers
rudder
fl Summation i /
±25-deg input
±4-deg input
26.5 deg
\
26.5 deg
5 deg
View A-A
(typical four places)
Secondary actuator
Figure 25. Rudder Actuator Installation
95
96
7'3.AA Primary Flight Control Electronics
The primary flight control electronics include ACT electronics and the CSEU. The ACT
electronic system is described in Subsections 7.3 and 8.0. Only the CSEU function is
described in this subsection. The CSEU function is shown in Figure 27 and includes rudder
ratio changer, spoiler control, stabilizer trim interface, and outboard aileron lockout.
These functions are described in the following paragraphs.
Rudder Ratio Changer—The rudder ratio changer provides a variable schedule of rudder
deflection versus rudder pedal input as a function of dynamic pressure. The ratio changer
electronics are online replaceable cards in the CSEU.
Input Servos
Input set No. 1
FCC, pitot-static, stabilizer position,
lateral control sensor, speed brake
sensor, yaw rate
Engage and
warning
panels
CSEU No. 1
CSEU No. 2
Input set No. 2
(same as No. 1)
Control
system
electronic
unit No. 1
Control system
electronic unit
No. 2
Upper yaw damper, elevator
feel system No. 1, stabilizer
trim arm No. 1, spoiler panels
1,4,11
Upper rudder ratio changer,
stabilizer trim command
No. 1, spoiler panels 3, 7,
8, 12
Aileron lockout control
Lower yaw damper, elevator
feel system No. 2, stabilizer
trim arm No. 2, spoiler panels
2,6,9
Lower rudder ratio changer,
stabilizer trim command
No. 2, spoiler panels 5, 10
Aileron lockout contiol
Figure 27. Control System Electronic Unit
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Spoiler Control-Spoiler control causes the spoiler panels to deploy as a function of control
wheel deflection, speed lever position, and air-to-ground logic. The 10 spoiler panels are
programmed in symmetric pairs to provide speed brakes, ground spoilers, and, in
conjunction with ailerons, linearization of rolling moment to wheel deflection. Spoiler
control includes control modules installed in the CSEU. Each control module commands a
symmetrical pair of spoiler panels. One electrohydraulic power control actuator drives
each spoiler panel.
Stabilizer Trim-The stabilizer trim function will maintain the airplane in a trimmed
condition per various alternative sources of trim command signals. Two independent
actuation systems position the stabilizer in response to the source commands. An electric
module in the CSEU selects a particular trim signal source and also energizes one or the
other actuation system. The three sources of electric trim command are the flight
control computers (FCC), the pilot electric trim switches, and the ACT Primary
Computers. Selection of the active trim source is accomplished by logic circuits in the
CSEU.
Outboard Aileron Lockout—Outboard aileron lockout logic provides discrete signals to the
left and right outboard aileron lockout actuators and to lockout logic in the ACT Primary
Computers. The lockout actuators disable the pilot inputs to the outer section of the
outboard aileron. The lockout logic in the ACT Primary Computers will disconnect the
pilot input to the inner section of the outboard aileron by software.
7.2.2 SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS
Secondary flight (high lift) controls position the wing trailing-edge flaps and the wing
leading-edge slats in a coordinated manner. The trailing-edge flaps and the leading-edge
slats are controlled to three positions (cruise, takeoff, and landing). The wing spoiler
panels are controlled symmetrically as a secondary flight control function for in-flight
drag modulation and landing deceleration.
Wing Trailing-Edge Flap Controls-The wing trailing-edge flap surfaces (see fig. 28) are
driven by two centrally located power drive units, one driving the inboard trailing-edge
flaps and the other driving the outboard trailing-edge flaps. Each power drive unit is
powered by a hydraulic motor with alternate electric motor operation. The drive units
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are connected to torque-tube systems in each wing to drive mechanical rotary actuators
on each inboard and outboard flap segment. A torque-limiting brake is provided in each
rotary actuator, which also incorporates a no-back brake. Asymmetry detection systems
shut off the respective power drive units if the inboard or outboard flaps become
asymmetric between left and right wings or between actuators on a flap segment. Flap
position indication is provided to the flight deck indicator from each flap panel.
Wing Leading-Edge Slat Controls—The wing leading-edge slat controls shown in Figure 28
use two power drive units located in the inboard wing leading edges, one to drive the
inboard leading-edge slats and the other to drive the outboard leading-edge slats.
The controls are programmed to extend partially the leading-edge slats before trailing-
edge flap extension and to retract the slats after trailing-edge flap retraction. Each
power drive unit is powered by a hydraulic motor with an electric motor alternate. The
drive units are normally controlled by a dual cable system from the flight deck control
lever. If hydraulic power is lost, the electric alternate system can be controlled by flight
deck switches. The drive units are connected to torque-tube systems that run along the
front spar of each wing and drive the screw jacks mounted on each slat segment. Each
screw jack on each slat segment incorporates a no-back brake and a torque-limiting brake.
Indication is provided to the flight deck when the leading-edge slats are in transit or ful ly
extended. Failure of any slat surface to fully extend or fully retract is indicated by the
intransit lights.
7.2.3 AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROLS
The automatic flight control system (AFCS) provides the following functions: autopilot,
automatic stabilizer trim, flight director, and thrust management. These functions will
reduce the pilots' workload in flight by automatically controlling the flight path and
engine thrust or by providing flight guidance signals to pilots.
Figure 29 and Table 6 show subsystem partitioning and summary definition of the major
components of the AFCS.
Automatic flight controls are shown in Figures 30 and 31 and provide the following major
functions: autopilot, flight director, and thrust management. These functions are
described in the following subsections.
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Figure 29. Automatic Flight Control (Functional Partitioning)
7.2.3.1 Autopilot
The autopilot function is computed in the FCC. Three FCCs are provided for those
autopilot modes that require redundancy. The following autopilot modes are provided.
Control Wheel Steering Mode—Control wheel steering (CWS) is a selectable mode of
operation for the autopilot. It provides (1) pitch and roll maneuver control for pilot inputs
and (2) pitch attitude hold and roll or heading hold when there are no pilot inputs.
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Table 6. Major Components of Automatic Flight Controls
Description
Autopilot controls
Flight control computer
Integrated autopilot/flight director
autothrottle/mode control panel
Maintenance control and display panel
Remote-mounted maintenance panel
Thrust management
Thrust management computer
Rating limit select panel
Limit display and mode annunciation
panel
Miscellaneous flight control electronics
Autopilot interface unit
Flight mode annunciator
Barometric altitude rate unit
Sensor flag warning annunciator
Quantity
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
Altitude Select Mode—Altitude select is the basic pitch mode and is armed when the
autopilot is placed in the command mode and a glide slope has not been captured.
Vertical Speed Select and Hold Mode—Vertical speed select and hold is the basic pitch
transition mode between selected altitudes. It is engaged synchronously when the
autopilot is initially engaged into the command mode of operation or when the vertical
speed mode is selected.
Vertical Profile Mode—Vertical profile mode is a selectable altitude transition mode that
uses combined autothrottle and elevator control. This mode provides airspeed and Mach
control through the elevators during altitude transitions coupled with either selected
rated (or derated) N. (low-pressure compressor speed) control during climb or idle thrust
during descent. When maintaining altitude, airspeed and Mach control is automatically
transferred to the autothrottle control section. Two selectable submodes of the vertical
profile mode are available. One submode is the automatic mode in which target altitudes
and speeds are automatically commanded by the flight management computer. The other
submode is manual in which the target altitudes and speeds are manually entered through
the mode control panel.
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Figure 30. Automatic Flight Controls (Autopilot/Flight Director)
Heading Select Mode-Heading select is the basic lateral mode and is engaged
synchronously when the autopilot is initially engaged into the command mode of
operation. Heading preselect capability is available whenever the mode is selected from
any other engaged lateral command mode.
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Navigation Mode— Navigation is a selectable lateral mode that uses the flight management
computer to provide lateral steering commands to the autopilot function in the FCC. The
flight management computer commands can be based on very-high-frequency omni-
directional radio range (VOR) information or waypoint guidance.
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Localizer Mode-This selectable lateral mode allows the lateral autopilot function to be
coupled to a localizer independent of the glide slope.
Approach Mode—The approach mode is a selectable mode that provides automatic glide
slope and localizer control and manually initiated automatic go-around control. This
mode can be operated multichannel through touchdown and automatic rollout. The mode
meets the fail-operational requirement with triple redundancy and meets fail-safe with
dual redundancy.
VOR Mode—The VOR mode is optional if the flight management computer is deleted. In
this configuration, the navigation (NAV) mode of autopilot operation couples the VOR
receiver outputs into the FCC to provide VOR control. This mode is not part of the basic
certification of the airplane.
7.2.3.2 Flight Director
The flight director function is also computed in the FCC and has the same modes as the
autopilot functions plus one additional mode, localizer back beam. The flight director
command displays can be turned on and off , independent of whether or not an autopilot
function is selected. Provisions are included to allow the flight director command bars to
be automatically biased out of view whenever the autopilot function is engaged in modes
other than CWS.
The control mode select functions for autopilot, flight director, and autothrottle are
integrated into a single panel. Select knobs are provided for indicated airspeed and Mach,
altitude, vertical speed, heading, and course.
7.2.3.3 Thrust'Management
The thrust management system includes the thrust rating limit and autothrottle functions.
These computations are performed in the thrust management computers located in the
electronic equipment bay. Space provisions are made for a second thrust management
computer. The thrust rating limit and autothrottle functions are described in the
following paragraphs.
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Thrust Rating Limit—The thrust management computer selects, computes, and displays
engine-rated thrust limits. Figure 31 is a simplified diagram illustrating the thrust
rating limit. Controls for selecting thrust rating limits and commanding derated limits
are provided on the thrust limit selection panel located near the engine instruments; the
limits are displayed on the limit display and mode annunciation panel shown in Figure 31.
Selection limits include takeoff and go-around, climb, maximum continuous, and cruise.
Actuation of automatic go-around switches at the thrust levers automatically causes go-
around thrust limit to be selected and displayed. Unlocking the thrust reverse
automatically causes reverse limit to be selected and displayed. The thrust management
computer interfaces with the engine N, instruments to position an indicator to show the
value of the selected thrust limits or derated limit.
Autothrottle—The thrust management computer controls the thrust levers, via the
autothrottle servomotor, to provide full-range thrust control (within the thrust rating
limits) during climb, cruise, approach, and landing.
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7.3 SELECTED SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Subsections 6.4 and 7.1 introduced the general configuration of the Selected System. This
subsection presents the same configuration in more detail. Subsystem functions and
components of the Selected System are described in Section 8.0.
The system consists of the ACT Primary System, Essential PAS System, and ACT
Maintenance and Display Computer as shown in Figure 17. The ACT Primary System
implements five ACT functions-Full PAS, AAL, LAS, WLA, and FMC-and provides all
active controls in the normal system condition. Essential PAS implements a simple short-
period PAS control law and is engaged when the short-period PAS of the Full PAS has
failed. These functions are described in the following subsections.
7.3.1 ESSENTIAL PAS SYSTEM
The Essential PAS System implements a highly reliable, fixed-gain short-period PAS that
provides minimum acceptable handling quality in the pitch axis. Figure 32 shows a
simplified block diagram of the Essential PAS System. To meet the reliability require-
ment, the system provides quadruple pitch-rate sensors, quadruple computers, and triple
actuators, plus actuator mathematical models. The pitch-rate sensors are simple analog
devices dedicated to the Essential PAS System. Each of the quadruple analog pitch-rate
sensors is directly connected to all of the computers. The consolidated pitch-rate signals
are processed by the SSFD algorithm to create a signal for control law computation and to
monitor system failure status. The output of the Essential PAS control law is normally
disconnected from the servocommand summing circuits. Full PAS failure status is
monitored as shown in Figure 32. When the short-period PAS of the ACT Primary System
fails, the fixed-gain short-period PAS is introduced into the loop using easy-on logic. The
PAS and MLC elevator commands of the ACT Primary System are processed by the SSFD
algorithm to form a summed elevator command and to monitor their failure status. To
provide functional independence, elevator commands of short-period PAS, speed PAS, and
MLC are processed separately by the SSFD algorithm. Outputs of the triple ACT Primary
Computers are connected to Essential PAS Computers A, B, and C, where the signals are
routed to other channels via digital cross-channel communication links. The computers
are operated asynchronously; this feature of Essential PAS has been verified in laboratory
testing. Three of the quadruple computers command the triple forced-summed elevator
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actuators. Figure 11 shows the side-by-side force-summed secondary actuation concept
used for the elevator control. Output of the secondary ACT actuator is series summed
with the autopilot's or the pilot's mechanical control signal to form a command input to
the elevator PCU. Each channel contains a conventional two-stage electrohydraulic
servovalve that converts the input electric signal into hydraulic flow. The hydraulic flow
displaces the actuator piston against the center spring. Valve spool and ram positions are
fed back to each computer for servo-loop control and failure detection. A force detent is
provided to serve as an antijam device.
7.3.2 ACT PRIMARY SYSTEM
The ACT Primary System implements five ACT functions in triple redundancy. The
following paragraphs describe each function.
Full PAS—Full PAS includes both short-period and speed PAS to provide good handling
quality in the pitch axis equivalent to or better than in a conventional airplane. Figure 33
shows a block diagram of Full PAS. Short-period PAS uses pitch-rate signals from the
triple IRS sensors and control column signals to generate an elevator command. The
pitch-rate and column signals are sent to the dedicated primary computers where the
signals are routed to other primary computers via cross-channel communication. The
feedforward and feedback gains of the short-period PAS are scheduled as a function of
airspeed. In case of airspeed sensor (DADC) failures, the gain schedule becomes
dependent upon flap position signals. If the IRS signals are lost, pitch axis control
deteriorates to a minimum acceptable level. However, the pilot will be able to control
the airplane with the combination of the remaining speed PAS and the Essential PAS
System. The primary computer must forward status information on its short-period PAS
to the essential computer to enable timely engagement of the Essential PAS control law.
The output of the elevator actuators is used to relieve a steady-state elevator trim
deflection. When the elevator deflection exceeds a certain threshold value for more than
a predetermined time, the elevator offload logic acts to adjust pitch trim by moving the
horizontal stabilizer through the stabilizer trim interface in the CSEU. The CSEU trim
function receives the autopilot, pilot, and ACT trim inputs and selects an appropriate
signal to command the stabilizer position. Figure 34 shows a simplified block diagram of
the elevator offload function.
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Figure 34. ACT Elevator Actuator Offload Function
Angle-of-Attack Limiter (AAL)-The AAL function includes the stick shaker and the stick
pusher. Figure 35 is a block diagram of the AAL subsystem. Maximum allowable angle of
attack, the AAL reference point, is defined as a function of leading-edge slat and trailing-
edge flap position and airspeed. When the difference between the actual angle of attack
and the reference angle declines below a certain threshold, the stick shaker is activated
to provide stall warning. Pitch-rate signals shown in Figure 35 provide anticipation; i.e.,
if the airplane rapidly approaches the stall condition, the stick shaker will be activated
sooner by the pitch-rate signal. If no pilot action results from the stick shaker warning,
the stick pusher operates to apply an airplane nose-down force on the control column.
Figure 36 shows the AAL actuation system of the Selected System. The actuator uses
low-pressure air from the basic airplane engine bleed system and pressure from an
accumulator as dual power supplies to meet the fail-operational requirement. Actuation
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Figure 35. .Angle-of-Attack Limiter Block Diagram
time of the stick pusher actuator is approximately 0.2 sec. The pilot may override the
pusher at any time by exerting sufficient force on the column or by operating a manual
dump that directly vents the actuator to ambient.
Lateral/Directional-Augmented Stability (LAS)-The LAS function, which includes the
conventional yaw damper and turn coordination originally implemented in the Baseline
CSEU and automatic flight control computer, is implemented here in the triple ACT
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Primary System. Figure 37 is a block diagram of the LAS function. The yaw rate and
bank angle from the triple IRSs and control wheel signals are used to improve dutch roll
damping and reduce side-slip angle. Air data signals from the triple DADCs are used as
gain schedule inputs to provide good handling quality equivalent to or better than that of a
conventional airplane. In case of DADC loss, LAS will use flap position as a backup gain
schedule input. The ground rule of Subsection 5.1 states that single-thread operation is
permitted if the function meets the following three conditions:
Channel A signals:
Yaw rate i .
Cross-channel
communication
Roll angle
Wheel position-
Air data •
Flap position-
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To rudder
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Legend:
FD failure detection
SS signal selection
Figure 37. Lateral/Directional-Augmented Stability Block Diagram
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• Adequate self-monitor can be provided.
• Pilot is able to detect system failure by observing airplane performance or other
cues.
• Authority and rate limit can be provided in the actuators to prevent hardover or
oscillatory failures causing structural damage.
LAS can meet these three conditions. Thus the airplane can dispatch with restriction
when a single channel (one success path) is available in the LAS system.
Two of the triple ACT Primary Computers command the rudder control surfaces through
secondary force-summed actuators similar to the elevator actuator. Mathematical
actuator models are implemented in the triple computers to meet the fail-operational
requirement.
Wing-Load Alleviation (WLA)—The WLA function, which has the most complex I/O
interfaces because of the large number of airplane control surfaces used, is implemented
in the triple ACT Primary Computers. The function consists of maneuver-load control
(MLC) and gust-load alleviation (GLA) subfunctions. By moving the outboard aileron,
MLC controls wing loads induced by pilot maneuver and reduces low-frequency gust loads.
To compensate for the pitching moment caused by symmetric aileron motion, an elevator
command is sent to the Essential PAS Computer, where the total ACT elevator command
is formed by summing command inputs from these functions. In addition to the elevator
and aileron, the WLA function uses inboard and outboard flaperons.
Figure 38 is a block diagram of WLA showing its sensors and control surfaces. The
function uses center-of-gravity and wing acceleration signals as inputs to control law
computation. Air data signals from the triple DADCs are used to gain schedule the
control laws. WLA shares the inner segment of the outboard aileron with FMC and
manual pilot control. The control wheel input is converted into triple electric signals that
are routed to the ACT Primary Computers. Command signals from WLA, FMC, and the
pilot are there summed by software before being sent to the inner segment of the
outboard aileron.
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Figure 38. Wing-Load Alleviation Block Diagram
A force-displacement summed actuation concept is used in the outboard aileron inner
segment actuator. Figure 12 is a simplified block diagram of this actuation concept. The
command signals from each of three ACT Primary Computers are magnetically flux
summed in the four first-stage electrohydraulic servovalves, two per hydraulic system.
Output of the valves is mechanically position summed by a linkage to control the power
valve. The dual pistons are force summed to control the inner section of the outboard
aileron.
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WLA also uses the trailing-edge flaperons as control surfaces. Two hydraulic systems are
required to meet the fail-operational requirement of the WLA function. Hydraulic power
must be supplied to the flaperons through swivel joints. The plan for ensuring hydraulic
system safety in the event of swivel joint failure or flap separation is described in
Subsection 7.1 and illustrated in Figure 18.
Flutter-Mode Control (FMC)—The FMC function suppresses flutter modes at airspeed
between VD and 1-2VD by sensing wing acceleration and driving the inner segment of the
outboard aileron. Figure 39 is a block diagram of the FMC function. Triple
accelerometer outputs from right and left wings are processed by the SSFD algorithm to
generate a signal for control law computation and sensor monitoring.
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7.3.3 ACT MAINTENANCE AND DISPLAY COMPUTER
Use of two separate sets of control computers presents a need for coordination of their
communication functions in a separate unit. These functions are:
• Start test
• Enunciate significant failures
• Select appropriate operations advisory messages
• Retain fault information for maintenance use
The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer meets these needs. Its primary functions of
output to the crew are shown in Figure 40.
ACT System (see fig. 17) Baseline Caution and Warning System
Not required
for dispatch
Minimum
equipment
list items
Sensors ,
/ Function J
\status /
/ Failure \
/ notice and \
I operations I
\ advisory /
Figure 40. ACT Displays
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In its normal mode of operation, the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer accepts
fault information from the ACT Primary Computers and the Essential PAS Computers.
This information is processed in the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer micro-
processor to determine status of both functions and the resulting advisory message if any
is required. By using this processing and the caution and warning system of the Baseline
Airplane, the crew is presented with essential fault information and the resulting
operation change requirements. Thus, when the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer
is active, the pilots do not need to refer to an operations manual for response to ACT
system failure.
A more detailed picture of the functions of this unit is contained in Figure 86.
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7.* ACT SYSTEM OPERATION CONCEPT
In normal operation, the ACT system is entirely automatic and transparent to the flight
crew and requires no crew attention. It also affects safety of flight, and hence the crew
must be kept apprised of its condition. These facts lead to the system operation concept
that follows.
The crew communication functions are held to the minimum in both directions, crew to
system and system to crew. The controls provided are only those needed for the crew to
choose the time for preflight testing and for emergency manual disconnect. The displays
provided are only those needed to communicate essential failure information and to (1)
enable the crew to make appropriate dispatch and flight plan adjustment decisions under
failure conditions and (2) supply data for maintenance essential to dispatch. These
provisions are described in Subsection 8.4.3.
With this system operating unattended by the crew, self-testing and self-monitoring
become essential for tracking soundness of the system. The extensive digital computation
capacity shown in Figure 17 makes that testing and monitoring practical. As stated in
Subsection 5.3.1, one ACT function is crucial and all others are critical. All must be
operating for dispatch without any flight restriction, and lack of any one of five of the
ACT functions will prevent dispatch. Therefore, preflight test must be performed to
verify that the airplane, from the ACT system point of view, is dispatchable. Similarly,
in-flight monitoring must be done to keep track of ACT control system soundness and
enable retreat to safe operating conditions if failures make that necessary. Finally, the
effectiveness of ACT system maintenance operations must be rapidly verifiable; e.g.,
when a "no go" ACT airplane undergoes maintenance action at the flight line, such action
must be quickly verified to restore dispatch status as early as possible.
The preceding paragraphs refer to communication from the ACT system to the air crew in
the event of some fault in the system. Figure 41 is a block diagram illustrating the
system response to such faults; it shows a two-part parallel communication process that is
effective during flight and preflight test. In the first part, the ACT Primary and/or
Essential PAS Computers detect a line replaceable unit (LRU) fault, determine the
corresponding ACT function status, and report that status to a dedicated ACT display.
Then, from that information, possible prior faults, and current operating conditions, the
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Figure 41. Response to A CT System Failures
ACT Maintenance and Display Computer determines the operations advisory message (if
any is needed) for transmission to the crew. Thus, the pilot can make his dispatch or
flight plan change decision in either of two ways:
• Observe the ACT status display and refer to an operations manual, the "manual
option" shown at 1 in Figure 41
• Observe the operations advisory, the "automatic option" shown at 2 in the figure
Subsection 8.4.4 treats the fault response processes in greater detail.
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8.0 SELECTED SYSTEM DETAILED DESCRIPTION
This section describes, in detail, the system selected from studies described in
Section 6.0. The description covers physical components such as sensors, computers, and
actuators and also the design concepts involved in software, redundancy management, and
system operation.
Subsection 8.1 describes those sensors, computers, and actuators that are a part of the
Active Controls Technology (ACT) system. It discusses the way the components of the
Baseline are changed in form or use to accommodate the ACT functions. Subsection 8.2
describes redundancy management and failure protection aspects of the ACT system.
Subsection 8.3 is concerned with the software used to control the computers and with the
memory requirements. Subsection 8.4 discusses system operation, test and maintenance,
communications to and from the crew, monitors, and fault response. Subsection 8.5
describes how the hydraulic system is changed from the Baseline Airplane to
accommodate the needs of the ACT system. Subsection 8.6 describes changes to the
electric system.
8.1 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
8.1.1 SENSORS
The Selected System shares sensors with the automatic flight control system (AFCS) and
display functions where appropriate. The Baseline Airplane provides many of the sensors
required for the ACT functions; some special sensors must be added to meet ACT system
standards of performance and redundancy. Figure 10 shows general locations of the ACT
sensors. Table 7 lists all required sensors and associates them with the ACT functions
that they serve. Table 8 is a condensed table of sensor specifications.
The crucial short-period pitch-augmented stability (PAS) function must have quadruple
redundancy to meet the reliability requirement. The Baseline Airplane senses the pitch
rate in triplex by using the inertial reference systems (IRS). Addition of a fourth IRS is
not economical. Furthermore, the Baseline IRS has a high failure rate (as shown in
subsec 9.2.1), which is a severe drawback in a sensor for the crucial PAS control law. It is
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essential to have a small and reliable source of pitch-rate signal for the ACT system. The
VYRO, a small, long-life, vibrating beam sensor designed by General Electric, is one of
the acceptable sensors that can supply the quadruple pitch-rate signal.
The airspeed variables shown in Table 7 are needed for gain variation schedules in several
control loops. The table also shows the control surface servo linear variable differential
transformers (LVDT) that are used to close the servo loops and also to monitor failures.
8.1.2 COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE
The Selected System uses three different types of computers: the ACT Primary
Computers, the Essential PAS Computers, and the ACT Maintenance and Display
Computer. Each shares the following characteristics:
• Digital implementation for design flexibility and self-test capabilities
• Fault-tolerant design for flight-crucial and flight-critical function implementation,
including capability to recover from transient failures
• Fault detection and identification capability to enhance maintainability of the
overall system
8.1.2.1 ACT Primary Computers
The ACT Primary Computer provides commands for flight-critical ACT functions. This
computer shares many of the architectural features of the Airborne Advanced
Reconfigurable Computer System (ARCS) computer described in Reference 6 and is
similar to flight control computers used in the current generation of commercial
transports. The ACT Primary Computers are used in a triply redundant set, with each
computer having identical hardware and software. The computers are loosely
synchronized on a 20-ms major frame.
The major sections of the ACT Primary Computer are central digital processing,
input/output (I/O), servoelectronics, discrete output voters, and power supplies. Figure ^2
is a block diagram of the computer. The digital processing section includes the central
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processing unit (CPU), program memory, variable memory, iteration reference timer, and
self-monitor circuits. The CPU is a general-purpose, 16-bit parallel processor with an
instruction set structured to accommodate flight-critical control functions. The memory
includes a minimum of 20K read-only memory (ROM) for program storage, with
expansion capability to at least 32K, and 2K of read and write random-access memory
(RAM) for variable storage. The iteration reference timer generates an interrupt signal
to the CPU to provide a 5-ms minor frame. The reference timer also provides signals to
the I/O section. Self-monitor circuits include a watchdog timer, power monitor,
arithmetic overflow monitor, memory parity monitor, and digital communication
monitors. The watchdog timer confirms that the CPU is responding to reference timer
interrupts and can perform a series of tasks. It also checks the operation of the reference
timer. The power monitor checks voltage levels and generates interrupts when voltage
drops below required levels and when it returns to proper levels. Power monitor
interrupts are nonmaskable. The arithmetic overflow monitor generates an interrupt
whenever an operation is performed that results in an overflow. The memory parity
monitor checks validity of data received from memory by generating a fault interrupt if
parity is incorrect; i.e., the data word contains the wrong number of ones. Digital
communication monitors check for errors in data transmitted over serial bus lines. These
monitors are physically located in the I/O section of the computer in digital I/O
interfaces.
Data flow within the digital processing section of the computer is via internal parallel
buses.
The I/O section of the computer consists of analog, digital, and discrete interfaces, plus
an autonomous controller and dedicated memory. This section provides communication
between the digital processing section and external devices such as sensors and
servodrives. Table 9 summarizes the I/O requirements of the ACT Primary Computers.
Each I/O interface has a dedicated variable memory associated with it. Data are placed
into or taken directly from this memory, which can also be addressed by the CPU. The
analog input section includes signal conditioners, antialiasing filters, demodulators, and
analog-to-digital (A/D) converters. The analog output section includes digital-to-analog
(D/A) converters and amplifiers. The discrete I/O section provides buffers for system
discretes at required voltage levels. The digital I/O section includes Aeronautical Radio
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Table 9. ACT Primary Computer Inputs and Outputs
Inputs Outputs
Power ACT channel 28V dc power
Digital Air data (ARINC 429)
Inertial reference (ARINC 429)
ACT Maintenance and Display Computer
(ARINC 429)
Essential PAS Computer (ARINC 429)
ACT Maintenance and Display Computer
Essential PAS Computer (ARINC 429)
Cross channel (high speed)
Analog FMC acceleration, left and right
GLA acceleration, left and right
Column force
Dynamic pressure
Stabilizer position
Flap position
Wheel position
Center-of-gravity acceleration
Outboard aileron outer segment servo
spool valve position, left and right
Rudder servo spool valve position
Outboard aileron inner segment servo
loop current, left and right
Outboard aileron outer segment servo
position, left and right
Outboard aileron inner segment servo
position, left and right
Outboard flaperon servo position,
left and right
Outboard flaperon servo position,
left and right
Rudder servo position
LVDT reference voltage
Rudder position command
Outboard aileron outer segment position command
Outboard aileron inner segment position command
Outboard flaperon position command
Inboard flaperon position command
Discrete Air and ground logic (2)
Test initiate (3)
Electric power monitor (4)
Hydraulic pressure monitor (3)
Pneumatic pressure monitor (2)
Solenoid valve (AAL) position (4)
Dump valve position (2)
Outboard aileron inner segment
servo failure (4)
Slat position (3)
Spare (13)
Warning displays (12)
Self-test (6)
Stick pusher activate
Stabilizer drive (2)
Shutdown actuators— servo failure (27)
Shutdown foreign actuators-computer failure (15)
PASSHORTfailed
failed
(30)
MLC failed
Spare
Incorporated (ARINC) 429 serial data receivers and transmitters for communication with
digital sensors and other system computers and high-speed serial data transmitters and
receivers for cross-channel communication with the other ACT Primary Computers. A
signal from the reference timer causes the autonomous I/O controller to load data from
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the various input sections into the cross-channel transmitter. No CPU action is required,
thereby allowing transmission of sensor data to other channels after failure of the CPU.
The controller also transfers computer output data to the cross-channel transmitter on a
signal from the CPU. The I/O controller is designed to prevent a failed CPU from
disabling the transmission of sensor data. The cross-channel transmission of sensor data is
inhibited only when the computer power supplies or the computers are lost.
The servoelectronics section of the computer provides servo-loop closure and drive
current for the electrohydraulic servos of the ACT system.
Discrete output voters are used to provide output discretes to shut down servos or to
provide angle-of-attack limiter (AAL) actuation. The servo shutdown logic votes on
outputs from each ACT Primary Computer and provides a signal to activate a servo
bypass valve for the force-summed actuators or to electrically null the servodrive output
for the force-displacement actuators. The servo shutdown logic receives signals on the
status of computers and servos, and if a majority vote indicates either is bad, it shuts
down the servo. Status signals from computers that are judged to be failed are ignored.
Majority vote is normally required to shut down the servo, but if only two good computers
remain and a disagreement occurs between these two, the actuator will be shut down.
Each computer contains a servo shutdown logic voter for each of the surfaces driven by
the ACT Primary Computers.
The AAL voter works in a manner similar to the servo shutdown logic, except when a
disagreement occurs between two remaining computers; then the output is zero (i.e., the
AAL actuator is not activated). Because there are only three ACT Primary Computers
and four AAL actuators, each line replaceable unit (LRU) contains two AAL voters,
although only one is used on two of the three ACT Primary Computers.
The power supply section provides power to all sections of the computer. Input power is
supplied from a 28V dc ACT system bus, which is supplied from a main dc bus and from a
standby battery bus. LVDT sensor excitation is provided by the ACT system ac buses,
which are supplied from the dc buses. This same voltage is provided as a demodulation
reference. Computer power outputs can sustain a short circuit without causing failure to
internal voltage supplies.
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8.1.2.2 Essential PAS Computers
The Essential PAS Computers provide crucial pitch augmentation. These computers
require far less processing and I/O capability than the ACT Primary Computers but
require higher reliability. The objective of the design of these computers is to keep them
simple to enhance reliability. These computers are used as a quadruply redundant set and
operate asynchronously.
Like the ACT Primary Computers, the Essential PAS Computers include a digital
processing section, I/O section, servoelectronics, discrete output voter, and power
supplies. Figure 43 is a block diagram of the Essential PAS Computers. The CPU
requirements are such that they can be met by currently available 16-bit microprocessors.
Use of a microprocessor saves size, weight, and cost and should provide improved
reliability. It adds some constraints, as it is not feasible to design a microprocessor
tailored to this application for a current technology system. This may lead to some
simplification of the self-monitor circuits. The arithmetic overflow monitor may not
produce an interrupt but instead may require a flag to be read under software control.
The memory parity monitor is deleted. All other monitors are functionally the same as
those in the ACT Primary Computers. Memory is reduced to UK of ROM and
approximately 256 words of RAM. Real-time programs are contained within
approximately 2K words of the UK of ROM, and this memory is physically separate from
the non-real-time program memory.
The Essential PAS Computers require significantly less I/O than the ACT Primary
Computers. Table 10 summarizes the I/O for the Essential PAS Computers. Analog
sensors are cross strapped (i.e., each of the four computers receives a signal directly from
all analog sensors), so the autonomous I/O controller has been deleted from the Essential
PAS Computers. All I/O is done with CPU control. As a result of the reduced I/O
requirement, the system requires relatively low cross-channel data rates and a high-speed
cross-channel data link is not required. An ARINC 429 standard bus may be used. This
provides uniformity of digital communication interfaces.
Servoelectronics, discrete output voters, and power supplies are functionally the same as
in the ACT Primary Computers, except the power supply must provide a +12V dc
excitation for the pitch-rate sensor. One discrete output voter is required in the Essential
PAS Computer to provide servo shutdown logic for the elevator servos.
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Table 10. Essential Pitch-Augmented Stability Computer Inputs and Outputs
Power
Digital
(ARINC429)
Analog
Inputs
ACT channel
28V dc power
ACT Primary Computer
ACT Maintenance and Display
Computer
Cross channel
Pitch rate
Elevator servo spool
valve position
Elevator servo position
LVDT reference
Air and ground logic
Test initiate
Electric power monitor
Hydraulic pressure monitor
PASSHORTfail
PASSPEED fail
MLCfail
Spare
(3)
(4)
1
 (3)
(4)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(11)
Outputs
±12V dc sensor excitation
ACT Maintenance and Display
Cross channel
Computer
Elevator position command
Warning displays
Self-test
(2)
(6)
Shutdown actuator— servo failure
Shutdown actuator— computer
Spare
failure (4)
(17)
8.1.2.3 ACT Maintenance and Display Computer
The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer collects data from the ACT Primary and
Essential PAS Computers and analyzes it to provide fault identification for maintenance
purposes and also to provide flight crew advisory and warning messages. The ACT
Maintenance and Display Computer also provides access to the other system computers
for maintenance testing. These tasks do not require high processing speeds and could be
performed by an 8-bit microprocessor. Detailed requirements for this noncritical
computer have not been determined, but 32K of program memory plus a 512-word
nonvolatile variable memory for fault-table storage have been specified for cost and
weight estimating purposes. This provides sufficient margin to incorporate any foreseen
function into the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer.
8.1.2.4 General Characteristics
Table 11 summarizes general characteristics of the ACT Primary and Essential PAS
Computers. These characteristics are discussed further in the following paragraphs.
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Table 11. Selected System Computer Characteristics
"•~-~^^  Computer
Item ""^ ^^^
Processing speed
Memory requirements
Inputs and outputs
Interrupts
Reference timing
Weight
Reliability
ACT Primary
400K ops
24K ROM
2K RAM
3 ARINC 429 digital inputs
2 high-speed digital inputs
25 analog inputs
40 discrete inputs
2 ARINC 429 digital outputs
1 high-speed digital output
5 analog outputs
96 discrete outputs
Minimum 4-level priority
5-ms minor frame
20-ms major frame
11.3kg (25 Ib)
6800-hr MTBF
Essential PAS
75K ops
11K ROM
256 RAM
5 ARINC 429 digital inputs
12 analog inputs
32 discrete inputs
2 ARINC 429 digital outputs
1 analog output
32 discrete outputs
Minimum 4-level priority
10-ms frame
6kg(13lb)
12 000-hr MTBF
Processing Speed and Memory Requirements—Estimates of processing speed and memory
requirements are based largely on laboratory test development. These estimates are
discussed in more detail in Subsection 8.3.3.
Input/Output-The I/O data in Table 11 summarize the detailed information in Tables 9
and 10. The I/O sections constitute much of the physical size and weight of the
computers and have a major impact on cost.
Interrupts-Both the ACT Primary and the Essential PAS Computers are largely interrupt
driven. The computers require a minimum of four priority interrupts to provide power,
reference timer, computer fault, and externally generated I/O interrupts. All interrupts
except the power interrupt are to be software maskable.
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Reference Timing—Both computers perform real-time control operations using signals
from a reference timer for scheduling. The ACT Primary Computers are multirate
scheduled to provide real-time iteration rates with periods of 5, 10, and 20 ms. Figure 44
shows typical scheduling of control activities for the ACT Primary Computer. The
Essential PAS Computers operate at a single rate with real-time operations scheduled at
10-ms intervals.
Physical Size and Weight—The ACT Primary and Essential PAS Computers have been sized
to conform to the ARINC 600 standards for packaging of digital avionic equipment. While
this is not a specific requirement for active controls computers, it provides a comparison
with other Baseline equipment and offers a configuration that would be readily accepted
for installation reasons.
Reliability-ACT system reliability is discussed in detail in Subsection 9.2.
8.1.3 ACTUATION SYSTEMS
S.I.3.1 Hydraulic Actuators
Two basic actuation configurations are being considered for the multiple-function ACT
actuation system: the secondary actuation configuration and the fly-by-wire (FBW) power
control unit configuration. In the secondary actuation configuration, the ACT control
signals control secondary actuators to produce a mechanical signal that is series summed
with the pilot's mechanical input. The combined mechanical input controls the servovalve
of the power control unit, which, in turn, drives the control surface. In the FBW power
control unit configuration, the ACT control signals are fed directly to the power control
unit. For most of the control surfaces used to perform ACT functions as well as basic
flight controls, the secondary actuation configuration is used. The FBW power control
unit configuration is used to drive the inboard portion of the outboard aileron and the
flaperons. Figures 11 and 12 show both configurations, and Table 12 shows which type is
assigned to each surface. In either configuration, system-failure-induced transients
should be held to a minimum and hardover surface failures must be prevented. Thus,
certain redundancy concepts, such as the active, standby type that usually induces large
failure transients and takes much time for switching, are not acceptable for ACT
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Figure 44. ACT Primary Computer Scheduling Diagram
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Table 12. ACT Actuator Characteristics Summary
Outboard
aileron.
outboard
portion
Outboard
aileron.
inboard
portion
Outboard
flaperon
Inboard
flaperon
Surface actuator [T^>-
Type
0
I—- >
B>
rs-^Elevator 12— -^
Rudder [£>
Number
per
airplane
4
2
4
4
6
4
Maximum
output.
N-m
1 500
1 200
1 240
3400
7344
20902
Average
rate.
deg/s
85
100
85
85
40
40
Maximum
deflection.
deg
+15
-30
+15
-30
+15
-30
+15
-30
+20
-30
±25
Maximum
no-load
rate,
deg/s
120
130
120
120
55
55
Open-
loop gain.
rad/s
20
40
40
40
20
20
Secondary actuator Q I^>-
Type
fT>
Number
per
airplane
4
Design
rate.
deg/s
G^>
Open
loop gam,
sec
80
Authority,
+15
-30
Configuration
Secondary
actuator
No secondary actuator used
No secondary actuator used
No secondary actuator used
6^>
<D>
3
2
(z^>
[£>
80
80
+12
-12
+4
-4
Secondary
actuator
Secondary
actuator
[J_J^> Surface actuator controls surface, secondary actuator controls surface actuator RT----1"' Same as 2 except three for each surface
Hydraulic power requirements f5— -^ „ , , , ,
. Proof pressure 37 233 kPa, high pressure 20 700 kPa, low pressure £> Side-by-side force-summed I secondary actuators-
350to690kPa each actuator contains LVDT, bypass filter, and
• Extreme temperature- -54°to125°C centering spring with maximum force of 230IM
• Operating temperature -40°to71°C .^^ Maximum output force is limited to 1780N
[2> Side-by-side actuator, two for each surface, mechanical input/mechanical feedback LL> Each secondary actuator has max.mum rate ofj^_^ 127 rnm/s and 38-mm stroke with linkage and
[3 I^> Dual-tandem electrohydraulic actuator mechanism. Stops make authority differences
P^^^ This rate exceeds maximum no-load rate of the
[4_^>> Two side-by-side electrohydraulic actuators surface actuator, except rudder rate is 35 deg/s
application. Several actuation redundancy schemes that satisfy the design criteria have
been considered. Based on practical design considerations, two of the most promising
concepts have been selected for the ACT actuation system.
Force-Summed Concept—As shown in Figure 45, the first concept is a force-summed,
multiple-channel, detection-correction system. Each actuation channel contains a two-
stage electrohydraulic servovalve that converts the input electric signal into hydraulic
flow. The hydraulic flow displaces the actuator piston against the centering spring. A
position transducer (LVDT) is used to close the position loop. A load limiter that limits
the pressure difference across the actuator piston is used to limit the maximum output
force to 1800N (400 Ibf). This force is available to prevent minor jams. For normal
operation, the force output required is on the order of 90N (20 Ibf). For a three-actuator
system, a pogo (force detent) is also provided to serve as an additional antijam device.
The pogo load is set to exceed the maximum output force of one actuator but be below
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Figure 45. Force-Summed Actuation Concept
the combined maximum output force of two actuators. Thus, if one actuator completely
jammed, the combined force of the other two actuators would collapse the pogo and the
system would remain fail-operational. Hardware used in this application is a lightweight,
off-the-shelf secondary actuator with performance proven in other Boeing programs. Two
or three redundant actuators are used for each ACT function, depending on the
redundancy requirements of the particular function. The two-actuator system with
mathematical model provides a single fail-operational capability, and the three-actuator
system with mathematical model provides fail-operational/fail-operational capability.
For failure monitoring and fault detection, an additional LVDT and electronics are used to
provide a mathematical model of valve spool position. Each servovalve spool position is
compared with the other and with the mathematical model to determine system integrity.
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LVDTs are used to measure valve spool positions. The inner servo loop may be closed
electrically if there is a design advantage. Normally a mechanical spring is used as
feedback for the valve spool. The piston position transducers (LVDTs) are used to close
the actuator position loop. Because the LVDTs are tied together, any component failure
in one channel would result in a large valve spool position disagreement and would be
easily detected. Arm and interlock logic are also provided in the computers to prevent
faulty detection and correction during system startup.
The servovalve failure detection circuit can be straightforward. For a valve failure like a
1
 •' "y
stuck or jammed valve, oscillatory failure, or a hardover valve, sufficiently large position
errors between spools will be produced to allow easy detection. An elaborate spool
dynamic model is not necessary to sense these kinds of failures. The mathematical model
is expected to be a simple gain change or first-order lag. This is combined with
comparators, thresholds, and time delays to denote failures. A low-pass filter may be
needed to smooth spool position LVDTs to match the mathematical model. A simulation
study of the force-summed actuator system with a mathematical model and detection
circuits has been done to verify fully the feasibility of the system and to find the
requirements of the mathematical model, the failure threshold level, filtering, and timing
requirements of the failure logic. The study results are described in Subsection 9.1.2.
The force-summed secondary actuator traditionally suffers some inherent force-fighting
problem among channels. This problem is caused by component tolerances in each
channel, resulting in each channel seeking its own position in a high-gain servo loop.
Force fighting increases system hysteresis and causes a "dead zone" when an even number
of actuation channels are active. Force-fighting problems can be resolved by using a low-
pressure-gain servovalve or by using channel equalization circuits. These methods would
either reduce system performance or add additional hardware. Typical channel mismatch
conditions that cause force fights are as follows:
• Input mispatch 5%
• Position feedback 1%
• Servovalve null shift 1%
• Servoamplifier tolerance 1%
• Equalization loop mismatch 1%
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Notice that the equalization loop itself causes 1% mismatch. The major portion is
obviously caused by input mismatch (presumably in an analog circuit system). The ACT
computers use signal selection and failure detection (SSFD) and frame synchronization,
and they produce essentially identical command signals to the surface actuators. Input
mismatch is not a problem, and a little force fight between channels will not significantly
degrade system performance. By using high-quality, low-gain servovalves, servo-
amplifiers, and LVDTs to minimize tolerance mismatches, it is believed that equalization
loops between channels are not required. Assuming the force-fight problem can be
reduced, then the associated problems such as increased hysteresis and dead zone become
less significant and the force-summed secondary actuators will perform satisfactorily.
This forced-summed, multiple-channel, detection-correction system concept covered
herein applies specifically to the ACT secondary actuators. Force-summed FBW power
control units are covered in Subsection 8.1.3.3.
Force-Displacement Hybrid Concept—The second concept is shown in Figure 46. This
concept was developed by the Parker-Hannifin Corporation of Irvine, California, intended
for advanced FBW applications. A similar prototype unit has been laboratory tested by
the Boeing Flight Control Research Group with acceptable results.
Four two-stage electrohydraulic servovalves with mechanical feedback spools are used.
Two valves are grouped to each hydraulic system and position summed by a linkage. The
two linkages are force summed and connected to the main control valve spool. Each first-
stage valve positions the corresponding spool (fig. 46) proportionally to the sum of
currents through the multiple coils. Because each valve receives the same combination of
currents, the four spools should track each other within the accuracy of the mechanical
servo loop. Any significant rotation of either summing linkage would indicate abnormal
operation. An LVDT is used to measure this rotation, and the two valves associated with
the rotating linkage will be shut off if the measurement exceeds a threshold. In addition,
the actuators are monitored by computers using a cross-channel monitor scheme. The
unit will provide fail-operational capability. The main feature of this unit is the
electrical and mechanical channel independence; i.e., a failure of an electric component
will not affect any mechanical component in the same channel or vice versa.
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Figure 46. Force-Displacement Actuation Concept
The actuator will be used without gain compensation under failure conditions. Without
gam compensation, an electric channel disconnection would reduce actuation loop gain by
one-third. Acceptable dynamic performance is expected under failure conditions.
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Both concepts (i.e., force summed and force-displacement hybrid) would be compatible
with the ACT design philosophy, computer redundancy arrangement, and total system
complexity. However, for the secondary actuation configuration to achieve the same
design goal, the force-displacement concept requires more hardware. In the pitch axis,
for example, to achieve a fail-operational/fail-operational capability requires eight
electrohydraulic valves while the force-summed concept requires only three. The simple
system should provide comparable system reliability with less cost and weight impact.
The force-summed concept is selected for the secondary actuation configuration.
For the FBW power control unit configuration, the force-displacement concept was chosen
to drive the inboard portion of the outboard aileron. The Boeing laboratory test of a
prototype unit demonstrated that for the required loads, the rate, frequency response,
hysteresis, and failure transients of this actuator concept are compatible with the ACT
flutter-mode control (FMC) and gust-load alleviation (GLA) control laws for this control
surface. (The somewhat simpler force-summed FBW power control unit concept was
chosen to drive the less demanding flaperons.) Table 12 lists parameters of all control
surface actuation systems in the technology base ACT airplanes.
8.1.3.2 AAL Pneumatic Actuator
The AAL system senses an impending stall condition and provides the pilot not only aural
and tactile warning (stick shaker) but also applies forward torque to the pilot's and
copilot's control column (stick pusher). This is accomplished by employing a dual tandem
floating actuator to pull the control column forward when the actuator is pressurized.
Figure 47 shows a block diagram of the system. Three electric channels and two
pneumatic channels are used to ensure fail-operational capability against either
inadvertent actuation or failure to actuate when needed. The actuator will provide a
starting force of 356N (80 Ibf) when pressurized by either one or both sides. As shown in
Figure 47, the installation linkage is such that the force exerted on the control column is
continuously reduced as it travels forward.
8.1.3.3 Flaperon Actuation System
The flaperon actuation system poses a difficult design problem. Although operation will
likely be required only when the trailing-edge flaps are fully retracted, the flaperon
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356N,(80lbf)
178N (40lbf)
Actuator force at pilot's hand exerts
^ame force when both (air bleed
accumulator) power sources are acting
as when only one power source is acting.
Accumulator,
138to310kPa
Air supply system (engine bleed)
normally 310 kPa (45 Ibf/in2)-
Figure 47. Stick Pusher Actuation Concept
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actuation installation must accommodate the large flap motion during extension. At least
two actuators and two hydraulic power systems are required for each flaperon to meet the
redundancy requirements. Major structural damage could conceivably cause the loss of
two hydraulic systems. Alternative designs are available by using power-by-wire (PBW)
techniques. A PBW system uses electric wiring to transmit power in lieu of hydraulic
lines. The advantage of a PBW system is that local damage or failure to the wiring and
equipment will not cause the loss of the affected electric power system(s). Currently,
there are two different PBW approaches under development. The first is called an
electromechanical actuator (EMA), which uses electric power directly. The second is
called integrated actuator package (IAP). Electric power is transmitted by wire and
converted to hydraulic power at the actuators.
The following three viable flaperon actuation systems were studied:
• Hydromechanical actuation system
• Electromechanical actuation system
• Integrated actuator package
Following completion of the study, an assessment based on performance, weight, cost, and
reliability was made on these systems. The results of the assessment indicated that the
optimum system is the hydromechanical actuation system. The hydromechanical system
is described in the following paragraphs. The other two configurations are covered in
Volume II, Appendix D.
Hydromechanical System—The hydromechanical actuation system consists of two
actuators and two flaperon lock systems powered by aircraft hydraulic power and electric
power. The hydraulic power and ACT electric control signals are supplied to the flaperon
as shown in Figure 48. Hydraulic power is transmitted to the actuators through hydraulic
lines and swivel joints. These hydraulic lines and swivel joints are well shielded from the
runway and tire debris by the flap support fairing. The swivel joints possess the same high
degree of reliability as the swivel joints that provide flow to the Boeing spoiler actuators
on the 727 and 747.
As shown in Figure 18, two actuators and two hydraulic power systems are required for
each flaperon to meet its redundancy requirement. A major concern is that a flap loss
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Hydraulic and electric
(actuator signals) path
•-x ;
Flaperon
Flap support and
deployment mechanism
Figure 48. Flaperon Actuation (Hydraulic Power Through SwivelJoints)
would cause the simultaneous loss of two hydraulic systems. Because of this, the proposed
design provides power capability from two hydraulic systems, but only one hydraulic
power system is directly connected to the flaperon actuators. Hydraulic power to the
actuators is normally supplied by hydraulic system A. Only one set of hydraulic lines is
brought to the actuators through swivel joints. A motor-pump unit is used to connect
hydraulic system B to hydraulic system A for power redundancy. In normal operation the
motor-pump unit is stalled and is therefore inactive. Should hydraulic system A fail, the
hydraulic motor in system B will automatically provide power to the pump in system A.
The pump in system A will pressurize the hydraulic fluid in the local flaperon area with
makeup fluid from the level-sensing reservoir. If a major fluid leakage occurs in the local
area or if the flaperon is lost, hydraulic systems A and B will remain operational.
System B will remain operational because it is not directly connected to the flaperon.
System A will remain operational because the level-sensing reservoir and the normally
closed shutoff valve will respond to block the path of the fluid flow to the flaperon.
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Flaperon Servoactuator System—The actuators shown in Figure 18 are force-summed
actuators. Each actuator possesses the full force and rate capability required to drive the
flaperon. Figure 49 shows a schematic of the servoactuator. Hydraulic pressure to the
servoactuator and flaperon lock system is controlled by a solenoid valve driving a bypass
valve. The solenoid valve is a normally closed valve driven by dual coils. The bypass
valve has the following modes of operation:
/—Inboard
/ actuator
Inboard
actuator
lock
To outboard
actuator lock
Bypass spring
Normally
closed
solenoid
valve, shown
open
Dual coils, shown
energized
Return Pressure
Figure 49. Flaperon Servoactuator System Schematic
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• Normal Mode—When the solenoid valve is energized, it allows hydraulic pressure to
actuate the bypass valve to a position that ports hydraulic fluid to the servoactuator
and the flaperon lock system. In this mode the hydraulic fluid unlocks the flaperon,
thus allowing the servoactuator to control the position of the flaperon. It should be
noted that the failure of one solenoid coil will not affect operation of the solenoid
valve.
• Failed Mode—When the solenoid valve is deenergized, it allows the bypass spring to
drive the bypass valve to a position that blocks the path of the hydraulic fluid to the
servoactuator, interconnects the actuator cylinder ports (thus eliminating its
capability to induce force fights), and depressurizes the lock system. This action
also can be triggered by a hydraulic system failure or failure of both solenoid coils.
The actuator is an equal-area actuator that is driven by a two-stage jet pipe servovalve.
An LVDT is used for loop closure as shown in Figure 50.
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Flaperon Lock System-Surface locking is used in the event of total hydraulic power loss
to the flaperon actuation system. Upon shutdown, it is also desirable that the flaperon be
locked in the neutral position to prevent asymmetry and loss of lift on landing. The
flaperon lock system is shown in Figure 51. The flaperon lock and unlocking system uses a
spring force to lock the flaperon at the 0-deg position following failure of both
servoactuator loops or both hydraulic systems. The flaperon is unlocked by a dual
hydraulic piston. The area of the hydraulic piston is sized so that either hydraulic system
can unlock and hold the flaperon in the unlocked position. With power loss to the flaperon
actuation system, this locking system, with its 3560N (800-lbf) force spring in conjunction
with the cam and lever-roller arrangement, can drive the flaperon to neutral (and lock)
from the maximum free-float up angle against the maximum holddown hinge moment (two
required per flaperon).
• Wing
Flaperon
Drive to neutral
and lock mechanism
Flap support
mechanism
fairing
Flaperon hinge C in
deployed position
Flap deployed
Figure 51. Flaperon Actuation System Installation
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Failure Detection Scheme—The flaperon is a flight-critical surface driven by two force-
shared actuators that are located 4.3m (14 ft) apart. The distance between the two
actuators allows the structure to absorb the mismatches of the two actuators. If the
actuators are driven in opposite directions at maximum force, the windup in the shaft
would be 4.7 deg. It should be noted that the torsional stress induced by the windup will
not cause the shaft material to exceed its torsional stress limit. The windup capability of
the shaft allows selection of a failure detection scheme that monitors the complete
servoactuator closed-loop performance.
The failure detection scheme is shown in Figure 52. A command signal from the
controller drives the servoactuator control loop and a model of the servoactuator control
loop. The position output of the servoactuator control loop is compared to the position
output of the model. If one of the components in the control loop fails, then the outputs
of the control loop and model will deviate. The actuator is considered failed when this
differential error exceeds 6% of actuator full stroke. Once the differential error exceeds
696, the computer will immediately deactivate the bypass valve on the failed actuator.
The same magnitude of error or a failure of the second hydraulic system will cause the
second actuator to switch to the bypass mode, thus allowing the spring lock system to lock
the flaperon in its 0-deg position.
System Installation—The servoactuator and the flaperon lock system installed in the
flaperon fairing are shown in Figure 51.
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8.2 REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
Redundancy management is the process that enables continued operation of the Active
Controls Technology (ACT) system in the presence of transient or permanent failures of
the control system hardware. Critical to this operation is the concept of coverage, which is
defined here as the probability that the system correctly detects component failure(s) and
successfully reconfigures the other components to maximize function success paths. This
philosophy for the ACT system includes the following:
• System elements are monitored for faults using a combination of hardware and
software.
• Faults are primarily detected by cross-channel comparison. Inline and inchannel
monitoring supplements cross-channel comparison and provides fault isolation.
• Detected faults are isolated and switched out where possible to prevent any
detrimental effect on airplane performance. Critical systems will survive at least
single failure, except actuator jam, without affecting performance. Crucial systems
will survive at least two similar failures, including a jam.
• Following clearance of a transient fault, the system will recover to the redundancy
level in effect prior to the failure.
• Following a failure that leaves only two success paths for a function, a disagreement
in those paths will lead to shutdown of the function or reconfiguration to a degraded
mode. Single-thread operation will be allowed only if it can be shown that the
function satisfies conditions stated in Subsection 5.2.2.
Redundancy management goals can be achieved by system monitoring and reconfiguration
and additional failure protection through design features such as physical and functional
isolation in redundant channels, supplying of electric power from redundant sources, and
hydromechanical voting. System monitoring and reconfiguration are performed under the
control of the ACT Primary Computers and Essential Pitch-Augmented Stability (PAS)
Computers on three separate planes: sensors, computers, and servoactuators. Figures 53
and 54 illustrate the redundancy management processes performed by each computer.
These processes are discussed in the following subsections.
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8.2.1 SIGNAL SELECTION AND FAILURE DETECTION
Protection against failures of the sensors, wiring, and input sections of the computer is
provided by the signal selection and failure detection (SSFD) processes. Each computer
uses signal selection to select a single value from each set of redundant sensors, and it
uses failure detection and reconfiguration processes to isolate failed signals. Because
sensor configuration differs between the ACT Primary Computers and Essential PAS
Computers, they will be discussed separately. In both cases, SSFD is performed primarily
by software.
8.2.1.1 ACT Primary Computer SSFD
Each ACT Primary Computer sees identical sensor information received from direct
connection to the sensor or from the cross-channel data link. The signal selection takes
two basic forms, depending on the type of sensor, as illustrated in Figure 55. Equalization
is used on most signals. For those sensors that normally have dc components (such as
airspeed, angle of attack, etc.), the last "good" value is held when two of three sensors
fail. For those sensors with values that are normally zero (such as pitch rates), the
selected value is set to zero when the sensors fail. Some sensors are filtered through a
washout upstream of the signal selection (e.g., wing acceleration for gust-load alleviation
and flutter-mode control), and the equalization is deleted. These signals are set to zero in
the event of sensor failure.
Equalization is used to minimize transients due to sensor failure. Equalization takes the
error signal, which is the difference between the equalized local signal and the selected
signal, and passes it through a high-gain lag filter to form an equalization signal. The
equalization signal is then subtracted from the local raw signal to form an equalized local
signal. The signal selector acts on the equalized signals. This method does not provide
exact equalization but can be used to reduce transients to levels that will not affect
airplane performance.
Failure detection is done by comparing input signals. For signals that have been
equalized, the error signal represents the difference between the equalized signal and the
selected signal, which is used as a reference. Because the error signal represents
differences between the equalized signal and the reference, steady-state errors are
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Figure 55. Signal Selection and Failure Detection for Sensors With and Without Equalization
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masked and this signal may be used to detect dynamic faults. This gives rapid response to
step failures and detection of high-frequency oscillatory failures. The equalization error
represents the difference between the raw and the equalized signal, which in steady state
is approximately the same as the difference between the raw signal and the selected
signal, so the equalization error may be used to detect static failures. The two separate
error detectors allow different thresholds and detect times for dynamic failures than for
static errors such as drif t and bias errors. For signals that are not equalized, there is only
a single detector, which compares differences between raw signals. Because these signals
are washed out upstream, this is essentially a dynamic type of fault detector.
Each detector uses a counter scheme to prevent nuisance trips and provide oscillatory
failure protection. If the threshold is exceeded, the counter counts up. If the threshold is
not exceeded and the counter is not zero, the counter counts down. If the counter
exceeds a threshold level, the signal is considered failed. The counter is counted up at a
faster rate than it is counted down so that an oscillatory failure will be detected.
Figure 56 shows typical flow charts for the failure detection schemes.
Signal selection operates on those signals that have not exceeded thresholds. When a
signal has been determined to be failed, sensors are reconfigured to exclude that signal
from the selection process, but the fault detector continues to monitor all signals. The
selection process selects the median signal, when none of the signals is considered failed,
and averages the two unfailed signals when one of the signals fails. When the second
signal fails, the selector uses a default value, which may be either the last good value or
zero, depending on the type of signal.
A further reconfiguration occurs when two of the three sensors have failed. A default
value is selected that may provide degraded performance operation. For example, a
default value selected for a variable used to schedule gains results in a fixed gain being
used in calculations. If operation with a default value does not provide adequate
performance, two options are available. The control law may be reconfigured (i.e.,
replaced with another control law not requiring the failed signal), or if no other control
laws are available, the function will be shut down.
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Figure 56. Failure Detection Logic
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8.2.1.2 Essential PAS Computer SSFD
Sensor selection is slightly more complex for the Essential PAS Computers as there are
now four rather than three computers. For the pitch-rate signal with four sensors, an
active, online selection process is used. Three signals are considered active and feed
directly into the selector. All four signals are monitored for failure, but the standby
signal is not used unless one of the active signals fails. The selection process becomes (1)
median of active channels with no failures, (2) median of active channels with standby
channel replacing failed channel after first failure, (3) average of unfailed channels with
two failures, (4) and a best-value selection with three or more failures. Best-value
selection uses inline monitoring to select the remaining good signal following the third
failure. Because inline monitoring does not provide 100% failure detection, it may not be
possible to determine which sensor has failed. Loss of sensor data for the Essential PAS
Computer can result in loss of pitch augmentation, which is unacceptable. Therefore, it is
not reasonable to ignore all sensors. One of the signals is arbitrarily selected if inline
monitoring does not provide enough information to determine which of the sensors has
failed. However, reliability analyses indicate that loss of three signals in the Essential
PAS System is extremely improbable.
The Essential PAS Computers also select the Full PAS signal from the ACT Primary
Computers to drive the elevator. In this case there are only three signals; therefore,
there is no standby channel. The SSFD algorithm is altered to account for simultaneous
failures, as redundancy management of the ACT Primary Computers masks the effect of
sensor failures on the output. A single sensor failure will not affect the output, but a
second similar failure can cause all three computers to shut down their outputs
simultaneously. The Essential PAS Computer cannot obtain sufficient information about
the PAS command from the ACT Primary Computers by comparison monitoring alone to
properly determine the status of that command. Discrete status bits from the ACT
Primary Computers will be used to augment the monitor information. If a signal fails a
comparison, or a vote of the status bits indicates a signal is failed, that signal is no longer
used by the selector. If two or more signals fail, the PAS command from the ACT
Primary Computers is disregarded and the output from the Essential PAS control law
computation is substituted.
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For both ACT Primary and Essential PAS Computers, the sensors are continuously
monitored. If a failed signal returns to within tolerances for a prescribed period of time
and inline testing indicates it is good, the sensor is considered recovered and once again
becomes active.
8.2.1.3 Discrete Input SSFD
Signal selection for discrete inputs (fig. 57) is based upon majority logic voting.
Monitoring is done by comparing input value to a selected value. If a disagreement occurs
and persists for more than the specified time, the signal is considered failed. If a failure
occurs while there are only two remaining signals, the output will revert to a safe state, if
such a state exists. For example, failure of the air-to-ground logic results in an "in the
air" state to be assumed, thus preventing entry to a self-test mode in flight. If a safe
state does not exist, the discrete will default to local input state.
8.2.2 COMPUTER MONITORING
Protection against computer faults is provided by computer monitoring and
reconfiguration. Failures are detected by both cross-channel comparison and inline
monitoring techniques.
Discrete
word
inputs
Channels
A
B Compare input
with selected
output
A k
—*
 +
Majority
vote
Delay
Change
output
state
^
Delayed
selected
output
discrete
Figure 57. Signal Selection Concept for Discrete Inputs
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8.2.2.1 Synchronization
The ACT Primary Computers are loosely synchronized on a frame basis, primarily to aid
fault detection. This synchronization is not essential but would be necessary if integral
feedback were incorporated. Synchronization aids fault detection and reconfiguration,
but it is not a requirement for these processes. The system is designed to operate
asynchronously as well as synchronously so that loss of synchronization does not shut down
the system.
The ACT Primary Computers are synchronized through the exchange of sync bits. The
synchronization concept is based on a "wait" algorithm. Each computer sets its sync bit
and waits until the others set theirs or until a time limit is exceeded. The computer then
clears its sync bit and checks to see that the other sync bits have also been cleared. If a
computer fails to achieve sync (i.e., it does not set and clear its sync bit in the prescribed
manner), that information is recorded for fault isolation use and possible maintenance
action, but it is not considered as a system fault by itself.
Because the computers can operate asynchronously, a simple "slow-resync" algorithm may
be used. If an out-of-sync condition exists, each computer varies its frame starting time
slightly, so that the computers drift back into sync. Performance during this out-of-sync
period is not significantly degraded.
The Essential PAS Computer implements a single fixed-gain control law. Synchronization
is not required for this function, and the Essential PAS Computers are designed to operate
asynchronously.
8.2.2.2 Output Monitor
The computer output monitor compares the outputs from the different computers.
Comparison of the digital outputs is made before conversion to analog form. Failures of
the digital-to-analog converters are not detected by the computer output monitor but are
tested by the servomonitor. The computer output monitor compares output differences to
thresholds and uses a counter algorithm similar to the sensor monitor (fig. 56) to
determine failures. Thresholds for the primary computer can be low, as all computers
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operate on identical data and are normally synchronized. The Essential PAS Computers
require higher thresholds to allow analog-to-digital tolerances and slight time differences
due to asynchronous operation.
If a computer fault is indicated by the output monitor, the computers will send output
discretes to the servo shutdown logic indicating that the computer output is failed and the
affected servos will be shut down. If only two computers are considered good when the
output monitor detects an error, both servos will be shut down.
The good computers will continue to monitor the faulted computer output. If the faulted
computer retains its ability to execute its programs and the program memory has not been
altered and input/output (I/O) capability is retained so that the computer can receive
information essential to processing, it will attempt to recover. The recovery procedure
used is a "warm restart." This is a simplified power-up routine that reinitializes control
function variables and checks to see if the failed output commands return to within
tolerances of the good computer outputs. The time constants of the control law filters
for the ACT airplane are such that this will occur within a short time if the fault has
cleared. If the output returns to within tolerance and stays there for a prescribed period
of time, the computer will be considered recovered and its actuators put back on line.
Servo output synchronization routines will be used as required to reduce transients at
recovery.
8.2.2.3 Self-Monitors and Self-Tests
In addition to the cross-channel comparison monitors, failure protection is provided by
computer self-monitors and self-tests. These functions are described in Subsections 8.1.2
and 8.3, respectively. Self-monitoring and self-testing provide extensive coverage of
latent failures and aid in failure isolation for maintenance purposes. It is expected that
self-test and self-monitoring can provide at least 95% coverage of computer failures.
If one of these monitors indicates a fault but the central processing unit (CPU) is still able
to execute instructions and the program memory is intact, the computer will attempt to
correct the error. For a watchdog monitor trip, the affected computer will attempt a
"warm start" recovery as in the previous case, but the servo will not be shut down unless
the output is out of tolerance for a period long enough to trip the output monitor.
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Coverage by inline methods is not considered adequate to allow single-channel operation
if a potentially catastrophic failure mode exists. Single-thread operation is permitted
only for the lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS) function, which meets require-
ments as described in the ground rules (subsec 5.2.2), and the crucial PAS function, as
there is no reasonable alternative to single-thread operation if a failure occurs when
system redundancy for this function has been reduced to two.
8.2.3 SERVOMONITORING
Faults in the servos, as well as in analog output and servoelectronic portions of the
computers, are handled by the servomonitor. The servomonitor provides cross-channel
comparison of servo outputs, and in some cases it is compared with an output predicted by
a mathematical model. There are three different kinds of servos to be monitored: force-
summed secondary servos, force-summed flaperon power control units (PCU), and force-
displacement magnetic flux-summed servos. Each servo requires a slightly different
monitor scheme, and Figure 58 illustrates the monitoring scheme for both kinds of force-
summed actuators. The positions of the servo spool valves are compared for the
secondary servos. The flaperon actuator forces are not summed by a rigid link but rather
by the torque box of the flaperon surface, which allows sufficient windup to compare
actuator ram position output and determine if a servoactuator has failed. Reliability of
the servos is such that only two servos are required for critical functions and three for
crucial functions when single-thread operation of actuators is allowed. Cross-channel
comparison alone does not provide adequate fault isolation for single-thread operation, as
a disagreement between two servos only indicates one has failed and not which one has
failed. A mathematical model in the computer provides an additional channel for
comparison. The servo spool valve position, or the actuator ram position, is predicted by
the model, and this prediction is compared to the measured position. This mathematical
prediction is used primarily for failure identification rather than failure detection, and a
simple mathematical model that ignores high-order dynamics of the system may be used.
Aerodynamic forces on the flaperon may also be ignored. Thresholds are set high enough
to avoid nuisance trips.
A counting algorithm similar to the SSFD algorithm described in the preceding subsection
can prevent nuisance trips caused by transients but retain detection of oscillatory
failures. Once a failure is detected and determined not to be a short transient, the servo
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Figure 58. ACT Force-Summed Actuation Fault Detection
is shut down by sending a signal to a voter whose output activates a hydraulic bypass valve
to shut down the servo. Once a servo has been shut down due to servo failure, it cannot
be monitored to see if the failure clears, so the servo remains shut down for the duration
of the flight.
The magnetic flux-summed servos of the force-displacement actuators use three coils in
each electrohydraulic valve so each valve receives signals from all three ACT Primary
Computers. This provides three channels for the electric portions of the actuation system
even though only two hydraulic channels are used. The electric and hydraulic portions of
the servo are monitored separately. Figure 59 illustrates monitoring for the electric
channels. The force-displacement actuators have four electrohydraulic valves, each
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containing three coils. The servodrive from each ACT Primary Computer is connected in
series with one of the coils in each of the four valves. The currents flowing in each of the
servodrive loops are compared to check the analog output and servoelectronic portions of
the computer as well as the coils themselves. The differences between the currents in the
three loops are compared to thresholds and the counting algorithm used to determine
failures. If a failure is detected, the servodrive current is electrically nulled by a signal
from the servo shutdown logic.
Hydraulic failures are monitored by using pressure switches in hydraulic pressure lines and
by measuring rotation in the summing linkages for each pair of electrohydraulic valves, as
described in Subsection 8.1.3. If a failure is detected, the failed valves are hydraulically
bypassed.
8.2.* ADDITIONAL FAILURE PROTECTION
Additional failure protection is provided for the actuation and for the electric systems.
Figure 60 summarizes the failure protection features. Actuator outputs are voted through
mechanical force summing or through a combination of magnetic flux summing and force
summing. These techniques are described in Subsection 8.1.3.
Electric power for each ACT channel is derived from two independent sources: one of the
aircraft main dc transformer-rectifier (T-R) buses and one of the standby batteries.
Power supply energy storage is sufficient to maintain voltage levels under maximum load
until battery backup can take over if a T-R bus fails. The probability of temporary loss of
power is therefore very low (see subsec 9.2.1), and no special procedures have been
designated for reconfiguration when power is lost. This would be treated as a
simultaneous failure of all parts of the affected channel. Reconfiguration and recovery
would follow procedures described in the preceding subsections.
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8.3 ACT SYSTEM SOFTWARE
Software is an essential part of any digital system. Software for the Active Controls
Technology (ACT) system has been designed with the objective of maintaining visibility
and simplifying verification and validation.
8.3.1 SOFTWARE DESIGN GUIDELINES
The design methodology requires using the "top-down" technique with limited application
of "bottom-up" techniques. Both top-down and bottom-up techniques are organizational
processes or ordered approaches used to attack a task. The top-down technique starts at
the "top" or highest level of consideration and uses partitioning designed to separate the
lower level parts required. The bottom-up technique is the opposite of top-down, in that
it first considers the parts available and'then designs at the next higher level to integrate
the parts into a unit.
For a design problem using the top-down approach, the highest starting level is the total
conceptual statement of the problem and the requirements the solution must meet. Then,
the next lower level of the solution and the interrelation of its parts are determined. This
process is repeated for each part on a new level to design the next lower level until the
lowest level parts of the solution are defined.
The bottom-up approach first takes the lowest level parts (e.g., a computer instruction
set) and integrates them into a higher level unit. This process may be repeated at each
successively higher level, with the lower level integrated units being further integrated
into higher level units. Successive bottom-up integration is not allowed in the ACT
design. Design of a bottom-level component is permitted when it is known that it will be
required even though the top-down design has not proceeded down to the level where it
would be specified. Control laws are examples of this type of component. There must
still be a top-down design and specification of the manner in which these components are
used.
Programs will be developed using the rules of structured programming, which define
organization and enforce discipline in the programming process. Programming rules are
made to ensure uniformity in style and to maximize clarity and visibility of how the
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program performs its intended task, regardless of how many programmers are involved.
Modularity is a main concern; it includes the organization of sets of instructions and data.
Standard control structures are established and program blocks are arranged sequentially
so that the flow of a program has maximum visibility. A classic objective of structured
programming is elimination of the GO-TO concept.
The entire computer resident software should be structured to maximize visibility,
flexibility, and efficiency. Items to be considered in program design include partitioning,
program module boundaries, hardware and software interfaces, program module control
and data interfaces, functional and safety criticality, implementation constraints, and
software testing.
8.3.2 SOFTWARE STRUCTURE
The objective of the overall ACT software task is to provide real-time implementation of
active controls and adequate failure detection and self-test to ensure safe and reliable
operation of the ACT system. Using a top-down design methodology, this overall task has
been divided functionally into progressively lower levels. The resulting functional design
trees are described in the following subsections.
8.3.2.1 ACT Primary Computer Software
Figure 61 shows the upper levels of the design tree for the ACT Primary Computers. The
overall task of active control is divided into two parts: real-time control, which performs
all tasks required for safe flight of the aircraft, and ground operations, which performs
preflight and maintenance testing while the aircraft is on the ground. The real-time
control software module is further divided into three tasks: real-time executive,
foreground tasks, and background tasks.
Real-Time Control-The real-time executive (fig. 62) provides interrupt processing
capability necessary for operating the control software in real time. There are four kinds
of interrupts: power interrupt, timer interrupt, input/output (I/O) interrupt, and fault
interrupt. Power interrupt software supplies system initialization following application of
power to the system and performs required tasks when loss of power is imminent.
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An event timer provides real-time information to the system. The timer interrupt
software begins processing for a new minor frame following a signal from the timer.
I/O interrupt processing software facilitates communication with external devices,
including communication with other computers via the cross-channel data link.
Fault interrupt software furnishes software processing for four different kinds of faults.
Cross-channel data link (CCDL) fault software indicates an error in data from another
computer and makes that information available to the reconfiguration software.
Arithmetic fault software provides overflow protection. Parity fault software provides
information about memory failures to the reconfiguration software. Watchdog monitor
software attempts recovery following a computer failure that prevents reset of the
watchdog monitor timer.
Foreground tasks are those control tasks that must be performed in real time. These
include tasks relating to redundancy management, control law calculation, and, because
different control laws run at different sampling rates, a multirate scheduler. The
breakdown for these tasks is shown in Figure 63.
The synchronization software minimizes the time difference between the start of a major
frame on different computers. Synchronization ensures that sensor data are sampled at
nearly the same time by all computers. Normal synchronization causes all computers to
start a major frame at the same time when the computers are operating within tolerance.
Resynchronization software acts to synchronize operation of the computers when one or
more is operating at a different point in a frame than the others. Cross-channel status
determines which computers are operating and in which minor frame they are operating.
This information is used to determine if resynchronization is necessary.
The multirate scheduler schedules control law software. Each control law calculation is
done only as often as required to get the proper sampling rate. Control laws and the
associated redundancy management are scheduled at different rates by the scheduler.
The signal selection and failure detection (5SFD) software (fig. 64) provides sensor failure
detection, signal selection, and transient suppression. Equalization is used on some sensor
signals to reduce transients by forcing all inputs to be close to the selected input value.
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The input processing module determines an equalized input value from the raw signal and
an error signal based on data from the previous frame. Fault detector software
determines which sensors are functioning correctly and changes the configuration to
exclude failed sensors. Two different failure detectors are implemented in software.
Detector-one compares the difference between the signal and a reference value to a
threshold. Signals that use equalization use detector-one to determine both high-
frequency and low-frequency failures. The error signal, which is the difference between
the input signal and the selected signals, is used for high-frequency detection. The
equalization signal, which is the filtered error signal, is used for low-frequency and bias
errors. Detector-two is used when no reference is available and compares differences
between signals to determine errors. Additional logic determines from the threshold
comparisons which sensor has failed. Both detectors use a threshold detector plus an
increment/decrement counter algorithm to detect oscillatory failures. The reconfigure-
sensors software uses fault detector information to declare temporary and permanent
faults. Sensors that have been declared failed, either temporarily or permanently, are not
used in the signal selection process. A temporarily failed sensor is declared good again if
it returns to proper operation, as confirmed by indicating the correct signal for a period
of time. This time limit is chosen so that changes in the measured quantity over that
time period are presumed large enough that the error would be detected even if a sensor
failed to the nominal signal value. A permanent failure cannot be recovered until
maintenance action has been taken.
Signal selection software determines a single value for each parameter from the
redundant sensor signals. The determine-sensor-configuration module determines how
many values the selector operates upon. Median select software produces an output equal
to the median of three input values. The average select module averages the values of
the inputs when only two sensors remain. The default select module produces an output
equal to some default value when there are fewer than two valid input signals. This
default value may be a constant or the previously selected output.
Following signal selection, the equalization error calculation routine calculates the error
signal, which is the difference between the raw signal and selected signal. The error
signal is passed through a high-gain lag filter to form the equalization signal. The
equalization signal is subtracted from the raw signal in the next frame during input
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processing to form the equalized input. This routine is bypassed for signals that do not
require equalization.
Control law software (fig. 65) calculates surface position commands using selected sensor
input data to provide the following functions: Full Pitch-Augmented Stability (Full PAS),
angle-of-attack limiter (AAL), wing-load alleviation (WLA), lateral/directional-augmented
stability (LAS), and flutter-mode control (FMC). The Full PAS function includes both
short-period PAS and phugoid PAS modes. WLA includes maneuver-load control (MLC)
and gust-load alleviation (GLA).
The output monitor software (fig. 63) detects computer failures that result in erroneous
digital output. Surface position commands calculated using the control laws are
transmitted digitally to other channels by the transfer data cross-channel software
module. The failure detector compares these output values and detects any that are out
of tolerance using the same algorithm as used by detector-two of the SSFD software
(fig. 64). Reconfigure-servos software shuts down the servos of the affected channel
when a failure is detected and reengages servos following successful recovery, providing
reengagement synchronization as required to prevent undesirable transients. Recovery
software reinitializes the computer and checks to see if proper operation resumes.
The servomonitor software checks the proper operation of the servos. The force-summed
servoactuators use comparison with a mathematical model to determine which servo has
failed in the event of a disagreement between the two servos, thus allowing operation
with a single servo. Mathematical model software is used to predict the spool valve
position for forced-summed secondary servos and to predict the actuator position for the
fiaperon power control units (PCU). The servo failure detector software compares servo
parameters to detect failures using the same algorithm used in detector two of the SSFD
software. Spool valve positions, both measured and predicted by the mathematical model,
are compared for the secondary force-summed servos. Actuator positions, again including
a mathematical model prediction, are compared for the fiaperon actuators. Servo-loop
currents in the electrohydraulic valve coils are compared for the dedicated force-
displacement servos. If a failure is detected, the shutdown servos software acts to
hydraulically bypass the servo in the case of force-summed actuators or to electrically
null the output command to the force-displacement summed servos.
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Background tasks software (fig. 66) performs tasks in flight to provide information about
the state of the ACT systems. These tasks are not time critical and are performed on a
time-available basis following completion of the foreground tasks. However, because
information on the state of the system is required to be up to date for reliability purposes,
sufficient time must be allowed for background tasks such that all may be completed
within a reasonable amount of time.
The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer interface software provides system status
information to the maintenance and display computer. The determine-LRU-status
software consolidates information supplied by system monitors and self-test. The LRU
status and monitor status is checked to determine functional status by the determine-
functional-status software, and the result is supplied to the ACT Maintenance and Display
Computer.
Background
tasks
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and Display
Computer
interface
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support
Determine-
LRU-
status
Determine-
functional-
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Figure 66. ACT Primary Computer Software, Background Tasks
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In-flight tests software provides up-to-date information on the soundness of the system.
Test results are used to supplement information from the real-time monitors. The in-
flight tests include reasonableness tests on sensor data, program memory sum checks,
cross-channel integrity tests, etc., that do not interfere with real-time operation.
Maintenance support software supplies information about the system so that failures may
be located and repaired quickly and easily by maintenance personnel. This primarily
consists of collecting and formatting data from monitors and tests so that data may be
transmitted to the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer.
Ground Operations—Ground operations (fig. 67) is the second major task of the software.
It provides software to perform preflight and maintenance testing. This module is active
only when certain conditions are met; one condition is that the airplane must be on the
ground. The software is divided into three parts: ground test executive, preflight test,
and maintenance test.
The ground test executive software verifies test conditions and interrupt processing.
Verify-test-conditions software checks to ensure that the airplane is on the ground and
then runs the proper test when other conditions are met. The executive includes fault
interrupt processing software and I/O interrupts processing software. The test scheduler
software determines which tests are to be run.
The bulk of the ground operations software is the preflight test (fig. 68), which performs
tests to determine the state of the system before flight. System components and
functions must be tested before takeoff to ensure that safety requirements are met.
These same tests may also be performed at other times for maintenance testing. The
preflight consists of three different kinds of tests: computer self-tests, system monitor
tests, and end-to-end tests.
Computer self-tests software (fig. 69) includes tests to verify the ability of the computer
to perform correctly. These tests are performed solely by the computer and require no
external input. The instruction repertoire test software checks the computer central
processing unit (CPU) to verify that each legitimate operation code executes properly.
Monitor-checks software tests each computer hardware monitor and verifies that they
trip when an error occurs. The watchdog monitor test software checks that the watchdog
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monitor trips if not reset by the CPU. It also checks the length of the watchdog monitor
timing windows. The parity check test software generates words with improper
parity and verifies that the parity check hardware functions properly. The overflow
protection test software performs arithmetic operations that result in an overflow and
verifies that an overflow interrupt is generated.
Memory-tests software checks that all computer memory is functioning without error.
ROM-sum-checks software verifies that errors have not occurred in program memory.
This is done by adding all the operation codes in each block of memory and comparing that
to a sum check code. Scratch pad read/write test software writes different patterns into
each scratch pad memory location and then reads it back to verify that proper data are
stored in memory. Patterns are chosen to show that each bit will set to both a "1" and
a "0."
Wraparound-I/O-tests software tests the I/O circuits of the computer by closing a relay
and wrapping outputs around to the computer inputs. Data are output, and inputs are
checked after a suitable delay to verify that these same data have been received at the
input. Four such tests are made, one for each type of I/O. These are analog I/O test,
discrete I/O test, cross-channel I/O test, and Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC)
429 interface test.
The final computer self-test software module is the dedicated display test module, which
checks the computer message display capability. The discrete warning lights are tested
such that the crew can determine if the displays are functioning.
System-monitor-test software (fig. 68) tests major system functions. All computers must
run the test simultaneously and depend on data from other computers. This software tests
the system-level monitors and the major sensors. The major sensor test software asks the
digital air data computer (DADC) and the inertial reference system (IRS) to perform
internal tests and then checks the results. The system-level monitor test software
provides data for normal and failure cases and checks that the monitor correctly
determines the status. Three software modules perform these tests: the SSFD test
module, output monitor test module, and servomonitor test module.
End-to-end tests software checks that the system is functioning properly from sensor
input to actuator output. This is done in two steps: Electronic end-to-end test software
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checks all components from the sensors to the computer output. The mechanical end-to-
end test software checks actuator operation when hydraulic power and ground clearance
are available. This test checks servoelectronics and hydraulic actuators. The two parts
of the end-to-end test verify that the system is functional.
Maintenance tests software (fig. 67) isolates faults and provides information for
corrective maintenance. Although each test in the preflight may also be used for this
purpose, the maintenance tests software is defined to include only those tests not also
included in the preflight. This includes sensor test software, which tests dedicated ACT
sensors, and full end-to-end test software, which combines the electronic and mechanical
end-to-end tests of the preflight.
8.3.2.2 Essential PAS Computer Software
Software for the Essential PAS Computers is similar to the ACT Primary Computer
software, except the real-time software is simplified because only one control law is
implemented in the Essential PAS Computer. Figures 70 through 77 show the design tree
for the Essential PAS Computer software. The task of the software is to maintain pitch
stability augmentation and to provide adequate self-test and failure detection. This task
is divided into two main tasks: real-time control and ground operations (fig. 70). All
software modules may be considered to be identical in function to similarly named ACT
Primary Computer software modules except as noted.
The real-time executive software (fig. 71) performs the same function as described
earlier, except the Essential PAS Computer does not have a separate autonomous I/O
controller to initiate analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion, so this must be performed by the
CPU. The timer interrupt software must now perform two tasks: Analog-to-digital
converter cycle software signals the conversion hardware to begin producing new values
before the beginning of a frame. The frame initiate software begins processing a new
frame. In addition, the fault processing software performs the same function as the fault
interrupt processing module in the ACT Primary Computers, but the submodules are not
necessarily interrupt driven.
It is in the foreground tasks module (fig. 72) that the Essential PAS Computer software
differs most from the ACT Primary Computer software. The SSFD software (fig. 73)
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operates on sensor input to be used by the fixed-gain short-period PAS module. The SSFD
software is similar to the ACT Primary Computer software with one major exception.
The Essential PAS Computer SSFD must deal with four redundant sensors rather than
three. All four signals are monitored by fault detector software at all times, but a
maximum of three signals is used by the signal selection software; one signal is designated
a standby and is not used until one of the other signals fails. If one of these signals fails
while the standby is good, the median select software is still used, but with
the standby signal used in place of the failed signal. If two failures occur, the average
select software acts on the two remaining good signals. If a third sensor failure occurs,
the fault detector provides insufficient data to determine which of the last two sensors
has failed. In the ACT Primary Computer, this would result in choosing a default value.
Selecting a default value for the pitch-rate signal, which is the only control variable
processed by the Essential PAS Computer, would result in potential loss of the short-
period PAS function and, given the ground rules of this study, loss of the aircraft. The
best-value select software applies reasonableness tests and checks the results of sensor
self-tests to determine which signal is correct. If no probable best value is indicated, one
of the signals is arbitrarily selected.
Fixed-gain short-period PAS software is similar to that of the ACT Primary Computer.
The Essential PAS foreground tasks software includes an additional module, the Full PAS
command selection (fig. 72). This software selects the output signal to be sent to the
elevator from the Full PAS commands received from the ACT Primary Computers and the
command calculated by the fixed-gain short-period PAS software. Because each Essential
PAS Computer receives data on only one bus from the ACT Primary Computers, these
data must be transferred cross channel before any voting may take place. The Essential
PAS Computers have no autonomous I/O controller; hence, the transfer must be done by
the CPU. Transfer data cross-channel software performs this task. These data are then
checked by the comparison monitor software to detect failures in the ACT Primary
Computers or in the data link. The reconfigure software examines the results of this
comparison along with status outputs from the ACT Primary Computers to determine
validity of these data. The select output signal software selects a signal from the valid
outputs. If all three redundant signals from the ACT Primary Computers are good, the
median select software determines the median signal for use as the output. If only two
signals are valid, the average software selects the mean of those two signals. If less than
two valid signals are available, the fixed-gain output software selects the output. Three
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separate signals are transmitted over the bus from the ACT Primary Computers, one for a
variable-gain short-period PAS, one for speed PAS, and one for the pitch compensation
component of MLC. If either of the latter two fails, the fixed-gain output software
selects zero for that part of the output. If the short-period PAS signal from the ACT
Primary Computers fails, the fixed-gain output software selects the output calculated by
the fixed-gain short-period PAS module of the Essential PAS Computers. The three parts
of the elevator output are then summed. To prevent large step changes on the output, the
fixed-gain output module includes easy-on software to smooth transients.
The output monitor software functions the same as that of the ACT Primary Computers,
except that it compares four outputs rather than three. The servomonitor software also
functions similar to the ACT Primary Computer software, except it deals only with force-
summed secondary servos and compares three servo spool valve positions and a
mathematical model.
Background tasks software (fig. 74) in the Essential PAS Computer is functionally
identical to that of the ACT Primary Computer. Ground operations software (fig. 75) is
also very similar to that of the ACT Primary Computer. The only significant differences
occur in preflight test software (fig. 76), where the major sensor test module is deleted
because the Essential PAS Computers do not receive data from the IRS or DADC. With
cross strapping of pitch-rate sensor data, each computer communicates directly with each
sensor and can isolate sensor failures by comparing results from the end-to-end tests.
Computer self-test (fig. 77) software in the Essential PAS Computers is simplified from
that of the ACT Primary Computers due to reduced complexity of the computers. The
major simplification is deletion of wraparound testing. Cross strapping of sensor data and
coordination of testing provide comparable fault detection with only slightly degraded
fault isolation, and deleting wraparounds aids computer simplification.
In addition to ACT Primary Computers and Essential PAS Computers, the system also
requires an ACT Maintenance and Display Computer, which coordinates testing, provides
fault information storage to aid maintenance personnel, and furnishes cockpit warning and
advisory messages. This computer is not flight critical, and no effort has yet been made
to detail software for it.
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Figure 77. Essential Pitch-Augmented Stability Software, Computer Self-Test
8.3.3 MEMORY AND EXECUTION TIME ASSESSMENT
Based upon the software design described in Subsection 8.3.2, estimates of memory size
and execution time have been made for major software modules. Table 13 summarizes
these estimates. Wherever possible, estimates are based on laboratory test software
written for the General Electric MCP-701A flight control computers, which represent
performance typical of current-generation flight control computers.
Total memory required for the ACT Primary Computers is approximately 15.IK words.
Allowing for 50% growth yields a requirement for a minimum of 22K words. Execution
time for the real-time functions is estimated to be 14.8 ms in each 20-ms major frame.
This allows a 34% margin for time growth. The growth margin may be inadequate if
another machine with somewhat lower performance is considered. Even the 34% margin
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Table 13. ACT Control System Memory Requirements and Timing
Software module
Real-time executive
Foreground tasks
Synchronization
Scheduler
SSFD
Control laws
Output monitor
Servomonitor
Background tasks
Control and display
communication
In-flight tests
Maintenance support
Ground operations
Test executive
Preflight tests
Maintenance test
Total
ACT Primary Computers
Memory,
words
750
200
100
800
1 200
400
500
1 900
500
200
1 200
6000
1 000
15100
Execution time
(per major frame),ms
0.2
0.6
0.1
4.5
2.4
2.5
4.5
14.9
Essential PAS Computers
Memory,
words
400
—
—
325
100
100
200
300
300
100
600
4500
400
7325
Execution time
(per major frame), ms
0.2
—
—
2.3
0.1
0.3
0.5
3.4
available for time growth with the MCP-701A is considerably below the preferred margin
of 100%. However, the software is estimated based on a full-feature aircraft with all
possible functions and surfaces. This represents a worst case with respect to execution
time. For an actual system, the number of functions and surfaces is expected to be
fewer; therefore, less execution time is expected. With this in mind, the relatively small
growth margin is deemed acceptable. Background task execution time is not critical, with
all functions completed in less than 5 sec.
The Essential PAS Computers require approximately 7325 words of memory, 1625 of
which are for programs necessary for safe flight of the aircraft. The rest are active only
on the ground for preflight or maintenance testing. A 50% memory growth allowance
results in a requirement for a minimum of UK words. Execution time for real-time
software is estimated to be 3.4 ms per 10-ms frame, based upon execution of laboratory
test programs on the MCP-701A. The PAS backup computer is based on a 16-bit
microprocessor and would take longer to execute the problem. The margin available
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should be adequate even with the expected slower execution time. Timing of background
tasks is not critical.
The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer software has not been defined in detail. It is
expected to require up to 32K words, which could be 8-bit words. Timing is not critical
for this computer.
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8.* ACT SYSTEM OPERATION
The Selected System was introduced in Subsection 6.4 and described more fully in
Section 7.0. The basic plan of system operation is given in those sections.
This subsection will first detail the operability of the Active Controls Technology (ACT)
system. Subsection 5.3.2 contains a narrative description of airplane performance
capability with complete loss of each active control function considered separately.
Subsection 8.4.1 presents that data in tabular form and develops the effect upon airplane
operability of various combinations of functions lost and functions whose loss could result
from one additional line replaceable unit (LRU) failure.
Subsections 8.4.2, 8.4.3, and 8.4.4, respectively, detail the means by which:
• System and component failures are detected.
• Failure and system status information is communicated to flight and ground crews.
• Flight plan change advisory messages are selected and communicated to the flight
crew.
8.4.1 AIRPLANE DISPATCHABILITY AND IN-FLIGHT OPERABILITY
The effect of single function loss in the ACT system is described in Subsection 5.3.2 and
reproduced in Table 14. Based on that airplane operability with a single function loss, a
study was conducted to define operability with multiple ACT function failures. The
results are shown in Table 15. The following list contains the assumptions made for the
operability assessment shown in Table 15.
• Only those functions listed in the table are assumed to be failed completely; i.e.,
other functions are assumed to be operating normally.
• The table does not treat the period of transition from normal to restricted flight.
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Table 14. (Assumed) ACT Airplane Operability and Dispatchability
With a Single Function (Complete) Loss
Case
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Complete function loss
Short-period pitch-
augmented stability
(PAS)
Speed PAS
Angle of attack (AAL)
Lateral/directional-
augmented stability
(LAS)
Wing-load alleviation
(WLA)
Flutter-mode control
(FMC)
in-flight operability
Loss of airplane
Flight restriction A
Continue normal
fl.ight schedule
Flight restriction B
Continue normal
flight schedule
Flight restriction C
•Oispatchability
No go
Restricted flight
No go
No go
No go
Restricted
flight
Remarks
PAS consists of crucial and critical PAS.
The crucial PAS loss will cause an im-
mediate safety hazard.
Flying quality after the critical PAS
loss is assumed to be acceptable for the
restricted flight.
The ACT airplane has "locked in" stall
at low-speed condition. The airplane
can continue normal flight schedule
if the AAL failure (complete function
loss) occurs in flight. The airplane may
divert to other airport if severe turbu-
lence exists at destination. No go
is for safety reasons.
Flying quality after the complete LAS
loss is assumed to be acceptable for
restricted flight. No go exists because
of structure dispatch requirement.
The ACT airplane structure exceeds
design limit load strength requirements
without WLA system.
The ACT airplane structure does not
satisfy design ultimate load strength
requirements without WLA.
The ACT airplane will retreat to a
lower cruise speed to allow adequate
speed margin for upset.
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Table 15. (Assumed) ACT Airplane Operability and Dispatchability
With Combination of Function Losses
Case
No.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Crucial
PAS
Critical
PAS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
AAL
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LAS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
WLA
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMC
X
X
X
X
X
X
In-flight
operability
Flight
restriction
A
Flight
restriction
D
Flight
restriction
A
Flight
restriction
E
Flight
restriction
B
Continue
normal
flight
Flight
•restriction
C
Flight
restriction
B
Flight
restriction
F
Flight
restriction
C
Flight
restriction
D
Flight
restriction
A
Flight
restriction
E
Flight
diversion
Flight
restriction
G
Dispatch-
ability
No go
No go
No go
Go with
flight
restriction
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
Remarks
Combination of cases 2 and 3
Combination of cases 2 and 4; assume
flight restriction D exists
Combination of cases 2 and 5
Combination of cases 2 and 6; assume
flight restriction E exists
Combination of cases 3 and 4
Combination of cases 3 and 5
Combination of cases 3 and 6
Combination of cases 4 and 5
Combination of cases 4 and 6; assume
flight restriction F exists
Combination of cases 5 and 6
Combination of cases 2, 3, and 4
Combination of cases 2, 3, and 5
Combination of cases 2, 3, and 6
Loss of critical PAS, LAS, and WLA may
result in an unacceptable risk in handling.
quality or performance capabilities under
some abnormal conditions
Combination of cases, 2, 4, and 6
X indicates function loss
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Table 15. (Assumed) ACT Airplane Operability and Dispatchability
With Combination of Function Losses (Continued)
Case
No,
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Crucial
PAS
Critical
PAS
X
X
X
X
X
X
AAL
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LAS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
WLA
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
In-flight
operability
Flight
restriction
E
Flight
restriction
B
Flight
restriction
F
Flight
restriction
C
Flight
restriction
F
Flight
diversion
Flight
restriction
G
Flight
restriction
E
Flight
diversion
Flight
restriction
F
Flight
diversion
Dispatch-
ability
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
No go
Remarks
Combination of cases 2, 5, and 6
Combination of cases 3, 4, and 5
Combination of cases 3, 4, and 6
Combination of cases 3, 5, and 6
Combination of cases 4, 5, and 6
Flight diversion for the same reasons as
case 20
AAL loss does not affect handling quality;
same as case 21
Loss of WLA and AAL does not affect
handling quality; same as case 22
Flight diversion for the same reason as
case 20
Loss of AAL and WLA does not affect
handling quality; flight restriction for the
same reason as case 26
Flight diversion for the same reason as
cases 20, 27, and 30
X indicates function loss
• Flight restrictions A, B, C, D, E, F, or G indicate that some type of restriction
exists for given system failures. Lacking detailed airplane performance
characteristics, these restrictions cannot be specified. Experience indicates that
when these restrictions can be determined, there will probably be not seven
different restrictions but three or four.
Based on the airplane operability in Tables Ik and 15, the ground rules were established as
described in Subsections 8.4.1.1 and 8.4.1.2 for prediction of in-flight operability and
dispatchabihty of the ACT airplane. Results of these predictions are discussed in detail
under Reliability Assessment in Subsections 9.2.2 and 9.2.3.
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8.4.1.1 In-Flight Operability
In-flight schedule changes include flight restriction and flight diversion. Flight restriction
may force the pilot to change the flight envelope or alter normal operating procedures to
avoid a potential safety hazard. In case of flight diversion, the pilot must land the
airplane as soon as possible to avoid the hazard. In some cases, the pilot will initiate
flight restriction with sufficient redundancy remaining prior to complete function loss.
The following ground rules are established for assessment of schedule change reliability:
• The pilot shall continue a normal flight schedule when angle-of-attack limiter (AAL)
or wing-load alleviation (WLA) or both functions become inoperative in the air,
assuming other ACT functions are operative with sufficient redundancy.
• The pilot shall initiate a flight restriction when subsystem failures occur in such a
way that one more LRU failure would result in the flight restriction in Table 15.-
• The pilot shall initiate a flight diversion when subsystem failures occur in such a
way that one more LRU failure would require flight diversion shown in Table 15.
The last two "one more failure" stipulations make the operability tables much more
complicated. Adding those statements to Table 15 yields Tables 16 and 17.
8.4.1.2 Dispatchability
The following general rules govern the influence of the ACT control system on airplane
dispatch.
No Go
The airplane shall not be dispatched, regardless of other function status, when
the system has complete loss of one or a combination of AAL,
lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS), and WLA functions.
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Table 16. , Dispatchability
Case
No. System failures
3
'
13
Dispatchability
No go Go withflight restriction
Go without
flight restriction
Remarks
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
g
10
11
12
13
14
Crucial PAS
Critical PAS
AAL
LAS
WLA
FMC
Critical PAS,
AAL
Critical PAS,
LAS
Critical PAS,
WLA
Critical PAS,
FMC
AAL, LAS
AAL, WLA
AAL, FMC
LAS, WLA
Crucial PAS(X)d'e
Not applicable
AAL(X)
LAS(X)
WLA(X)
Not applicable
AAL(X) and DCf
LAS(X) and DC
WLA(X) and DC
Not applicable
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
and DC
AAL(X) orWLA(X)
and DC
AAL(X) and DC
LAS(X)orWLA(X)
Not applicable
Critical PAS(X or 0)
Not applicable
LAS(O)
Not applicable
FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
WLA(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O)
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
Not applicable
AAL(O) and FMC(X)
LAS(O) and WLA(O)
Not applicable
Not applicable
AAL(O)
Not applicable
WLA(O)
FMC(O)
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
AALfO)andWLA(O)
AAL(O) and FMC(O)
Not applicable
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction B
aOnly those functions shown in this column are assumed to be failed. (Other functions are operative with
sufficient redundancy.)
Single and combination of failures
clndicates type of flight restriction
No go if remaining crucial PAS has reliability lower than 10 failure after 1 hr of flight
e(X) indicates complete function loss
(0) indicates one failure away .from complete function loss
Example 1: LAS(X) = complete LAS loss
LAS(O) = one failure away from complete LAS loss
Example 2: LAS(X or 0) = LAS(X) or LAS(O)
DC indicates don't care
Example: (Case 7) no go under AAL(X) and DC = no go if AAL is lost regardless of other functions
(don't care other functions)
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Table 16. Dispatchability (Continued)
Case
No.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
System failures3'*3
LAS, FMC
WLA, FMC
Critical PAS,
AAL, LAS
Critical PAS,
AAL, WLA
Critical PAS,
AAL, FMC
Critical PAS,
LAS, WLA
Critical PAS,
LAS, FMC
Critical PAS,
WLA, FMC
AAL, LAS, WLA
AAL, LAS, FMC
AAL, WLA, FMC
LAS, WLA, FMC
Critical PAS,
AAL, LAS, WLA
Dispatchability
No go
LAS(X) and DC
WLA(X) and DC
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
and DC
AAL(X)orWLA(X)
and DC
AAL(X) and DC
(PAS-LAS-WLA) (0)
or LAS(X) or
WLA(X)
LAS(X) and DC
WLA(X) and DC
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
orWLA(X)andDC
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
and DC
AAL(X)orWLA(X)
and DC
LAS(X)orWLA(X)
and DC
(PAS-1AS-WLA) (6)
or LAS{X) or
WLA(X)
and DC-AAL
Go with
flight restriction
LAS(O) and FMC(X)
LAS(O) and FMC(O)
WLA(O) and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(O) and AAL(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
WLA(0)andAAL(0)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) or FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) or FMC(O)
Not applicable
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(O) and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(O) and FMC(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
WLA (0) and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
WLA(O) and FMC(O)
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
and WLA(O)
AAL(O) AND LAS(O)
and FMC(X)
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
and FMC(O)
AAL(O) and WLA(O)
and FMC(X)
LAS(O) and WLA(O)
and FMC(X)
LASIO)andWLA(O)
and FMC(O)
Not applicable
Go without
flight restriction
Not applicable
Not applicable
WLA(O) and FMC(O)
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
AAL(0)andWLA(0)
and FMC(O)
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Remarks0
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
-
Flight restriction G
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
203
Table 16. 'Dispatchability (Concluded)
Case
No.
28
29
30
31
32
System failures9'
Critical PAS,
AAL, LAS.FMC
Critical PAS,
AAL, WLA, FMC
Critical PAS,
LAS, WLA,
FMC
AAL, LAS,
WLA, FMC
Critical PAS,
AAL, LAS,
WLA, FMC
Dispatchability
No go
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
and DC
AALIX)orWLA(X)
and DC
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(X or 0) and
WLA(X or 0) and
DC- AAL
AAL(X) or LAS(X)
orWLA(X) and DC-
FMC
PAS(X or 0) and LAS
(X or 0) and WLAIX
or 0) and DC-FMC
and DC-AAL
Go with
flight restriction
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
and FMC(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) and WLA (0)
and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
AAL(O) andWLA(0)
and FMC(O)
Not applicable
AAL (0) and LAS(O)
and WLA (0) and
FMC(X)
AAL(O) and LAS(O)
and WLA (0) and
FMC(O)
Not applicable
Go without
flight restriction
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Remarks0
Flight restriction G
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
• The airplane shall not be dispatched, regardless of other function status, when
subsystem failures occur in such a way that the crucial pitch-augmented
q
stability (PAS) function does not meet the reliability requirement of 10"
failure probability per 1-hr flight.
Go With Flight Restriction
The airplane shall be dispatchable with a flight restriction when subsystem failure
results in one of the following failure combinations:
• Loss of critical PAS function
• One failure from complete critical PAS loss
• One failure from complete LAS loss
• Loss of flutter-mode control (FMC) function
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Table 17. tin-FlightOperability
Case
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
a bSystem failures '
Crucial PAS
Critical PAS
AAL
LAS
WLA
FMC
Critical PAS, AAL
Critical PAS, LAS
Critical PAS, WLA
Critical PAS, FMC
AAL, LAS
AAL, WLA
AAL, FMC
LAS, WLA
Flight diversion
PAS(Q)d
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not aoplicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Flight restriction
Not applicable
Critical PAS(X or 0)
Not applicable
LAS(X or 0)
Not applicable
FMC(X)
PAS(XorO) and
DC-AAL6
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(X or 0)
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA
PAS(X or 0) and
FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O)
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL
Not applicable
FMC(X) and DC-AAL
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA
Continuation of normal
flight schedule
Other crucial PAS failures
Not applicable
AAL (X or 0)
Nm applicable
WLA(X or 0)
FMC(O)
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
AAL(X orO) and WLA
( X o r O )
FMC(O) and DC-AAL
Not applicable
Remarks0
Complete loss of
crucial PAS
will lose aircraft
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction B
aOnly those functions shown in this column are assumed to be failed.
(Other functions are operative with sufficient redundancy.)
Single and combination of failures
c
 Indicates type of flight restriction
(X) indicates complete function loss
(0) indicates one failure away from complete function loss
Exampte 1 : LAS(X) = complete LAS loss
LAS(b) = one LRU failure away from complete LAS loss
Example 2: LAS(X or 0) = LAS(X) or LAS(O)
e
 DC indicates don't care
Example: (Case 7) No go under AAL (X) and DC = No go if AAL is lost regardless of other functions
(don't care other functions)
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Table 17. In-Flight Operability (Continued)
Case
No.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
a bSystem failures '
LAS, FMC
WLA, FMC
Critical PAS, AAL,
LAS
Critical PAS, AAL,
WLA
Critical PAS, AAL,
FMC
Critical PAS, LAS,
WLA
Critical PAS, LAS,
FMC
Critical PAS, WLA,
FMC
AAL, LAS, WLA
AAL, LAS, FMC
AAL, WLA, FMC
LAS, WLA, FMC
Flight diversion
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
(PAS-LAS-WLA)
(XorO)
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not aoplicable
Flight restriction
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(X)
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O)
FMC(X) and DC-WLA
PAS(XorO) and
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL
PAS(XorO),and
DC-AAL and DC-WLA
PAS(XorO)and
FMC(X) and DC-AAL
PAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O) and DC-AAL
Not applicable
PAS(X or 0) and
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(X)
PAS(XorO)and
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA and FMC(X)
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA and FMC(O)
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and DC-WLA
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and FMC(X)
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and FMC(O)
FMC(X) and DC-AAL
and DC-WLA
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA and FMC(X)
LAS(X or 0) and
DC-WLA and FMC(O)
Continuation of
normal flight schedule
Not applicable
Not applicable
FMC(O) and DC-WLA
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
FMC(O) and DC-AAL
and DC-WLA
Not applicable
Not applicable
Remarks0
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction G
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
Flight restriction C
Flight restriction F
Flight restriction B
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Table 17. In-Flight Operability (Concluded)
Case
No.
27
28
29
30
31
32
System failures '
Critical PAS, AAL,
LAS, WLA
Critical PAS, AAL,
LAS, FMC 1
Critical PAS, AAL,
WLA, FMC
Critical PAS, LAS,
WLA, FMC
AAL, LAS, WLA,
FMC
Critical PAS, AAL,
LAS, WLA, FMC
Flight diversion
(PAS-LAS-WLA)
(X or 0) and
DC-AAL
Not applicable
Not applicable
(PAS-LAS-WLA)
(X or 0) and
DC-FMC
Not applicable
(PAS-LAS-WLA)
(X or 0) and
DC-FMC and
DC-AAL
Flight restriction
Not applicable
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and LAS(X.orO)
and FMC(X) and
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and
LAS(X or 0) and FMC(O)
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and DC-WLA
and FMC(X) and
PAS(X or 0) and
DC-AAL and DC-WLA
'and FMC(O)
Not applicable
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(X) and DC-AAL
and DC-WLA
LAS(X or 0) and
FMC(O) and DC-AAL
and DC-WLA
Not applicable
Continuation of
normal flight schedule
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Remarks0
Flight restriction G
Flight restriction D
Flight restriction E
Flight restriction A
Flight restriction f
Flight restriction B
• Go With No Flight Restriction
The airplane shall be dispatchable without any restriction when subsystem failures
occur in such a way that one more failure would result in loss of FMC function.
Again, inclusion of the "one failure from" statements expands Table 15 to the much more
inclusive Table 17 form.
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8.4.2 SYSTEM TEST AND MAINTENANCE
Figure 78 shows the organization of ACT testing in three modes. Although routine
preflight testing is undesirable, the system criticality described in Subsection 5.3.1 makes
preflight essential, and the primarily electronic character of the system, coupled with
computer automation, combines to make preflight test time very short. These tests are
indicated in the second column at the left in Figure 78. The same tests and others can be
called up as needed for maintenance operations represented at the right in the figure. In
the IAAC ground test concept, all of these tests are accomplished without special test
equipment; the active control computers do the whole job.
The ACT Primary Computers have sufficient capacity such that they can perform
multiple control law and redundancy management calculations during flight and also
monitor their own soundness and that of the system as well. The in-flight monitor mode is
indicated in the middle of Figure 78.
The computer memory required for system test is presently estimated at 8200 words in
the ACT Primary Computer and 5500 words in the Essential PAS Computer. Figure 79
shows the logic fundamental to the selection of test and maintenance modes and the basic
control character of each mode. One of the large blocks will be detailed in a later figure.
Figure 80 is a bar chart that compares time available to time required for routine ACT
testing. The ACT Design Requirements and Objectives Document states the objective
that "preflight test time shall be less than 2 minutes." ACT Primary and Essential PAS
Computer sets will test themselves simultaneously; the ACT Primary self-test series is
slightly longer than the Essential PAS, both remaining below 30 sec by current estimate.
The electronic preflight will be performed simultaneously with other cockpit preparation
operations typically needing 10 min or more. The mechanical part of preflight must
exercise the ACT servos. This requires operating pressure in the hydraulic system and
means that either the main propulsion engines or the auxiliary power unit (APU) must be
running. The servo test also results in control surface motions. These conditions
prerequire that the aircraft have ground clearance for personnel safety reasons. Thus,
this part of preflight will be done just before taxiing or during taxi out. At least in the
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latter case, the duration of less than 0.5 min will not extend airplane preflight time. The
last bar at the right in Figure 80 indicates the full-time character of the in-flight
monitors.
8.4.2.1 Preflight Testing
The objectives of preflight testing are to:
• Provide a factual basis for the part of the pilot's dispatch decision representing the
ACT control system
• Identify the failed LRUs if the ACT system indication is no go, and verify system
integrity after replacement
The first objective requires that the control system operating status be made known to
the pilot.
System faults determined during preflight test will have one of three results:
• No effect upon the flight plan
• Takeoff into a restricted flight plan
• "No go," dispatch denied
Fault information is presented to the flight crew only in the latter two cases.
Subsection 8.4.4 details how the system and air crew respond to such cases.
Figure 17 shows the organization of the ACT control system as a whole, including the
provisions for all six active control functions. Figure 81 is an idealized form of the prior
diagram and will be used to illustrate the preflight test series. Each computer set
performs the same test and monitor functions again with respect to its own input and
output quantities. The one exception is the singular interface between the two computer
sets; this must be treated as a special case.
Although the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer is not dispatch required, it can be
undergoing test during the ACT preflight test period simultaneously with the two control
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computer sets. This saves time and allows the crew to know before takeoff the
availability of the "automatic option" information output illustrated at 2 in Figure 41.
Preflight Test-Electronic—The basic scheme of the preflight test series is the "inside-out"
plan, in which the computers first test themselves and then, employing their recently
verified hardware and software, test the operation of other components and combinations.
This sequence is illustrated in Figure 82. In the first preflight test phase, the computers
will perform the following self-tests under software control:
• Program sum checks
• Hardware monitor test
• Digital receiver and transmitter test
• Scratch pad memory read/write test
• Discrete input/output test
• Analog input/output test
• Instruction repertoire
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1. Computers
2. Monitors
Figure 82. Inside-Out Test Sequence
The Essential PAS Computers will not require all the tests of this list; e.g., discrete
input/output is not needed in these computers.
Next, the computers test the control system monitors as indicated at 2 in Figure 82. The
three sets of cross-channel monitors are as follows:
• Signal selection and failure detection (SSFD) is the sensor comparison monitor. It
selects a midvalue from among the sensor signals gathered by cross-channel
communication and then derives and tests differences to detect sensor failure.
Selected midvalues are input to the computer control law process.
• The computer output monitor compares the results of the multiple parallel control
law computations that are performed based upon the one selected sensor signal.
Differences detected there indicate faulty computer operation.
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• The servomonitor is a computer operating on signals fed back from active control
servos to the computer. In the redundant secondary servos, the second-stage valve
spool position is sensed by a linear variable differential transformer (LVDT); after
being digitized, these signals and the mathematical models of spool position are
compared to enable detection of servo faults.
These monitors, illustrated in Figure 53, are used in flight operations as full-time
overseers of system operation and detectors of local faults. They also serve the same
functions in ground test phases; hence their proper operation must be verified early in the
ground test sequence.
The foregoing tests will be run separately but simultaneously by the ACT Primary and
Essential PAS Computers.
The "special case" cited early in this subsection is the test of the decision process in
which the short-period pitch augmentation responsibility is transferred from the ACT
Primary Computers to the Essential PAS Computers. As part of its software, the latter
computer set has a continuous monitor function on the elevator command output of the
primary computers. This midvalue logic cross-channel monitor must be tested using both
computer sets; therefore, this test occurs at the end of the control system monitor
testing.
Next, as indicated at 3 in Figure 82, the primary computers call for reports on the
soundness of the two major sensor sets: the digital air data computers (DADC) and the
inertial reference systems (IRS). Of the six active control functions, five are served by
the DADCs and four by the IRSs. Thus, those two sets are the most complex and widely
used sensors. Both have their own digital computers and their own self-test routines. In
the preflight test, the ACT Primary Computers will call upon the DADCs and the IRSs to
report individually upon their availability for service in the upcoming flight.
To complete the electronic preflight test, the ACT Primary and Essential PAS Computers
perform an end-to-end electronic exercise of the various functions without actuator
operation. This is shown at 4 in Figure 82 and at B in Figure 83. The airplane presumably
still lacks ground clearance and hydraulic power; hence, there will be no actuator
response. However, the servocommand output is still available for comparison with stored
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Figure 83. ACT Function Loop Tests
reference values. For the control laws for low-frequency ACT functions, a static output
represents an adequate test criterion. For high-frequency mode control laws, the dynamic
response must be observed to check for proper damping. This requires much greater test
data and sampling rate than the static output case.
In operation, the test program injects a sensor stimulus to cause a sensor output that will
be processed in the control law computation to yield a servocommand. An out-of-
tolerance response by itself would indicate only a fault somewhere in the loop represented
in the sketch. The fact that (1) three or four such loops are being run simultaneously and
(2) that cross-channel comparisons are being done at SSFD and computer output monitors
enable the test system to identify the faulty LRU, excepting, of course, the servo.
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Preflight Test-Mechanical-This final part of the prefiight routine, shown at A in
Figure 83, tests the servoactuators. It requires hydraulic power and ground clearance;
hence, it is normally performed during taxi out from loading gate to takeoff runway.
Requiring confirmation of mechanical motions, these tests are much slower than the
electronic steps. Therefore, they are performed in parallel, with computer commands
synchronized to each servo. Entirely satisfactory servo response testing can be achieved
using small excursion commands such as 20% of full-scale deflection. Using such
commands limits the hydraulic power demand such that all ACT servos can be tested
simultaneously as long as both engine-driven hydraulic pumps are operating.
The servomonitor and the ability to deactivate failed channels (functions illustrated in
fig. 53) are also checked in the mechanical test phase.
8.4.2.2 In-Flight Monitors
ACT control system in-flight monitoring has these important objectives:
• Continuously check on system operations
• Detect and report failures
• Reconfigure the failure-affected function control chains to minimize redundancy
loss
The in-flight monitors are shown in block diagram form in Figure 53. The monitor
functional flow is illustrated in Figure 84, which, as shown in the small key diagram at the
right, is a part of Figure 79. Figure 41 illustrates system response to in-flight faults as
detected by the monitor network, the same as the prefiight fault response activity.
As illustrated in Figure 78, at the moment of ACT airplane lift-off, the condition of "no
weight on wheels" signals the start of ACT system operation and the beginning of routine
in-flight monitor operations in the computer background mode. In the operating
condition, the computer watchdog and overflow monitors operate continuously to guard
against timing errors and overflow. Parity and sum checks are also cyclically performed.
These are sources of information on the soundness of the operating computers.
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In this phase, sensors and servos cannot safely be given artificial stimuli. The major
sensors, DADC and IRS, are within their computers performing continuous self-test and
reporting their soundness via "status monitor" bits in each data word transmitted. This
comes from inline testing and can be relied on for about 90% fault detection. Thus,
continuous operation of ACT cross-channel monitors in flight is essential if the system is
to achieve very high failure detection probability.
Information on an in-flight fault that would prevent next dispatch will be displayed to
enable call ahead for maintenance action at the next stop. All fault information also is
retained in the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer memory and maintained there
for several flights in chronological order.
8.4.2.3 Maintenance Testing
The maintenance test plan for the active control system is based upon these concepts:
• Fault information for several flights is immediately available to the maintenance
technician via the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer.
• Individual component and subsystem tests are run automatically under control of the
ACT computers.
• Selection of tests is accomplished by the technician via the ACT Maintenance and
Display Computer.
All tests of the preflight series are available individually for maintenance use. Those
involving the DADC and the IRS require advance power up of those systems. In addition,
the maintenance test spectrum includes individual sensor and servo tests and full end-to-
end tests, as shown at A in Figure 83. In these, the computer test program sends an
appropriate stimulus to the sensor or servo and compares the returned signal with its
stored range of acceptable values.
Any of these tests is callable at will by the technician to enable (1) verifying stored fault
data, (2) diagnosing failed functions, and (3) checking results of maintenance action.
218
8.4.3 CREW COMMUNICATION
The communication requirements of the active control system, both from system to crew
and from crew to system, are described in terms of system operation; i.e., what is
required of the crew to monitor and manage the ACT system in its almost entirely
automatic operation.
8.4.3.1 Preflight Testing
Preflight testing required of the active control system occurs in two automatic sequences:
electronic preflight and mechanical preflight. Although both test sequences proceed
without crew intervention, the crew must select the time they are performed. Thus,
there must be a "start test" switch for each of these two operations. These momentary
contact pushbutton switches will be illuminated as they are pushed and the test begins.
The light behind the button will be extinguished at completion of the test sequence.
The preceding information describes crew requirements for a normal preflight test in
which no fault is found. Where faults are found, the communication requirement is not as
simple. The system recognizes and stores information on faults of three levels:
O Faults that have no effect upon aircraft dispatchability
• Faults that allow dispatch but with some restriction to the flight plan
• Faults that prevent dispatch
Figure 41 illustrates response to faults detected in preflight test.
The first category of fault is not reported to the flight crew. If a fault found in preflight
test affects dispatchability of the airplane, it is next necessary to determine the status of
the ACT function or functions affected by the failure and display that status for the flight
crew. At this point, the crew has the option of referring to an operations manual to
determine the flight plan effect specified for the particular status. Alternatively, the
crew can use the same information, determined as a flight advisory message by the active
control system and displayed subsequent to the function status message. The pilot's
decision may be made based upon the same information derived either way, from the
manual or from the information display.
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The operations are illustrated in Figure 41. System operations are shown at the top of the
figure, and the pilot actions are represented in the lower portion. Communication from
the control system to the crew shows in that diagram at two places indicated by the
circled numbers 1 and 2. Function status is reported by the dedicated ACT discrete
display; the operations advisory message is shown by the baseline caution and warning
system caution annunciator display. The block diagram in Figure 40 illustrates this
scheme. The two sets of active control computers determine function status as indicated
in the top line in Figure 41 and then relay that information to the ACT Maintenance and
Display Computer. This computer selects the corresponding flight advisory message, if
any is required, and passes it to the caution annunciator display.
The preceding constitutes the primary mode of operation of system communications in the
preflight test process. Only one ACT Maintenance and Display Computer is included in
the system, and it is not required for dispatch. Therefore, there must be a backup
communication alternative to determine dispatch information about the control system
itself if the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer is not available. The provision for
that is a set of dedicated active control system indicator lights, capable of displaying
function status as represented at circled number 1 in Figure 41. Those indicators,
combined with the operations manual, enable the dispatch decision to be made whether or
not the caution annunciator display is showing information from the ACT Maintenance and
Display Computer.
The only additional crew communication provisions required are the active control
function disconnect switches. These switches are accompanied by reconnect switches to
accommodate possible erroneous disconnect.
All crew communication provisions represented in the foregoing discussion are shown in
Figure 85 and are intended to illustrate requirements rather than design selection. The
concept represented there is based upon these assumptions:
a. Fail-operative communication from the ACT system to the flight crew can be
achieved by using the baseline caution and warning system plus dedicated discrete
indicators showing the status of all ACT functions.
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b. In the primary operating mode, the caution annunciator display will report all
system information essential to the flight crew. This includes:
• Identification of LRU failures if they are required for dispatch
• Any change in flight plan made necessary by system failures
c. In the backup mode for the loss of the caution annunciator panel, the crew will use
the dedicated discrete status indicators. Flight manual data will be provided to
interpret those indicators in terms of required operations changes.
d. Manual controls will be provided only for:
• Initiating preflight tests
• Emergency disconnect
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In normal operation, system failures are followed by automatic reconfiguration or
automatic function disconnect.
e. Information displayed by the caution annunciator will be supplied by the ACT
Maintenance and Display Computer. Backup discrete displays, both ACT dedicated
and caution and warning system discrete indicators, will be signaled directly from
the ACT control computers.
f. Level A warnings (requiring immediate action) and level B cautions (crew attention
and future action required) issued from the ACT system will activate the pilots'
master lights on the glare shield.
g. Dedicated ACT indicators and controls will appear on a dedicated ACT panel.
In Figure 85, under the heading "Function," are the two "start test" operations needed for
preflight test and the six active control functions. These individual items require the
discrete indicators and controls appearing in the next two columns. Everything above the
double line is there specifically for the associated functions. Below the double line is the
baseline caution and warning system, which shows the items listed under assumption b.
This system also provides crew communication for other onboard systems.
The logic of assumption b is that different kinds of failures in the ACT control system
have widely varying consequences. They may:
• Have no effect upon operations
• Have no effect upon flight in progress, but prevent dispatch
• Require change in current flight plan
For the first failure category, no information is needed by the crew. When the second
category is encountered in flight, corrective maintenance must be done at the next way
station. This will often require active preparation before the airplane lands, to the extent
of flying in parts from another base. Such a situation would need the maintenance call-
ahead function by the flight crew, and for that, identification of the failed component
must be announced. For the last case, the crew must be notified of the flight plan
change.
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8.4.3.2 In-Flight Monitors
Operation of the active control system in-flight monitor and self-test functions is
completely automatic. The response of the system and flight crew to faults that these
monitors discern in flight is again illustrated in Figure 41 and is almost entirely parallel to
the system test and communication operations of the preflight period. The three response
levels to faults required of the system and crew are as follows:
• For a fault that does not affect flight operations, the system merely stores the
component fault data; no notification is provided to the flight crew.
• A system fault that does not affect current flight operation but will prevent the
next dispatch must be identified so that the crew can arrange corrective
maintenance at the next airport.
• A fault that changes the function status so as to require a change in flight plan must
be identified and the flight plan change announced to the crew.
The responses just enumerated represent the normal mode of operation of the system
when in-flight failures occur. Where the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer and
caution and warning system chain is not operating, communication depends upon the set of
discrete function status lights. Here again, as shown in Figure 41, the essential
information is supplied by the discrete indicators and operations manual, enabling the
pilot to determine proper response to the faults through the use of the manual. This dual
display capability is shown in Figure 86, a more detailed version of Figure 40.
A special case of in-flight change of plan is represented by the "Divert" indicator shown in
Figure 85 in the short-period pitch-augmentation function line. The appearance of this
red light, accompanied by the master warning lights on the glare shield and a warning
aural signal, calls for immediate diversion of the flight to a landing at the nearest
adequate runway. This emergency condition is produced either by reduction of the crucial
pitch-augmentation function to only two success paths or by loss of the combination of
three critical functions (speed PAS, LAS, and WLA), as defined in Tables 15 and 17.
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8.4.4 FAULT RESPONSE
The fault response function in the ACT control system uses failure information derived by
the control computers to first determine the status of active control functions and then,
from that information, to determine the correct change in operations, if any is required,
and to communicate that to the pilots. This function must not be confused with the
automatic response of the ACT computers to reconfigure active control functions after
component failures. That operation is described in Subsection 8.2.
The basic scheme in this fault response technique may be represented by the following
sequence:
Component »-Logic A *-Function "-Logic B — --Advisory
failure(s) status message
Thus, when a component failure is detected in the active control system, it is entered into
logic process A and the resulting output will be the operating status of the ACT function
or functions affected. Similarly, that information injected into logic process B will result
in output of the proper operations advisory message if any is needed. Logic A is
implemented in the control computers, ACT Primary and Essential PAS; and logic B is
implemented in the ACT Maintenance and Display Computer. This process is represented
in Figure 41. There, where the control system determines function status, logic A is being
applied; and, in the box labeled "Selects Flight Advisory Message," logic B is being
implemented. As described in the preceding subsection, the ACT Maintenance and Display
Computer is simplex equipment not required for dispatch; therefore, occasionally the ACT
airplane will be operating without that computer. In that instance, logic A and the
sequence indicated by the circled number one in Figure 41 apply, using the crew's
reference to an operations manual.
The simpler step shown in the preceding paragraph is logic B. This logic is expressed in
the Boolean equations shown in version 1 of logic B, as listed in Table 18. Those equations
are derived from the rules for dispatchability and operability of the ACT airplane as
shown in Tables 15 and 16. Those tables, involved as they are, can be reduced to version 1
of Table 18 with no assumption on the character of flight restrictions that might result
from failure of various ACT functions and function combinations. Using a reasonable
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Table 18. Selection of Advisory Messages From ACT Function Status
(Logic B, Boolean Equations)
Key:
First letter
P = PAS
A = AAL
L = LAS
W = WLA
F = FMC
SPEED
Second letter
L Function lost
0 One failure away from function lost
Exceptions:
PSPASSHORT
PSN pASSHORT A>1 x 10"9/hr
PSO pASgHQRT <three success paths
Version 1: No assumptions on character of flight restrictions
Advisory'message
Restriction A
Restriction B
Restriction C
Restriction D
Restriction E
Restriction F
Restriction G
NO GO
DIVERT
Conditions requiring message:
At dispatch
PL + PO
LO
FL
(PL + PO)-LO
(PL + PO)'FL
LO-FL
(PL + PO)-LO-FL
PSIM+AL + LL+WL +
[(PL + POHLL + LOHWL + WO)]
In flight
PL + PO
LL + LO
FL
(PL + POHLL+ LO)
(PL + PO)-FL
(LL + LOJ-FL
(PL + POHLL+ LOI-FL
PSO+ [(PL + POHLL + LOHWL + WO)]
Version 2: Assuming flight restrictions.and function status scanned in
this order: PS, A, W, L, P, F
Advisory message
Restriction B
Restriction A (if B does not apply)
Restriction C (if neither B nor A
applies)
Conditions requiring message:
At dispatch
LO
PL + PO
FL
In flight
LL+LO
PL + PO
FL
Dispatch "NO GO" and in-flight "DIVERT" are the same as in version 1.
configuration for the ACT airplane and assuming reasonable flight restrictions based upon
current commercial jet transport practice, the number of flight restrictions applicable to
these operations is reduced to only three plus the "Divert" command. With those
additional assumptions, the Boolean equations for logic B reduce to the very simple form
shown as version 2 in Table 18. Because the current technology control system work
assumes no specific airplane configuration, version 2 does not represent a segment of the
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selected ACT configuration description. It does, however, represent a probable
simplification of the version 1 list of equations when they are actually applied to a real
airframe. Such determination of an actual airframe and actual logic B equations will be
done in ensuing stages of the IAAC Project.
Logic A Boolean equations are less simple. They must accept the output of the entire
fault determination process in both sets of active control computers operating on all
components of the ACT system. With such a large number of elements as input items, the
logic A equations become very long. One of the shorter equations, which determines
flutter-mode control failure, has 60 terms in 15 variables. Including both function failure
conditions and conditions where a function or a combination of functions is "one failure
away from function loss," there must be 12 such logic A equations, some of them much
larger than the sample described. Although these equations are subject to reduction
techniques normal in Boolean algebraic operations, they will still require greater
computer capacity than is needed for logic B. The derivation, reduction, and
implementation planning for logic A equations will be subjects of the next phase of IAAC
control system work.
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8.5 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
8.5.1 BASELINE CONFIGURATION
The general arrangement of the hydraulic power system is shown in Figure 87. The
system is very similar to that of the Baseline Airplane.
The Baseline hydraulic power generation system consists of three continuous-duty 20 700-
•O
kPa (3000-lbf/in ) systems that use phosphate ester fluid. The systems are identified as
A, B, and C. In systems A and C, hydraulic power is generated by an engine-driven pump
(EDP) installed parallel with an electric-motor-driven pump (EMP). System B hydraulic
power is generated by two ac EMPs and one air-turbine-driven pump (ATDP). The bleed
Pneumatic lines
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Figure 87. Baseline Hydraulic Power System
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air manifold serves as the pneumatic source. Emergency hydraulic power is derived from
the wind-milling engines rotating the EDPs. System A is augmented by a ram-air-turbine-
driven (RAT) hydraulic pump. Ground hydraulic power is available from the ATDP,
powered by the auxiliary power unit (APU) or pneumatic ground cart; the ac pumps, also
energized by ground cart or APU; or by an external hydraulic power supply source. Flight
deck controls and displays consist of depressurization switches for the EDP, shutoff
switches for the ATDP and the EMPs, low-pressure and low-fluid warning lights, and
selectable readout for system pressure and fluid quantity.
8.5.2 MODIFICATIONS FOR ACT CONFIGURATION
The maximum additional hydraulic flow for each of the three ACT hydraulic systems is as
follows:
• 126-cm /s (2-GPM) (additional servovalves) leakage flow
• 126-cm /s (2-GPM) flow due to the higher rates for the ACT outboard ailerons
(inboard and outboard segments)
• 63 cm /s (1 GPM) for secondary ACT actuators
• 126 cm /s (2 GPM) to drive outboard flaperons
• 315 cm /s (5 GPM) to drive inboard flaperons
There is no difference in the hydraulic demand for the ACT versus Baseline yaw and pitch
functions.
A hydraulic flow load analysis indicates that, if the flaperons are excluded, all the other
ACT functions can be accommodated by the Baseline system. When inboard and outboard
flaperons are included in the ACT configuration, the 2334-cm /s (37-GPM) capacity of the
three hydraulic pumps has to be increased by 20%, resulting in a total hydraulic system
weight increase of approximately 4.5 kg (10 Ib).
The ACT technology base configuration hydraulic distribution system is shown in
Figure 88.
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8.6 ELECTRIC SYSTEM
Redundant crucial and critical systems, such as the active controls system, require power
sources with the same degree of redundancy to avoid losing more than one channel if a
single power source fails. Furthermore, reliability of the power sources must be
significantly better than the power utilization systems if the overall reliability is not to
be compromised by the power sources.
The electric system for the Baseline Airplane is discussed in Subsection 8.6.1; the
modifications necessary for IAAC are described in Subsection 8.6.2.
8.6.1 BASELINE CONFIGURATION
8.6.1.1 Primary Electric Power
The Baseline and ACT electric systems are shown in Figure 89. Primary three-phase,
115V, 400-Hz power is supplied by two engine-driven 90-kVA integrated drive generators
(IDG) that cannot be paralleled, so the system operates as two separate isolated channels.
A third 90-kVA APU-driven generator is provided for ground maintenance operations and
as an in-flight backup for the two main engine-driven generators. The APU can be started
at any altitude up to 7620m (25 000 ft) and can provide full electric power up to 10 670m
(35 000 ft). The APU generator control unit is interchangeable with those used for the
engine-driven generators. Any single generator can supply all flight-essential loads. Two
of the three generators must be operative for airplane dispatch with no load reduction or
for a category III landing.
During ground operations, electric power can be provided from either the APU generator
or from a ground power cart through the 90-kVA external power receptacle. Ground
power can be used to energize all main power buses or only those electric loads required
for normal maintenance, servicing, and cargo handling. On the ground or in flight, utility
and galley loads will be automatically shed when the system is overloaded.
Airplane 28V dc power is provided by two 120A unregulated transformer-rectifier (T-R)
units. Each of the two main ac buses supplies its own T-R unit. The dc system operates
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isolated only. If a T-R unit fails, a dc bus tie contactor enables the remaining T-R unit to
supply both main dc buses. During ground operation, a 20A T-R unit provides dc power for
ground handling loads.
A T-R unit is provided for normal starting of the APU when ac power is available from
either the main generators or external power. When ac power is not available, a
dedicated APU battery is used; a dedicated APU battery charger operates from either the
main buses or external power.
8.6.1.2 Standby Electric Power
Backup power to flight-critical loads is supplied by a 40-Ah nickel-cadmium battery and a
1000-VA static inverter. A battery charger provides controlled recharge of the battery
and operates as a T-R unit to supply the standby loads if the main dc source is lost but ac
power is still available. Standby bus transfer is automatic.
The third power source for the category III autoland system is provided by the standby
system. During category III landing, third-channel autoland dc loads will be supplied by
the standby battery charger in the T-R mode. Autoland ac loads will be supplied from the
standby inverter.
8.6.2 MODIFICATIONS FOR ACT CONFIGURATION
The electric system for the ACT Configuration is shown in Figures 89 and 90. A second
standby battery, with charger, with the same capacity as the Baseline Configuration
standby battery is added to the Baseline electric system to provide the necessary
redundancy to support the ACT system. The standby battery capacity requirement for the
ACT airplane is approximately double that in the Baseline Airplane. Therefore, the
additional standby battery has the same capacity as that in the Baseline Airplane.
Battery 1 supplies channels A and B, and battery 2 supplies channels C and D. For
dissimilar redundancy, no two buses share the same T-R and battery. Thus, ACT T-R 1
supplies buses A and C, while T-R 2 supplies buses B and D (fig. 89). It is assumed that
the Baseline Airplane standby battery load can be redistributed between the two ACT
system battery buses to place about the same load on each battery. The individual T-R 1
and battery loads are shown in Table 19.
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Battery bus (typical) ACTT-R bus (typical)
28V dc
Inverter
150-VA capacity
115V,400 Hz
Transformer
150-VA capacity
26V,400 Hz
26V ac bus
ACT channel (typical)
Figure 90. Detail of ACT Channel Power Supply (Typical)
Table 19. Individual Transformer-Rectifier and
Battery Loads
Power
supply
T-R 1
T-R2
Battery 1
Battery 2
Channels
A and C
B and D
A and B
Cand D
Amperes
ACT
system
39.3
36.1
39.0
36.4
Baseline
40.8
43.5
18.4
22.9
Total
80.1
79.6
57.4
59.3
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Assuming the total ACT system battery load and the Baseline standby loads all are
supplied by the batteries for 30 min during emergency operation, the battery energy
requirements are:
• Battery 1
• Battery 2
57.4A x 0.5 hr = 28.7 Ah
59.3A x 0.5 hr = 29.7 Ah
The Baseline Airplane standby and APU starting batteries are 40-Ah units. To maintain
commonality between standby and APU batteries, the same 40-Ah battery is
recommended for the ACT airplane.
The T-R capacity to supply the ACT system equipment is too small to justify additional
dedicated T-Rs. The Baseline Airplane T-Rs, however, do not have growth potential to
absorb the ACT system loads and still retain sufficient reserve capacity to supply all loads
with one T-R inoperative. Therefore, the modification is to replace the baseline T-Rs
with larger units (150A) and supply the ACT system T-R buses from the main dc buses. In
effect, the ACT system T-R buses are extensions of the main buses (fig. 89).
The load totals for each power source are summarized in Table 20. Tables 21 and 22 list
the ACT system dc and ac bus loads, respectively. Table 23 shows electric system
equipment from Baseline specifications that satisfies ACT system needs.
Table 20. ACT Load Totals for Each Power Source
T-Rs operating
TRU
1
2
Channel
A and C
B and D
A
80.1
79.6
T-Rs not operating
Battery
1
2
Channel
A and B
Cand D
A
57.4
59.3
Ah*
28.7
29.7
*30min
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Table 21. iACT Direct-Current Bus Loads (Amperes)
Load unit
MCP-701 A computer
Control/display panel
Elevator servo
solenoid
bypass
Failure warning
display
303T rear-spar
accelerometer
303T front-spar
accelerometer
Outboard aileron (inner
segment) bypass solenoid
Outboard aileron' (outer
segment) bypass solenoid
Stick pusher solenoid
(AAL actuator)
Rudder bypass
valve solenoid
Flaperon
bypass valve
solenoid
Outboard
Inboard
PAS backup computer
Dedicated pitch-rate
sensors
ACT Maintenance and
Display Computer
Total dc
Current per unit
Maximum
steady
state
3.6
0.5
0.6
(hold)
0.1
0.04
0.04
0.6
(hold)
0.6
(hold)
0.6
(hold)
0.6
(hold)
0.6
(hold)
3.6
0.03
3.6
Maximum
surge
1.0
(pull-in)
1.0
(pull-in)
1.0
(pull-in)
1-0
(pull-in)
1.0
(pull-in)
Units per channel
A
1
1
-
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
-
2
1
1
-
-
B
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
2
1
-
2
2
1
1
-
-
C
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
-
1
1
2
-
1
1
-
-
D
-
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
—
-
1
1
1
-
Current per channel
Maximum steady state
A
3.6
0.5
-
0.1
0.04
0.04
1.20
1.20
0.6
0.6
—
1.20
3.60
0.03
-
12.71
B
3.6
0.5
0.6
0.1
0.04
0.04
-
1.20
0.6
-
1.20
1.20
3.60
0.03
-
12.71
C
3.6
0.5
0.6
0.1
0.04
0.04
1.20
-
0.6
0.6
1.20
—
3.60
0.03
-
12.11
D
-
0.5
0.6
0.1
-
-
-
-
0.6
-
-
—
3.60
0.03
3.60
9.03
Comments
One panel with
four channels
Mathematical model
in D channel
One panel with four
channels
Three each wing
Three each wing
Two each wing,
mathematical model
in D channel
Two each wing,
mathematical model
in C channel
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Table 22. ACT Alternating-Current Bus Loads (Amperes at 26V)
Load unit
Elevator servo
Outboard
aileron
servo LVDT
Flaperon
servo LVDT
LVDT
(Outer
segment)
(Inner
segment)
Outboard
Inboard
Rudder servo LVDT
Total transformer
load at 26V ac (amps)
Transformer load at
1 1 5V ac
Transformer output, VA
Transformer losses, VA
(at 80% efficiency)
Transformer input, VA
(= inverter output)
Inverter input, VA
(at 60% efficiency)
Inverter input
(amps at 28V dc)
Current per unit
Maxi-
mum
steady
state
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.2F
Maxi-
mum
surge
Units per
channel
A
2
4
-
2
4
2
B
4
4
2
-
4
-
C
4
-
4
4
2
2
D
4
2
4
4
-
1
Current per channel
Maximum steady state
A
0.50
1.00
-
0.50
1.00
0.50
3.50
0.79
91.0
22.8
113.8
189.6
6.77
B
1.00
1.00
0.50
-
1.00
-
3.50
0.79
91.0
22.8
113.8
189.6
6.77
C
1.00
-
1.00
1.00
0.50
0.50
4.00
0.90
104.0
25.2
130.0
216.7
7.74
D
1.00
0.50
1.00
1.00
-
0.25
3.75
0.85
97.5
24.4
121.9
203.2
7.26
Comments
Only a mathematical
model in one channel
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Table 23. ACTPower Supply Equipment
Item
Battery3
Battery charger3
Transformer-rectifier
Static inverter
Transformer, 115/26V
Battery-switching relay
ACT
Number
2
2
2
4
4
b
Rating
40 Ah
150A
100V A
150V A
Baseline
Number
1
1
2
Rating
40 Ah
120A
fACT same as Baseline except quantity.
^Weight and cost insignificant compared
to major equipment
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9.0 SELECTED SYSTEM EVALUATION
9.1 LABORATORY PERFORMANCE TESTS
This section describes several laboratory experiments made using a typical digital flight
control computer (the General Electric MCP-701A) to examine potentially critical
mechanization questions. The results were encouraging in that no significant problem in
achieving digital mechanization of the Active Controls Technology (ACT) control laws
was found.
9.1.1 CONTROL LAW IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION
The ACT control functions were designed to be implemented using currently available
hardware technology. With the application of digital computers to airborne flight control
systems, such control functions will be implemented in a sampled-data environment.
Control laws for these functions were developed in the continuous domain using root locus
synthesis and analysis techniques, and the same functions were to be translated into a
sampled-data representation. Some discrepancies in digital system performance were
expected because of either the programming technique used or associated hardware design
aspects such as sample rate, analog input prefiltering, and computation delay. Laboratory
tests were conducted to evaluate the performance of four representative ACT control
laws implemented using the General Electric MCP-701A digital flight control computer.
Digital control law implementation was developed beginning with an analysis of the digital
system basic hardware performance characteristics. Next, the control laws were
implemented and evaluated from a frequency response performance viewpoint.
9.1.1.1 Laboratory Setup
The basic hardware characteristics of the General Electric MCP-701A were investigated
using a single channel of the quadruple-channel system. Laboratory tests were conducted
to establish the hardware input/output bandpass characteristics.
The basic General Electric MCP-701A hardware can be represented as a prefilter,
computation delay, and zero-order hold, as shown in Figure 91. The prefilter attenuated
the analog input signal high-frequency components to suppress "aliasing" during the
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Output
Antialiasing filter
a>1 = 28 rad/s
co2= 126 rad/s
Computation delay
+T2 =
Zero-order hold
Figure 91. Mathematical Model of Laboratory Computer
analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion. Aliasing is the characteristic of an A/D process in
which a high-frequency analog signal is sampled (any signal frequency above
one-half the sampling rate) that results in false low-frequency signal in the discrete time
domain. The laboratory computer prefilter was mechanized by two single-lag filters with
fixed break frequencies of 28 and 126 rad/s as shown in Figure 91. Computation delay is
made of two parts, the A/D conversion cycle time, T., plus the time, T.,, required to
execute the program and produce a result. For the MCP-701A, the value of T. + T- was
determined to be approximately 57 jus, which is negligible relative to the sampling rate
and antialiasing filter contributions. The zero-order hold function shown in Figure 91 is
the mathematical expression for the computer sample-hold characteristic; its time
constant is the sampling period T.
Frequency response of the basic General Electric MCP-701A hardware was obtained in the
laboratory to compare the mathematical model with laboratory results. Figure 92
presents the Bode plot of the laboratory frequency response and mathematical model for
four different sampling intervals of 5, 10, 20, and 40 ms. The plots show that the
mathematical model represents the actual response very closely. It further shows that
the predominant frequency response characteristic of the hardware comes from the
prefilter element. These results show that the digital system basic hardware
characteristics can be mathematically modeled for analysis purposes.
9.1.1.2 Control Law Implementation
Four representative ACT control laws were implemented using the laboratory computers
for system performance evaluation. The evaluation was limited to system dynamic
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performance. The ACT control laws selected for laboratory performance evaluation
were:
• Pitch-augmented stability (PAS)
• Maneuver-load control (MLC)
• Gust-load alleviation (GLA)
• Flutter-mode control (FMC)
Figure 93 shows the functional block diagram of the ACT control laws. These represent
an early system configuration and may not be consistent with control laws given
elsewhere in this document. It should be noted that these control laws were developed
assuming that perturbation values of the input variables were available. No detailed
consideration has been given to the signal processing required to handle steady-state
signal values due to trim conditions, biases, etc. The control filters were designed in the
continuous s-domain and mechanized in the discrete (digital) domain using the
bilinear transformation (Tustin's substitution). The procedure is based on substituting
2 Z-l for s in the analog filter equation and writing difference equations to develop
T Z-l
algorithms for software coding.
Frequency response data were taken for the control filters implemented using a frequency
analyzer across the MCP-701A associated input and output channels. Figures 94
through 99 show frequency responses of the preceding filter cases with sampling periods
of 5, 10, 20, and 40 ms and also the theoretical predicted continuous responses. The plots
clearly show errors in gain and phase between the measured and theoretical continuous
responses. The measured responses have faster gain rolloff and significantly more phase
lag due to the basic hardware characteristics discussed previously. The responses also
show that the gain and phase differences from the theoretical decrease as the sampling
rate is increased. Test results show that the analog input signal prefilter values must be
included in the hardware model and, depending on the sample rate selected, can influence
system performance. These values can be selected to change basic hardware
characteristics, and software implementation can be used to compensate for certain
hardware limitations. After the hardware system has been fully integrated, careful
analysis and laboratory testing will be required to ensure that the optimum performance
has been obtained.
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9.1.2 SYSTEM CONCEPT EVALUATION
The tests described in the preceding subsections essentially illustrate that the ACT
control functions can be realized using digital technology. This subsection deals with
special investigations conducted to evaluate various functional elements that are part of a
redundant system configuration.
9.1.2.1 Laboratory Setup
The basic laboratory equipment consisted of the following elements:
• A digital computer simulating the ACT airplane
• A digital redundant flight control system mechanized on flight control hardware
• An analog computer simulating the actuators
A block diagram of these elements, as they were interconnected for closed-loop tests, is
shown in Figure 100. Figure 101 is a photograph of this setup, showing the four flight
control computers in the center foreground. A Boeing-owned ECLIPSE computer was used
to simulate the longitudinal equations of motion of the ACT airplane at several flight
Analog computer
(actuators)
Surface position signals
Outputs of control 'laws
Cross-channel link
MCP-
701 A
MCP-
701 A
MCP-
701 A
MCP-
701 A
Redundant General Electric MCP-701A
(control laws)
rSensor data
'ECLIPSE (ACT
airplane dynamics)
Figure 100. Laboratory Setup for Closed-Loop Simulation
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Figure 101. Computer Laboratory Setup
conditions. State variable techniques were used to implement the dynamics of the
longitudinal axis in four rigid and six elastic modes for real-time execution. Minimum
real-time execution for the airplane model was set at 40 iterations per second (25-ms
sampling period). Although different flight conditions (i.e., VB, VMO, and VD) were
programmed, only the V..Q flight condition was tested as a closed-loop system in the
laboratory. Sensor data were simulated in the ECLIPSE computer and fed to the General
Electric MCP-701A computers.
General Electric MCP-701A flight control computers were used to implement ACT
control laws and redundancy management. ACT control laws were programmed using an
algorithm derived from incremental difference equations. In addition to the software
required to realize the ACT control functions, extensive redundancy management
software routines were coded and tested in the laboratory. A cross-channel data link
connected the flight control computers to make up a redundant digital system
configuration. Outputs of the computers were fed to an analog computer.
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An EAI-PACER 500 analog computer was used to simulate servoactuators. Simple lag
filters represented the ACT actuation system. Surface position signals from the analog
computer were fed back into the airplane simulation to close the loop.
9.1.2.2 Synchronous and Asynchronous Computer Operation
The Segregated System mechanizes each ACT control law in a separate dedicated
computer set, whereas the Integrated System implements all ACT control laws using one
computer set. Because both system concepts were designed to operate in a redundant
system configuration, additional multiple computer hardware and software packages
would be required in the Segregated System. To minimize hardware and software
complexity, the dedicated computers of the Segregated System and the Essential PAS
Computers of the Selected System were designed to be operated asynchronously. A series
of laboratory closed-loop tests was conducted to verify that implementation of each ACT
control law in a redundant system is feasible in computers operating either synchronously
or asynchronously. The testing involved simulation of the quadruply redundant PAS and
triply redundant FMC control functions, each operating in closed-loop configuration, as
described in Subsection 9.1.2.1.
The tests were conducted separately with each redundant control system. The simulated
pilot input continuously disturbed the simulated ACT airplane with a 0.1-Hz sinusoidal
column input command for a period of 1 hr while the control computers operated
synchronously. The same test procedure was repeated with the control computers
operating asynchronously.
A high-amplitude pilot input command (on the order of 15 deg of elevator deflection
command) was provided to investigate control computer drift . Control computers dr i f t ing
with respect to each other would each sample similar input signals at different times and
produce dissimilar output signals. For the worst case, these differences in output signals
will be more pronounced if the drift is large and the input signals contain high-frequency
components.
During the tests, the aircraft parameters were continuously recorded to note any response
disparity between the two modes of computer operation. Further, synchronous and
asynchronous operations were verified by monitoring the clock signals on a four-channel
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oscilloscope. The test results obtained were compared, and no differences in response
were apparent. Computer drift did not affect the response; drift time was negligible
compared with the sampling period. Further, these input signals are processed by a signal
selection and failure detection (SSFD) algorithm that selects an appropriate signal for the
control law computations. This SSFD concept, discussed in Subsection 9.1.2.3, is used in
the ACT system design to isolate input signal failures and produce identical computer
output commands in a redundant system configuration.
Laboratory tests indicate that each ACT control function implemented in control
computers operating asynchronously can achieve the same performance as the control
computers operating synchronously.
9.1.2.3 Signal Selection and Failure Detection
All redundant systems require some form of SSFD if fault isolation is required. Digital
computers can be effectively multiplexed to provide SSFD functions for processing
incoming variable signals. The following discusses SSFD functions that process triple
sensor output information by a median selection or an averaging algorithm if a failure is
detected. Median selection simply provides a signal output that is the median signal of
three incoming sensor signals. If two signals are identical, the median will be that signal.
If one failure is detected, the averaging algorithm provides a signal output that is the
average of the remaining two valid sensor signals. Sensor output data are first converted
to digital form and then cross fed to the other remaining channels via a cross-channel
data link. Each individual computer channel of the redundant system collects the sensor
output data and then derives and tests differences to detect sensor failures. Two SSFD
functions were coded for real-time tasks: one that processes pitch-rate sensor outputs
and one for acceleration sensor outputs.
Tests were performed to simulate sensor output failures, both "zero" failures (sensor
output goes to zero) and "hardover" failures (sensor output goes to a plus or minus
maximum value), and evaluate the two SSFD functions for the quadruply redundant PAS
and triply redundant FMC configurations, each operating in a closed-loop system
(subsec 9.1.2.1). Evaluations were made by observing the simulated ACT airplane time
history for "normal" system operation (no failures) followed by various combinations of
sensor output failures.
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Both the quadruply redundant PAS and the triply redundant FMC achieved performance
requirements during this test. Following two pitch-rate sensor failures for PAS or one
acceleration sensor failure for FMC, the observed aircraft parameters showed normal
performance. Following a third pitch-rate sensor failure or second acceleration sensor
failure, the redundant control system automatically shuts down, resulting in an open-loop
airplane. It should be noted that the open-loop ACT airplane is stable at the V..Q flight
condition tested. The following paragraph discusses the SSFD process for the quadruply
redundant PAS system. SSFD is described in more detail in Section 8.0.
The quadruply redundant PAS system design must be operational following any two sensor
failures, providing all required functions with no performance degradation. The signal
selection concept for the quadruply redundant configuration uses an active-standby, online
technique. Three out of four incoming sensor signals are designated active and processed
by the SSFD algorithm; the fourth is on standby. When the first active signal failure is
detected, the fourth input is switched into an active mode.
If no fault is detected, the median algorithm is selected. If one fault is detected, the
standby signal switches to an active mode and the median algorithm is again selected. If
two faults are detected, the averaging algorithm is selected. Following a third failure,
third-failure information is generated to shut down the PAS control computers.
Figure 102 illustrates the process just described. The slightly biased pitch-rate sensor
outputs and the elevator deflection commands shown were obtained by disturbing the
simulated ACT airplane with a 0.1-Hz sinusoidal pilot input command.
The median-selection process input signal can exhibit an abrupt change when one signal
fails to a hardover state and that signal was in, or passed through, the middle region of
the three signals. Figure 102 shows that suppression of the transient associated with
hardover failures can be achieved. These abrupt responses are softened by inserting an
equalization loop around the median-selection function. The selected output is the
median signal of the equalized input signals, where the input signals are continously being
equalized toward the selected output. The equalization technique forces the inputs to the
median-selection algorithm to be nearly identical.
The two SSFD algorithms were evaluated using the simulated ACT airplane having PAS
and FMC control laws, respectively. Various types of sensor signal failures were
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Figure 102. Quadruply Redundant Pitch-Augmented Stability Pitch-
Rate Sensor Failures
introduced (e.g., hardover and zero failures) with satisfactory test results. These SSFD
functions can be used to prevent sensor output signal failures from disturbing the airplane
response and to extend the operational reliability of the flight control system.
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9.1.2.4 Actuator Recovery From Computer Transient
Many computer shutdowns can be attributed to transient failures of software or hardware.
Laboratory testing was conducted to establish that an ACT computer actuator system can
recover from such transient failures.
The dual force-summed actuator used in the laboratory test is described in detail in
Subsection 8.1.3. Because each servoactuator channel is directly commanded by an
associated processor, failure of a computer will temporarily shut down its associated
servo to prevent deterioration in performance or possible structural damage. The
temporarily disconnected actuator must then be brought back into the system smoothly
when the transient failure of the computer disappears. A hydraulic bypass valve is
incorporated into the actuator design to shut down the actuator when it or the computer
driving it fails. The same bypass valve is also used to reactivate the actuator if the
system recovers to normal operation.
Testing involved simulation of the dual force-summed actuator model and the PAS
system. Figure 103 shows the laboratory setup for closed-loop tests. The ECLIPSE
computer, described in Subsection 9.1.2.1, implements the longitudinal equations of
motion of the ACT airplane at different flight conditions. The dual force-summed
actuator model was implemented in one MCP-701A digital computer operating in real
time at 200 iterations per second (5-ms sampling period). The bypass valve was simulated
by a digital first-order lag filter with a time constant of 0.01 sec. The output signal of
the lag filter falls exponentially to zero when bypass is requested and returns to its
nominal value when bypass is no longer requested. The bypass signal is activated when a
failure is detected. Computer failure was simulated by shutting down one of the
computers driving one actuator, then an appropriate signal was introduced from the
analog computer to simulate the output of the failed computer. The actuator was
programmed to detect the failure 0.5 sec after the computer failure had occurred.
Identical PAS control laws were contained in three MCP-701A digital computers operating
asynchronously in real time at 200 iterations per second (5-ms sampling period). A cross-
channel data link connected the three digital computers. The PAS control laws were
integrated with the redundancy management software to realize a triplex redundancy
scheme.
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Analog computer
ECLIPSE
computer
Airplane
longitudinal
equations
of motion
Cross-channel data link
Figure 103. Laboratory Setup for Pitch-Augmented Stability Closed-Loop Simulation
The control law equation implemented was
„ 1.5
where
0.8
>COL
91202
Au
5COL
= pitch-rate sensor output, station 1202, deg/s
= incremental horizontal velocity, body axis, m/s
= column input signal, deg
= elevator deflection command, deg
The analog computer was used to add three voltage biases to the pitch-rate sensor signals
from the ECLIPSE computer and to provide a method of introducing sensor failures. All
data used in the simulation correspond to flight condition
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Figure 104(a) shows the closed-loop short-period response to a 6-deg step column input
with PAS control law implemented on a digital computer. Figure 104(b) shows the same
system responses to the same input with PAS control law implemented on an analog
computer. Responses from the two test methods are closely matched.
Tests were performed using a sinusoidal $COL command signal at 0.1 Hz. Figure 105(a)
shows the closed-loop system responses to a hardover failure (e.g., computer output
command goes to maximum value). When the failure is removed and the failed computer
recovers to its normal operation (e.g., back on line), a time delay occurs before the PAS
computer outputs command the same actuator positions. This is due to reinitialization of
software parameters following computer startup and the 1.25-sec lag on the S-QJ
command signal path. Figure 105(b) shows the same system responses for the case where
the 1.25-sec lag filter was removed. The PAS computer outputs are identical.
Figure 106(a) and (b) shows the closed-loop system responses for both "zero" failure
(computer output goes to zero value) and oscillatory failure (computer output goes to
+_ maximum value), respectively, with a 0.1-Hz sinusoidal S^Q, command signal input,
including the lag filter on its path.
This study indicates that if the ACT system has integrating functions or very-low-
frequency filters, the transient response during recovery will be large and may not be
acceptable. For this case, the system must incorporate a more sophisticated recovery
technique, such as exchange of filter data between the computers, so that the transient
response will be within acceptable levels. The control laws synthesized during the IAAC
Project, however, have fairly high frequency, and the simple recovery mode is adequate.
Figure 106(c) shows the closed-loop system responses to a hardover computer failure with
no SPQT input command. The failures excited a lightly damped 1.0-Hz oscillatory mode
of the basic ACT airplane response.
Laboratory tests verified the reconfiguration method of the dual force-summed actuator
operating in a closed-loop configuration.
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9.1.3 ACTUATOR EVALUATION
9.1.3.1 Actuator Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
An actuator failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) has been conducted for the ACT
secondary actuation and ACT fly-by-wire (FEW) power control unit actuation systems
described in Subsection 8.1. The analysis was conducted based on major component
breakdowns as shown in Figures 45 and 46.
The results are shown in Tables 24 and 25. The following can be concluded from the
analysis:
• For a crucial ACT function:
• The actuator meets the fail-operational/fail-operational requirement against
any two component failures, excluding jamming failure.
• The actuator meets the fail-operational requirement against any single
jamming failure.
• For a critical ACT function:
• The actuator meets the fail-operational requirement against any single
component failure, excluding jamming failure.
• The actuator meets the fail-safe requirement after a second component
failure.
• The actuator will be shut down after a jamming failure.
9.1.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Force-Summed Actuators
Subsection 8.1.3 and Figure 45 describe the force-summed secondary actuator concept for
application in the ACT control system. A simulation study has been conducted to verify
the design concept. The following questions were answered in the simulation study:
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Table 24. Force-Summed Secondary Actuation System Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis
Item identification
name a
Electronics
©
LVDT
®
LVDT
®
Bypass valve
®
Valve feedback spring
©
First stage electrohy-
draulic valve
©
Second stage electro-
hydraulic valve
®
Centering spring
©
Actuator
®
Pogo
©
Connectors
O
Item function
Computer command
signals, close servo loop
current feedback, etc
To close actuation
position loop
To measure electro-
hydraulic valve spool
position and use it to
detect failure by
comparing with other
channels
Solenoid-operated
on off valve used to
bypass a failed
channel
To close electrohy-
draulic valve position
loop
To transfer electric
signal to valve position
To control fluid flow
to the actuator
To provide hard point
for pilot's mechanical
input
To provide force
voting and
mechanical input to
PCU
To disconnect a jam
med mechanical path
To provide electric
power signal for
electrohydraulic
valve, shutoff
valve, LVDT
Type of failure or
error
Fail, no output due
to power loss,
loose connections,
fracture, overheat
Fail, hardover due
to hot short or
overheat
Fait, no output or
power loss, loose
connection or short
Fail, no output due
to open circuit or
power loss
Fail, hardover due
to jam or short
Failure to open due
to jam or electrical
open or loose
connection
Fail, open madvert
ently due to short
circuit
Disconnect or break
causes valve to go
hardover
No output due to
leakage or break
Hardover due to clog
or jam in the fluid
nozzle
No output due to
excessive leakage
Offcenter due to
jam or leakage that
causes actuate'
hardover
Fail, break, or jam
Leak due to break
or seal failure
Jam
Spring break
Break or short
Detection method
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector or
preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Maintenance
inspection
Preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure effects
subsystem operation
Lose one channel
Lose one channel, small
failure transient
Lose one channel, small
failure transient
None
Inadvertent channel
shutoff
None
Inadvertent channel
shutoff
Lose one channel, small
failure transient
Lose one channel, small
failure transient
Lose one channel
Lose one channel
Lose one channel, small
failure transient
None, unless both
channels fail and
both spring breaks
Lose one channel
Lose one channel for
triple actuator, lose
function for dual
actuator
Lose one channel
Lose one channel
Two failures in For two-actuator system, any two independent failures or an actuator
different channels |am will cause inoperative system
For three-actuator system, any three independent failures or any two
actuator jams will cause inoperative system
aNumbers identify the component shown in Figure 45
This device is used in three-actuator PAS function only If one of the
three actuators is jammed and full hydraulic pressure or bypass fails to
free it, the combined force of the other two will break the pogo loose
There is no pogo in two-actuator system
266
Table 25. Force-Displacement Actuator Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Item identification
name*
Electronics
LVDT
LVDT
Hydraulic shutoff
valve
Valve feedback spring
First-stage electrohy-
draulic valve
Second-stage electro-
hydraulic valve
Main valve spool
Actuator
Connectors
Item function
Amplify input signals,
close servoloop,
current feedback, etc.
To close actuation
position loop
To detect hydraulic
channel failure
To shut off electro-
hydraulic valves in
the failed channel
To close electrohy-
draulic valve position
loop
To transfer electr.c
signal to valve posi-
tion
To maintain valve
position and to control
the main spool
To control hydraulic
flow to the actuator
To control surface
position
Provide electric
power, signal for
electrohydraulic
valve, shutoff
valve, LVDT
Type of
failure or error
Fail, no output due
to power loss,
loose connections,
fracture, overheat
Fail, hardover due
to hot short or
overheat
Fail, no output or
hardover due to
power loss, loose
connection, or short
Fail, no output due
to power failure or
loose connection
Fail, hardover due
to short or jam
Failure to close due
to jam or electrical
open or loose
connection
Fail, closed inadver-
tently due to short
circuit
Disconnect or break
causes valve hard-
over
No output due to
leakage or break
Hardover due to
clog or jam in the
fluid nozzle
No output due to
excessive leakage
Offcenter due to
jam or break
Excessive leakage
due to erosion
Jam
No force output due
to excessive leakage
or crack
Jam
Break or short
Detection method
Failure detector
or pref light test
Failure detector
or pref light test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight lest
Preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector or
preflight test
Failure detector or
preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure detector
or preflight test
Preflight test
Failure detector
Failure detector
or preflight test
Failure effects
subsystem operation
Lose one electrical
channel
Lose one electrical
channel, small fail
transient
Lose one electrical
channel, small fail
transient
None
Inadvertent shutoff of
one hydraulic channel
None
Inadvertent shutoff
of one hydraulic
channel
Lose one hydraulic
channel, small fail
transient
Lose one hydraulic
channel
Lose one hydraulic
channel
Lose one hydraulic
channel
Lose one hydraulic
channel
Lose one channel
May cause total loss
of function
Lose one hydraulic
channel
Inoperative system
Lose one electrical
channel
Double failures' Any two electric or any two mechanical failures, one in each channel, or a
single jam in the mam spool or actuator, will cause the inoperative actuator
system
'Numbers identify the components shown in Figure 46.
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• In normal operation, how high is the force-fight level caused by various component
tolerances?
• How can the failure transient be predicted? How does one design the failure logic,
threshold, and timing?
• What kind of mathematical model is needed to track valve spool motion?
Computer Simulation Construction-The dual force-summed actuator configuration was
selected for the simulation study because it represents typical even-numbered-channel
force-summed actuator characteristics. The force-summed actuator tends to present a
dead-band characteristic when operated in an even-number-of-channels configuration.
Figure 107 shows a block diagram of the computer simulation, which includes two
hardware actuator channels and one mathematical model used as a failure monitor. The
parameters have been collected from vendor catalogs, test data, or other documents and
represent typical servoactuator parameters. A simple first-order lag (8^0 rad/s) was used
to compute valve spool position. The mathematical model used in the failure monitor is
represented by spool position; i.e., no lag. Major position loop gain was 80 rad/s, as was
the actual hardware tested. Because a prior laboratory test of a single-channel actuator
showed sufficient stability margin, no attempt was made to use the computer simulation
for stability check or compensation. Most of the parameters associated with force fight
and failure transients were well represented; i.e., valve dead zone, null shift, feedback
spring rate, etc. Force-fight level was set to be proportional to the difference between
actuator positions and combined structure compliance. The position output, which is also
the feedback signal of the valve spool "mathematical model," is the average of the two
actuator positions.
Cross-channel comparators between the valve spool positions and the mathematical model
were used for failure logic design. Figure 108 shows the flow diagram of the failure logic.
Every time the valve spool position difference exceeds the threshold, the detector counts
up four; every time valve spool position is within the threshold, it counts down one. This
device effectively detects high-frequency oscillatory failure. Threshold was set at 25% of
the full stroke, and average detect time was about 50 ms. The threshold was large enough
and the timing was long enough so that chances of false alarms were minimized (several
trial runs verified this). These numbers can be changed easily if necessary, even after the
airplane is in operation. The failure logic used should be able to detect all hardover- or
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Figure 108. Failure Detector
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oscillatory-type failures. Passive failures will be detected when the error signal exceeds
the threshold by an amount equivalent to a large airplane motion. The preflight procedure
will detect passive failures.
Simulation Results—Figure 109 shows three identical input signals fed into the two
identical actuation channels (possible only mathematically) and one simplified
mathematical model. The simplified model is representative of the model that would be
part of the actual monitor implementation. Both actuators have identical outputs and no
force fight. The mathematical model, which represents spool position without lag,
tracked the real spool positions closely.
Figure 110 shows a computer run with a reasonable combination of component tolerances
in each channel. The position difference between the actuator outputs is small enough so
that both actuator positions still look identical. This is evidenced by the appearance of a
small force fight between actuators.
Figure 111 simulates a hardover failure. The trace shows that at 0.11 sec, the No. 1 valve
suddenly fails hardover. Then, as the No. 2 valve and mathematical model go in the
opposite direction to keep the No. 1 actuator from running away, a maximum force fight
exists between the two actuators. At approximately O.l'f sec, the failure is detected and
the No. 1 actuator is bypassed. Hydraulic pressure difference across the piston drops to
zero. As soon as the failed actuator is bypassed, the good actuator takes over and the
output follows the computer input the same as before the failure occurred. The failure
transient is very small. Before the failed channel is bypassed, the output to the power
control unit is the average of the two actuator positions that essentially still follows the
input. After the failed channel is bypassed, a large dip occurred. In an actual case, it
would take a much longer time to bypass the hydraulic pressure, and the dip would be
much smaller.
Figure 112 shows that the failure detector is also able to detect oscillatory-type failures
at high frequencies. The mathematical model and the good valve spool position are
tracking each other, and a large position error exists between the good and the failed
valve spools, sufficient to trigger the failure detectors. Further investigations into
actuator responses to computer transients were conducted in the laboratory and are
covered in Subsection 9.1.2.4. The simulation study shows that secondary actuators with
mathematical model are a feasible and acceptable approach for the ACT system design.
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9.2 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
9.2.1 COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA
Reliability of the individual ACT functions and of combinations of those functions depends
upon the failure rate of their components and upon their configuration. The best source
for reliability data was experience with the components in commercial service. If that
information was not available, the manufacturer's quoted failure rate or an analysis by
subcomponents from MIL-HDBK-217C was used. Values used and their sources are listed
in Table 26.
9.2.1.1 Partitioning of Line Replaceable Unit Failure Rates
The reliability studies of the Integrated and Segregated Systems assumed that any failure
of a line replaceable unit (LRU) represented total failure of the unit. Actually, a multiple
data source such as the digital air data computer (DADC) or the inertial reference system
(IRS) can partially fail and still provide some of the data correctly. Benefits can be
realized by extracting (when possible) the desired information where it is first produced.
Thus, the pitch and yaw rate and normal acceleration will be extracted from the IRS in
analog form without being converted to digital form and operated upon by the IRS
computer. The DADC dynamic pressure and angle-of-attack outputs will also be
extracted as analog signals. Similarly, the entire primary computer need not always be
used. Table 27 shows how the LRUs were broken down into subcomponents to select the
necessary subcomponents and subcomponent failure rates for each application.
This ability to intercept an analog signal before it becomes subject to the potential
failures of other parts of the LRU does improve system reliability, but some of the
differences noted in Subsection 9.2.2 is only a consequence of the improved method of
calculating reliability.
9.2.1.2 Failure Rates of Supporting Systems
The ACT functions require support from the airplane electric, hydraulic, and pneumatic
systems. The pneumatic system is used only in the angle-of-attack limiter (AAL) and
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Table 26. Failure Rates of ACT Components
System elements
ACT secondary actuator by parts:
Power piston and servovalve
T- valve
LVDT servovalve
LVDT power piston
Solenoid bypass valve
Total secondary actuator
Single-wire segment
Connectors:
10-pin stanchion connector
(for Essential PAS)
20-pin stanchion
10-pin production break
(uninhabited environment)
20-pin production break
(uninhabited environment)
200-pin rack and panel
computer connector
Secondary actuator mechanical
voter
Hydraulic power
A
B
C
Pneumatic power (for AAL)
Electric power (per channel)
Actuator, triple electric and
duplex hydraulic:
Electrohydraulic valves (four)
Power piston and servoyalve
(two)
Hydraulic bypass valve (two)
Total actuator, aileron.
outboard, inner segment
MTBF, flight hours
6.25 x105
105
1.43 x105
1.43 x 105
1.66 x 105
31 600
5x106
11.0x106
7.14 x 106
5.09 x 106
3.29 x 106
2.78 x105
-
11 500
71 400
71 400
-
-
46900
6.25 x 105
1.67 x 105
5.55 x105
c
Failure rate per 10
flight hours
1.6
10.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
31.6
0.2
0.09
0.14
0.196
0.304
3.6
0
87.0
14.0
14.0
0
0.001
21.3
1.6
6.0
1.8
Data source
N ASM 4742
Boeing data
NASACR-145271
NASACR-145271
Boeing data
Sum of above
Boeing data
MIL-HDBK-217B
MIL-HDBK-217B
MIL-HDBK-217B
MIL-HDBK-217B
MIL-HDBK-217B
Multiple mechanical failures
required to cause malfunction
Boeing data
Boeing data
Boeing data
Supplied by both engines and
accumulator
Subsection 9.2.1.2
Boeing data on comparable
parts
N ASM 4742
Boeing data
A combination of the above.
allowing for redundancy
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Table 26. Failure Rates of ACT Components (Continued)
System elements
Actuator, aileron, outboard
(inner segment)
Actuator, secondary, outboard
aileron outer segment
Actuator flaperon
Actuator, secondary, elevator
Actuator, secondary, rudder
Actuator, stick pusher
Actuator, stick shaker
Computer, essential (see
subsec 9.2.1.3 for breakdown)
Computer, primary (see
subsec 9.3.1 .3 for breakdown)
Computer, management
Sensor, accelerometer, FMC
Sensor, accelerometer, GLA
Digital air data computer (DADC)
(see subsec 9.2.1.3 for breakdown)
Sensor, mertial reference system
Sensor, angle of attack (used
with DADC, see subsec 9.2.1 .3)
Sensor, flap position (LVDT)
Sensor, wheel position (LVDT)
Valve, solenoid, stick pusher
MTBF, flight hours
5x105
27900
33.800
25900
26700
20000
106
12000
6620
6620
18400
18400
11 765
2392
15400
91 000
91 000
65400
g
Failure rate per 10
flight hours
2.0*
35.9*
29.6*
38.6*
37.4*
50.0*
1.0
83.0
151.0*
151.0*
54.35*
54.35*
85.0*
418.0*
65.0*
11.0*
11.0*
15.3*
Data source
From above components
Boeing data
Vendor MTBF
Boeing data
Boeing data
Boeing data on similar 727
thrust reverser actuator
727 experience
Vendor data for similar
component
Vendor data
Vendor data
Boeing data
Boeing data
Vendor MTBF
Vendor MTBF
727 experience
NASACR-145271
NASACR-145271
Boeing data
Including connections and wires
provides bleed air from both engines. An additional backup is the low-pressure
accumulator. Because this system is a simple adjunct to the necessary engines, it was felt
that any additional airplane unreliability caused by the AAL use of pneumatic power
would be negligible.
Hydraulic power is essential to safe flight of the Baseline Airplane. A ground rule has
been that the ACT unreliabilities are to be the incremental unreliabilities beyond those of
the Baseline Airplane. However, because the three hydraulic systems are used in many
places in ACT, the reliability calculations are made more meaningful if the contributions
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Table 27. Partitioned Failure Rates
Line replaceable unit and its
component functions
Primary computer
CPU and memory
Servoamplifiers
Input set, including:
Cross-channel communication
Common parts
Digital air data computer
a sensor (analog)
(includes a vane at 65)
q sensor (analog)
Common parts
Digital (computer) parts
Inertial reference system
Yaw-rate sensor (analog)
Pitch-rate sensor (analog)
Normal acceleration (analog)
Computer parts
Common parts
o
Failure per 10
flight hours
151.0*
40.6*
17.8*
66.6*
26.0*
85.0*
70.8*
44.6*
18.2*
18.2*
418.0*
20.3*
20.3*
31.7*
118.5*
31.0*
MTBF, flight
hours
6620
24600
56200
15000
38500
11 800
14 100
22400
55000
55000
2392
49300
43900
31 500
8440
32200
Including connections and wires
from the three hydraulic systems are included; hence, the differing hydraulic system loss
rates of Table 26 are included in the fault trees as multiple-occurring events.
The electric system has been especially designed to provide an extremely low probability
of loss of all four electric channels and of loss of individual channels. Each channel is
supported from both an airplane dc bus and a battery. No two channels have the same two
sources. The airplane dc buses support each other and are themselves powered from ac
buses that have multiple sources of supply. A fault tree illustrating the failure paths
necessary to produce channel failure is shown in Figure 113. Input events shown in double
circles are sets of components combined to simplify the drawing. Figure 114 shows
components of these sets, and Table 28 lists failure rates used for the components.
Analysis of the fault tree by the FTREE program (vol. II, app B) yielded the failure rates
in Table 29 for several different takeoff conditions. It should be understood that when
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Figure 113. Fault Tree for Electric System
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Figure 113. Fault Tree for Electric System (Continued)
failure rates such as 10 or 10" appear, they represent only "less than 10 ." The
numbers shown are presented for comparison but should not be interpreted as absolute
values.
The electric system enters into the ACT systems in many places and in very involved
ways. To consider this dependency when calculating the ACT function would have been
extremely costly in time and computer use. Because the failure rates are small, the
electric system does not contribute significantly to the ACT failure rate. Accordingly, it
was not necessary to enter electric failure rates into the fault trees.
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ac Bus 1 Set
ac Bus 2 Set (Opposite)-Same Rate
g42 -»-Failure rates—130 3.2
equivalent x 10" /h
Source: Boeing MIL-HDBK
experience 217C
232
Boeing
experience
Boeing
experience
50
Boeing
experience
APU Set
Door \ / APU
won't H e"9|ne
moper
ative
232 13.2
— Failure
rates
x 10~6/h
Source: Estimate
286 11.1
Boeing experience
473 to start
APU to start and run: 3532 x 1(T6/h
APU to continue to run: 3059 x 10~6/h
3069 to run
Figure 114. Sets of Components Reducible to One Component
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dc Bus 1 Set
dc Bus 2 Set (Opposite)
13.2
Equivalent
Failure rates
x 10-6/h
Source:
MIL-HDBK-
217C
11 1
Boeing
experience
0.1
767
calcu-
lations
Hot Battery Bus 1
Hot Battery Bus 2 (Opposite)
288
Equivalent
Failure rates
x 10-6/h
Source
Battery not
previously
charged
*Charge can be observed by crew. Probability
of no charge for several flights small
compared to battery fails probability.
MIL-HDBK-
217C
286
Boeing
experience
Charge Set 1
Charge Set 2 (Opposite)
Failure rates, -
x 10-6/h
Source
Boeing
experience
Figure 114. Sets of Components Reducible to One Component (Continued)
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Table 28. Electric Power System Component Failure Rates
Failure
probability,
x 10~6/h
Source of failure rate Name of event
942.0
942.0
3532.0
3059.0
40.0
3.2
3.2
93.0
13.2
13.2
3.2
288.0
288.0
3.2
3.2
3.2
0.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
See Figure 114, ac bus set
See Figure 114, ac bus set
See Figure 114, APU set
See Figure 114, APU set
Boeing experience and Rome Air
Development Center (RADC)
Boeing experience and RADC
Boeing experience and RADC
Boeing calculation
See dc bus set
See dc bus set
Boeing experience and RADC
See Figure 114, hot battery 2 set
See Figure 114, hot battery 2 set
Boeing experience and RADC
Boeing experience and RADC
Boeing experience and RADC
Boeing experience and RADC
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
MIL-217-all modes
Boeing estimate
Boeing estimate
Boeing estimate
Boeing estimate
MIL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
MlL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
MIL-217C-all modes
Arbitrary value to examine sensitivity
Arbitrary value to examine sensitivity
ac bus 1 set
ac bus 2 set
Auxiliary power unit—fail to start and run
Auxiliary power unit—fail to continue to run
Over 90-kVA load, switch to one generator, excess
not shed
Left bus tie breaker—fails open
Right bus tie breaker—fails open
Bus power control unit—all failure modes
dc bus 1 set
dc bus 2 set
dc tie breaker—fails open
Hot battery bus 1 set
Hot battery bus 2 set
Battery power breaker 1 contact 3—fails open
Battery power breaker 1 contact 2—fails open
Battery power breaker 2 contact 3—fails open
Battery power breaker 2 contact 3—fails open
Computer power input diode 1—fails open
Computer power input diode 2-fails open
Computer power input diode 3—fails open
Computer power input diode 4-fails open
Computer power input diode 5—fails open
Computer power input diode 6—fails open
Computer power input diode 7—fails open
Computer power input diode 8-fails open
ACT T-R bus 1—short circuit to ground
ACT T-R bus 2—short circuit to ground
Battery bus 1—short circuit to ground
Battery bus 2—short circuit to ground
Computer power input diode 1-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 2-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 3—short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 4-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 5-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 6-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 7-short circuit across junction
Computer power input diode 8—short circuit across junction
(Probability the charger failed in previous flights and was
not noticed by crew)
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Table 29. Electric System Failure Rates
Takeoff
condition
Two engine-driven
systems on line
and APU operable
but not running
Two engine-driven
systems on line
and APU inoperable
No. 2 engine-driven
system and APU on
line; other engine-
driven system
inoperable
Propability of all ac
channels inoperative
(i. e., probability of
being dependent
upon battery alone)
3.3 x 10"9
Probability of
one channel
inoperative
2.97 x 10'10
4.63 x 10'10
8.35 x 10"10
Probability of three
of four ACT channels
inoperative (system
failure)
2.91 x 10'16
4.95 x 10'14
1.6x 10"13
9.2.2 IN-FLIGHT SCHEDULE RELIABILITY
Reliability of the Selected System during in-flight operation has been predicted using the
BCAC fault tree (FTREE) model as described in Volume II, Appendix B (subsec B.4.2). The
results are presented in Tables 30 through 32. This assessment differs in two significant
ways from those conducted for the Integrated and Segregated Systems. First, the
selected crucial short-period PAS electronics is mechanized in the separate, four-channel,
independent hardware and software of an Essential PAS backup function, while Full PAS is
performed by triple ACT Primary Computers. Second, the major sensors and the
computer LRU failure rates have been allocated down to the section or module level to
obtain more realistic function failure probabilities (subsec 9.2.1.1).
9.2.2.1 ACT System Reliability
Table 30 shows the probability of occurrence of flight restriction and flight diversion for
the Selected System and provides data previously developed for the Integrated and
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Table 30. Probability of Occurrence of Flight Diversion and Flight Restriction
Flight envelope change
Flight restriction
Flight diversion
Flight diversion not
including contribution
from crucial PAS
Probability of event occurrence in 1-hr flight
Integrated System
2.51 x10"3
7.08 x 10~4
Not applicable
Segregated System
3.27 x 10~3
2.56 xlO"4
Not applicable
Selected System
1.73x10~3
4.00x10^
4.00 x 10"4
Table 31. Probability of Failure of Individual ACT Functions
ACT function
PAS (shorter Essential)
PAS (speed)
PAS (Full)
LAS
FMC
WLA
AAL
AAL, inadvertent
operation
AAL, both stick pusher
and stick shaker
Probability of failure in 1-hr flight
Integrated System
3.49 x10'10
1.67x 10~7
—
1.13x 10~6
3.93 x 10~6
1.21 x 10~5
4.26 x 10'7
—
_
Segregated System
2.46 x 10~11
1.67 x10"7
—
3.88 x 10~6
3.88x10"6
1.21 x 10"5
1.13X10-6
—
—
Selected System
5.56 x10"12
—
1.73x10~7
2.93 x 10~8
2.86x 10~7
5.15 x10'7
2.97x 10~7
5.96x10'10
2.55x10"7
Segregated Systems. The Selected System has lower probability of occurrence than the
comparable Integrated System because failure rate allocations have been made at the
module level rather than at the LRU level. The gain schedule signal in the ACT PAS and
lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS) functions is furnished by either the DADC
or by flap position, and single-thread operation is permitted for the LAS function.
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Table 32. Selected Configuration Studies
Condition different from Selected System being evaluated Probability of eventat left per 1-hr flight
Probability of
Selected System
for comparison*
ACT system evaluated without flap position as backup
Probability of flight restriction
Probability of flight diversion
ACT system evaluated without flap position and IRS
as backup
Probability of Full PAS loss
Probability of flight restriction
Probability of flight diversion
LAS single-channel operation
Probability of function loss without
single-thread operation capability
(baseline)
Probability of function loss using
servo output channel switching
2.J CLx ID:3
7.68 X10"4
3.11 x 10-7
-32.15 x 10
7.68 xlO"4
3.62 x 10~7
3.55 x 10~8
1.73 x 10"3
4.00 x 10"4
1.73 x 10~7
1.73 x 10 "3
4.00 x 10 "^
2.93 x10"a
2.93 x10"8
'Selected System incorporates flap position as backup for DADC for gain scheduling, IRS pitch rate in
Full PAS is backed up by four highly reliable pitch-rate instruments in crucial PAS, and LAS is per-
mitted to degrade to single-channel operation.
9.2.2.2 Individual Function Reliability
The ACT system individual function reliability requirements defined in the ground rules
and this subsection have been met by the Selected System. Table 31 shows the individual
ACT function reliability analysis results. The crucial ACT functions of Full PAS and
Q
inadvertent stick pusher operation show failure probabilities of less than 1 x 10 per 1-hr
flight. All other individual function failure probabilities are also satisfactory. An
assessment of the combined Baseline Airplane stick shaker and the ACT system AAL with
stick pusher resulted in an essentially unchanged probability value. This is not an
unexpected outcome, as both the stick shaker and the stick pusher actuators receive
commands from the same computer and sensor combination. The probability that the
_9
stick pusher will not operate when required must also be less than 1 x 1 0 per 1-hr flight.
The combination of probabilities that would result in this condition is (1) the
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probability that the airplane is at an airspeed and aircraft attitude that represents
incipient stall, (2) the probability that the stall warning system has failed or the flight
crew does not act upon the stall warning, and (3) the probability that both stick pusher
actuators fail to operate. This potential system failure probability is assessed as
extremely remote.
9.2.2.3 System and Function Reliability for Selected System
A significant part of the analysis conducted on the Selected System addressed potential
reliability improvements available from reconfiguration. The question of single-channel
operation (single thread) in LAS was investigated because of the potential improvement in
dispatch reliability if dispatch were to be permitted with one channel inoperative
(subsec 9.2.3). Function failure probabilities for three computer and actuator
configurations were assessed. First, the basic three-computer, two-actuator model
requiring two operating channels was evaluated to establish a baseline. Next, the LAS
function was modeled to evaluate single-thread operation by adding computer and sensor
failure rates modified to evaluate covered as well as noncovered component failures.
Coverage as used herein is the probability that the system will correctly detect a
component failure and then successfully reconfigure the system. This became the
Selected System. Finally, LAS was modeled to permit switching either computer servo
output channel upon computer failure by incorporating a computer servo output logic and
a switching circuit. Results of the single-channel operation study are presented in
Table 32. As expected, the failure probabilities of the two computers hardwired to the
actuators and the two actuator failure probabilities dominate the LAS function failure
probability. The improvement in failure rate achieved by use of the servo output switch is
tenfold. The full single-channel configuration is less than 18% better. Subsection 9.2.3
discusses the benefits in dispatch reliability accruing from single-channel operation.
Also investigated were the reliability improvements obtainable from providing backup
sensor signals for the DADC outputs. Table 32 shows results of these studies. Probability
of occurrence increased by 21% for flight restriction and 92% for flight diversion without
flap position signals as backup inputs. With both the IRS pitch attitude and flap position
signals deleted as backup inputs in the models, probabilities were calculated for the Full
PAS function loss and for flight restriction and flight diversion. The Full PAS loss
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probability increased by 79%, and the flight restriction probability increased by
There was no change in flight diversion probability over the calculation without flap
position signals as backup inputs alone, because the failure rate contribution of the IRS
pitch attitude signal in this model is much smaller than either the DADC with flap
position or primary computer failure rates. However, the results of these configuration
studies verify the benefit of including backup signals for the major system sensors to
attain lower flight schedule interruption rates.
9.2.2.^  Assumptions of Reliability Analysis
Because no adequate modeling technique was available to accommodate all logic
complexities of ACT, the following simplifying assumptions were made:
• Software reliability equals 1.0.
e All circuits are verified serviceable prior to each flight.
• Coverage in going from quadruple to triple and from triple to dual redundancy
equals 1.0.
Such assumptions are questionable in the design of crucial digital flight hardware. Boeing
is collaborating with Raytheon to assess whether the computer-aided reliability estimates
(CARE III) model could properly model digital computers driving highly complex, critical
flight control systems. The Boeing fault tree model (vol. II, app B, sec B.2.0) can list and
predict the independent probability of each minterm. It appears that this information can
be used by CARE III to account for latent failures and degrading coverage, so Boeing is
presently transferring the FTREE model to Raytheon to provide the input end of CARE
III. If CARE III is available during the next phase of the IAAC Project, this combined
program may provide a more realistic prediction for the Selected System and for FBW
modifications. At the present time, it appears that the Selected System will be able to
meet the "extremely improbable" criterion for catastrophic failure because of the
independent hardware and software provided by the Essential PAS backup function and
because of the very short failure recovery time inherent in the Selected System
architecture. This reinitialization capability should provide the answer to a large part of
the transient hardware and software problems of present digital computers. Over 90% of
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computer failures are not traceable to hardware defects (ref 7), and the impact of such
interruptions on ACT operability can be avoided by rapid, automatic recovery from
temporary faults.
9.2.3 DISPATCH RELIABILITY
The prediction of dispatch reliability (the probability that the airplane may be dispatched
without delay in excess of 15 min) can be made by either of two methods:
a. By an analysis based on the probability of a required ACT function being made
inoperable by failure of a component
b. By comparison to delay rates experienced in commercial service resulting from
failure of components that are similar to the ACT components
Although the FTREE program (vol. II, app B, sec B.2.0) can compute the probability as in
item a (that an airplane would be in an undispatchable condition upon landing), the
program cannot assess the impact of the time required to troubleshoot, repair, or replace;
nor does it account for the different maintenance time available for a through-stop, a
turnaround, or an overnight. All of these data and more are required to determine
whether there will be a dispatch delay, and such data are not readily available.
The second method requires extensive actual airline experience data on the number and
duration of delays charged to particular components similar to ACT hardware in both
function and minimum equipment list (MEL) requirements. The MEL identifies those
components that can be inoperable without precluding dispatch. Previous experience has
shown that only the second method provides accurate predictions, and it is therefore used
here.
A simplifying assumption used in the calculations was that if any component is part of a
redundant set, not all of which is needed for dispatch, it does not contribute significantly
to dispatch delays or cancellations. This is because the probability of two failures is so
much lower than that of a single failure. These calculations cover only the increment in
dispatch delays and cancellations produced by incorporation of the ACT system into the
Baseline Airplane.
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Table 33 shows the ACT component to be analyzed, then lists hardware, currently in
airline service, chosen to approximate the ACT component and the airplane type in which
it is used and from which the actual delay and cancellation rates experienced were
calculated. The following correction factors are used as indicated in the table:
• Number per Airplane—The ratio of the number of components in the ACT airplane to
the number of similar components in the airplane in service.
• Flight Length Factor—The ratio of 1 hr, assumed as the ACT airplane duration, to
the average flight duration of the inservice airplane.
• Removal Rate Factor—The ratio of anticipated removal rate of an ACT component
to the experienced removal rate of an inservice component. This value may be
estimated by the ratio of failure rates.
The sum of the interruption rates for each of the listed components represents the LRU
total; i.e., the total interruptions traceable to the particular ACT LRUs. Experience has
shown that the total airplane interruptions for an automatic flight control system are
about 1.3 times as great as the sum of all interruptions traceable to particular LRUs
Table 33. Tabular Solution to Dispatch Reliability
Name of part added
to (deleted from)
Baseline Airplane
Primary ACT
computers
(three)3
Essential PAS
computers (four)
Elevator secondary
actuators (three)
W LA primary
actuators (two)
Elevator PCUs
(two)
ACT hydraulic
lines
DADC on ACT
(three)b
Comparison part
assigned serial
numbers and
part names
34-12-130-011
Digital air data
computer
34-12-130-011
Digital air data
computer
27-31-675-051
Elevator PCU
27-11-675-011
Aileron actuator
27-31 675-051
Elevator PCU
27-21-280-191
Rudder
hydraulic lines
34-12-130-011
Digital air data
computer
Com-
parison
airplane
DC- 10
DC- 10
747
747
747
Til
DC-10
A B C
Baseline (per 1000 departures)
Inter-
ruptions
0116
0 116
00277
00235
00277
00021
0116
Delay
hours
0097
0097
0095
00434
0095
00094
0097
Cancel-
lations
00
00
00
00149
00
00
00
D
Number
per
airplane
factor
3/2
4/2
3/4
2/4
2/4
4/1
3/2
E
Flight-
length
factor
058
058
036
036
036
1 0
058
F
Removal
rate
factor
1 10
060
091
1 0
091
1 0
1 0
G= AD
E F
H= B D
E F
J = C D
EF
ACT airplane
(per 1000 departures)
Inter-
ruptions
0111
0081
0007
0004
(0 005)
(Negative
0008
0 101
Delay
hours
0093
0068
0023
0008
(0016)
Negative
0038
0084
Cancel
lations
00
00
00
0003
00
00
00
Remarks and MEL
requirements
Assumes no MEL
dispatch for OADC
or ACT Primary
Computers
Assumes no MEL
dispatch for DADC
or Essential PAS
Computers
No MEL dispatch
No MEL dispatch
Net reduction
No MEL dispatch
NoMELdispatchb
alf LAS function is configured for single-thread operation, it is possible to dispatch with one primary computer inoperative
^-Vhen DAOC is backed up with pitch angle and flap position, it is possible to dispatch with one DADC inoperative
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because of interface problems. Therefore, the ACT system totals are computed as 1.3
times the LRU totals.
Delay and cancellation rates are significantly impacted by the following hardware options:
• Pitch Angle and Flap Position Signals Substitute for DADC—With this system
configuration, dispatch is allowed with one DADC failed.
• Single-Thread Operation of LAS—Because single-thread LAS is allowed under flight
restrictions, dispatch is possible with one primary computer failed. This implies the
possible need to exchange primary computer positions during preflight preparation,
and this is considered acceptable.
Three combinations of the preceding options for the Selected System were evaluated. The
results are shown in Table 34 and compared with similar versions of the Integrated System
and Segregated System dispatch reliability. Figures in parentheses show the interruptions,
delay hours, and cancellations as a percentage of those of the basic Selected System
without the beneficial impact of such additional dissimilar redundancy. The delay rate
allowed under the design requirements and objectives (DRO) for the Baseline Airplane was
1.3%. The ACT system is not to add more than 5% to that. Thus, the allowable limit is
0.65 delays per thousand departures (5% of 1.3% of 1000). All combinations shown in
Table 34 fall below this limit.
Data presented for interruptions and delay hours show that the Segregated System has the
lowest schedule interruption times. This reflects the fact that most delays, like
diversions, result from a fault that would cause a combination of ACT functions to be
inoperable. The Segregated System, with different computers for each ACT function, is
less prone to simultaneous component failures than the other systems. The smaller
difference between the Integrated and the Selected System delays results from using four
high-reliability dedicated pitch-rate sensors in short-period PAS instead of inputs from
the IRSs.
The Selected System has an important advantage over the Integrated System that cannot
be quantified because of lack of comparable commercial transport experience. It is
anticipated that rigorous retest will be required after any maintenance work on any
293
Table 34. Predicted Delay Rates
Systems and assumptions
Basic Selected System but:
• No DADC backup
• No single-thread LAS*
Selected System
•With DADC backup
• No single-thread LAS
Selected System
• With DADC backup
• With single-thread LAS**
Integrated System
•With DADC backup
• No single-thread LAS
Segregated System
•With DADC backup
•No single-thread LAS
Limit underDRO
Per 1000 departures
LRU totals
Interruptions
0.307
(100%)
0.206
(67%)
0.095
(31%)
0.292
(95%)
0.122
(40%)
0.5
Delay hours
0.298
(100%)
0.214
(72%)
0.121
(41%)
0.265
(89%)
0.128
(43%)
-
Cancellations
0.003
(100%)
0.003
(100%)
0.003
(100%)
0.0055
183%
0.0055
183%
-
System totals (LRU total x 1.3)
Interruptions
0.399
(100%)
0.268
(67%)
0.124
(31%)
0.380
(95%)
0.159
(40%)
0.65
Delay hours
0.387
(100%)
0.278
(72%)
0.157
(41%)
0.344
(89%)
0.167
(43%)
-
Cancellations
0.009
(100%)
0.004
(100%)
0.004
(100%)
0.0072
183%
0.0072
183%
-
* Figures in parentheses show the interruption, delay, or
cancellation rates as a percentage of those for the basic
Selected System that has no DADC backup and no single-
thread LAS.
**The Selected System with DADC backup and with single-
thread LAS was used in calculations of cost of ownership.
portion of the crucial short-period PAS system. Because the Integrated System shares
computers and pitch-rate sources between the crucial and critical systems, it is probable
that any maintenance or removal of the computers or IRSs resulting from other ACT
function maintainance would also require this time-consuming retest. The Selected
System should avoid this penalty.
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9.3 COST OF OWNERSHIP
Cost-of-ownership analysis predicts the incremental return on investment (ROD that may
be expected by the airlines for the Integrated, Segregated, and Selected Systems. This
analysis enables present dollar values per flight hour to be calculated for economic
parameters such as fuel cost saving, maintenance cost, spares inventory cost, and system
purchase cost. This avoids the need for intuitive weighting factors (previously inherent in
trade matrices) and removes subjective judgment from the design decision process. The
ACT functions considered in this analysis were PAS, LAS, WLA, FMC, and AAL.
Flaperons were not included in WLA.
9.3.1 COST-OF-OWNERSHIP MODEL
The Boeing-developed airline cost-estimating system (ACES) computer program was used
in this analysis. For each future year, this program calculates the airline profit or loss
that may be expected from the add-on ACT, then calculates the ROI to the airline based
on the present equivalent value method. ACES considers the expected inflation rate,
investment tax credit, depreciation credit, income tax, operating cost, etc., and shows
parameters that have the greatest impact on ROI. It also establishes the payback point
after which a positive cash flow (profit) to the airline may be expected.
9.3.2 COST-OF-OWNERSHIP ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
The economic analysis is based on the following cost-of-ownership ground rules that are
consistent with those used by Boeing for in-house studies on aircraft of similar size:
• Fleet size = 30 aircraft
• Airplane production run = 300 airplanes
• Minimum attractive ROI = 15%
• Tax depreciation life =10 years
• Fleet life = 15 years
• Investment tax credit = 10%
• Cost per delay hour = $1400
• Cost per cancellation = $5100
• Spares holding cost = 10% of spares cost
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• Yearly utilization = 3000 hr
• Average trip = 1.25 flight hours and 863 km (466 nmi)
• Yearly general inflation rate = 10%; yearly fuel inflation rate = 15%
• Insurance = 1% of purchase cost
• All costs in 1978 dollars
9.3.3 COST-OF-OWNERSHIP PARAMETERS
Table 35 shows the cost-of-ownership parameters used to calculate ROI to the airline.
The calculated ROI and years to payback are also shown. These data are based on the
ACT system configurations described in this document, except that flaperons are not
included. This simplification was necessary to enable using the Initial ACT weight, drag,
and fuel burn predictions when evaluating the configurations described herein (see ref 2).
Table 35. Cost-of-Ownership Results for Various ACT Systems
Parameter incremented
Aircraft purchase cost per aircraft
Maintenance manual cost per
30-airplane fleet
Test equipment cost per
30-airplane fleet
Spare inventory initial cost per
30-airplane fleet
Maintenance cost per aircraft
flight hour
Departure delay and cancellation
cost per aircraft flight hour
Change in system weight
relative to Integrated System
Fuel saving per flight hour at
863 km (466 nmi)
Payback period in years
Incremental return on investment to airline
ACT technology base
Integrated
$274 000
$21 000
$22 500
$250 000
$4.18
$0.54
0
160kg
(352 Ib)
2.83
25.1%
Segregated
$390 200
$31 400
$44 900
$356 000
$4.91
$0.45
+114 kg
(+252 Ib)
146kg
(322 Ib)
4.14
22.1%
Selected
$297 100
$26100
$33600
$271 100
$4.22
$0.19
+14 kg
(+30 Ib)
160kg
(352 Ib)
2.98
24.6%
Selected,
pitch FBW
$207 000
$26 100
$33 600
$271 100
$3.98
$0.12
-157kg
(-345 Ib)
172kg
(379 Ib)
2.02
27.6%*
'Assumes 1985 introduction with fuel cost of $0.555/2 ($2.10/gal) and that fuel cost inflates
at 15% per year against a general inflation rate of 10% per year.
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Significant variations in cost-of-ownership parameters among ACT systems are discussed
in the following items.
• Incremental Aircraft Purchase Cost-Trie Segregated System showed the highest cost
because of the 21 small segregated computers used as compared with the 4 larger
computers in the Integrated System. The Selected System cost is higher than the
Integrated System cost because of four additional small computers and three extra
dedicated pitch-rate sensors used to provide the standby, independently redundant,
short-period PAS system. The Selected System with FBW in the pitch axis was the
lowest in incremental cost because of the high parts count of the mechanical pitch
signaling system, which was deleted. The parts deleted included the elevator feel
mechanism, elevator pressure control modules, elevator feel computer, cables, bell
cranks, push rods, pulleys, etc.
• Maintenance Manual Cost for 30-Airplane Fleet—This parameter was based on
typical autopilot cost prorated for increasing electronic complexity. Thus, the
Segregated System cost is the highest.
• Incremental Test Equipment Cost for 30-Airplane Fleet—This assumed that the
airline would already possess the basic digital test equipment for the remainder of
the digital electronic suite. Cost increment thus was based on the cost of additional
adapters and test software required for ACT. The more electronically complex the
ACT system, the greater the cost.
• Incremental Spares Inventory Initial Purchase Cost per 30-Airplane Fleet—This
parameter was affected primarily by the higher cost, higher-removal-rate electronic
equipment. The Segregated System cost was highest and the Selected System was
next.
• Maintenance Cost per Flight Hour—This was calculated based on past experience and
recent predictions at the significant LRU level. As expected, the 21-computer
Segregated System cost was highest. The cost of the Selected System with pitch
FBW was lowest because of the removal of elevator mechanical controls. The
additional maintenance cost for ACT is less than that for a current autopilot
system. This is because rate gyros, which account for up to 70% of maintenance
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cost of current systems, are eliminated, and vertical reference and rate data are
provided by the IRS.
Incremental Delay and Cancellation Cost per Flight Hour-Integrated System cost
was highest because the loss of a single flight control computer or IRS prevented
dispatch. The Segregated System showed some improvement because of the
separation of functions and the adoption of the four reliable, dedicated pitch-rate
sensors for the short-period PAS function. Hence, the aircraft could now dispatch
with one IRS down. The Selected System with pitch FBW shows the lowest delay and
cancellation cost because of the adoption of the flap position switch to back up the
DADCs for the speed PAS function and the removal of the mechanical connections,
feel computer, etc., between the pilot's control column and the elevator.
ACT System Weight and Fuel Saving—Detailed performance data were derived only
for the Initial ACT Integrated System because the aircraft of the later systems
remained externally the same and used the same active control surfaces. Thus, only
ACT system weight relative to the Integrated System would impact block fuel. The
weight delta for the Selected System had an insignificant impact on fuel burn, but
fuel savings for weight changes in the Segregated System and Selected System with
pitch FBW were adjusted as indicated. The weight penalty for the Segregated
System derived from its 21 computers and the addition of an extra battery to supply
emergency dc power. The weight saving for the Selected System with pitch FBW
resulted from deletion of mechanical components in the elevator pitch controls.
Payback Period and Incremental ROI—The payback period for all systems was short,
as desired, and the ROI to the airline exceeded the 15% minimum attractive rate of
return established for this study. The ROIs shown in Table 35 are based on a service
entry date of 1985 and assume that fuel inflates at 15% per year and other cost-of-
ownership cost parameters inflate at 10% per year. The 1985 starting fuel price
used was $0.555/£ ($2.10/gal), and all dollars are 1978 dollars to keep the present
studies in line with the Initial ACT ROI reported in Reference 2. ROI is highly
dependent on the relationship between average yearly fuel inflation rate and the
inflation rates of aircraft cost, maintenance cost, etc. This is shown in Figure 115,
where the fuel yearly inflation rate is varied between 15% and 25% while
maintaining other inflation rates at 10%. It is apparent that ROIs much greater
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Figure 115. Return on Investment Versus Inflation Rate of Fuel
than those shown in Table 35 will be obtained if historical (since 1972) average
annual fuel inflation rates persist into the future.
Figure 116 plots ROI against years to payback for the various ACT systems. Given equal
technical risk for these current technology systems, the least financial risk will be
provided by the system that gives the shortest payback period and the highest ROI;
namely, the Selected System with pitch FBW at 2.02 years and 27.6% ROI.
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9.3.4 HIGH-LEVERAGE COST-OF-OWNERSHIP PARAMETERS
Figure 117 shows the impact on incremental ROI of varying the incremental aircraft price
and the fuel savings or fuel cost by 50% above and below nominal. It is apparent that the
highest leverage exists for decreases in fuel cost and incremental aircraft cost.
9.3.5 COST-OF-OWNERSHIP CONCLUSIONS
The incremental ROI and the short payback period obtainable from the active control
systems studied make them a highly attractive investment at expected fuel-price inflation
rates.
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Figure 117. Effect of Changes in Cost Parameters on Incremental Return on
Investment
It should be noted that the preceding statement applies to the Integrated, Segregated, and
Selected Systems as a whole, because no attempt has yet been made to assess the
incremental ROI for individual functions. Thus, it has been shown (ref 2) that PAS, by
permitting a reduction in horizontal stabilizer area (weight and drag), accounts for about
90% of the reduction in fuel burn. Whether the addition of FMC and WLA would
be cost effective has not yet been established. However, if they are not cost effective
and therefore are excluded from the Initial ACT Configuration, the ROIs of the various
systems can only increase.
Advanced technology studies indicate that FEW in all axes is highly cost effective. From
this it can be concluded that if total FBW is adopted, most active control functions that
may prove necessary can be provided at minimum additional cost.
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10.0 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TASK OVERVIEW
The overall objective of the work performed under the advanced technology task was to
define advanced control systems for future commercial transports. It is part of the
Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic
Transport Project, which is one element of NASA's Energy Efficient Transport (EET)
Program. Figure 118 shows the Advanced Technology ACT Control System Definition
Task breakdown. The work consisted of two tasks: Advanced System Trade Studies and
Implementation Alternatives. The combined output from these two tasks constituted
definition of representative advanced control systems.
The objectives of the Advanced System Trade Studies were to develop control law analysis
and synthesis methods suitable for coupled multiloop systems and to demonstrate the
Conf iguration/ACT System
Design and Evaluation
Test and
Evaluation
Advanced Technology ACT
Control System Definition
CY78 CY79
From:
Configuration/ACT System
Design and Evaluation
Element
CY80 CY81 CY82 CY83
Implementation
Alternatives
Advanced System Trade Studies
Advanced Technology
ACT Control System
Advanced Control
System Definition
Figure 118. Advanced Technology Control System Task Breakdown
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potential benefits of these by evaluating the closed-loop performance of a set of control
laws. Gust-load alleviation (GLA), flutter-mode control (FMC), and rigid-body pitch
stability and command augmentation control laws were synthesized. The methods
employed were based on modern optimal control and estimation theory.
The GLA and FMC control law performance was evaluated based on wing-load and control
surface responses to continuous random vertical turbulence, discrete vertical gusts, and
control loop stability margins. The pitch augmentation control laws were evaluated based
on pitch-rate and load factor responses to elevator commands.
The technical approach for the control law synthesis and performance evaluation is
summarized in Section 11.0 and described in more detail in Volume II, Appendix E. The
GLA and FMC control laws and the corresponding results from the performance analyses
are summarized in Section 12.0, with a more extensive collection of performance data
presented in Volume II, Appendix F. The pitch augmentation control laws and the results
of the performance evaluations are presented in Section 13.0.
The objective of the Implementation Alternatives work was to identify advanced system
alternatives to the current technology implementation. The total control system,
including sensors, computers, servos, actuators, and data transmission, was considered.
The work comprised two major tasks. First, sensors, computers, servos, actuators, and
data transmission technology that might be expected to be available for a circa 1990
commercial airplane were projected. Second, the corresponding flight control system
architecture system provides the same functions as the current technology system and
was designed to provide improved performance and reliability with cost of ownership
equal to or better than the conventional system. Alternative implementation is described
in Section 14.0, with more details provided in Volume II, Appendix G.
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11.0 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY CONTROL LAW SYNTHESIS
AND ANALYSIS METHODS
The following subsections summarize the technical approach used for control law
synthesis and open-loop and closed-loop performance evaluations. Volume II, Appendix E,
contains a more detailed description.
The complexity of the control task and the dynamic characteristics of a typical flexible
transport airplane dictate the solution of a coupled multiloop control problem. The
classical approach of synthesizing one loop at a time is not well suited to deal directly and
efficiently with coupled multiloop systems or to take advantage of favorable interactions
between the control loops.
The design was accomplished using a set of experimental computer programs on the CDC
6600 system. These programs are particularly suited for the analysis and synthesis of
multivariable controllers for Active Controls Technology (ACT) airplanes and are based on
time-domain modern control theory. Key elements are state-space representation of
dynamic systems, modal analysis, and optimal control and observer synthesis. Figure 119
indicates the design process flow. The main elements are model generation, linear
analysis, optimal controller design, and simulation.
Model
generation
Final
design
Open-loop
analysis
Closed-loop
simulation
Controller
design
Linear
closed-loop
analysis
Figure 119. Control Design Procedure
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11.1 DYNAMIC MODELS
The control Jaw synthesis and analysis require models of the flexible airplane, measure-
ments and performance parameters, actuation system, and wind disturbances. These
models are connected to perform open-loop analysis, control law synthesis, and, when
combined with a control law, closed-loop performance evaluation.
11.1.1 FLEXIBLE AIRPLANE MODEL
The airplane at each flight condition is represented by a set of constant coefficient linear
second-order differential equations modified by the addition of first-order lag terms.
Figure 120 is a corresponding block diagram description, with blocks representing the
steady and unsteady aerodynamic forces and the structural model. This diagram graph-
ically describes how the model is put together in the computer using an automated
model generation program. After the input-to-output relations of each block and the
block connections are specified, a precompiler program generates Fortran subroutines
that are combined to represent the complete model in program form. The individual
blocks may represent nonlinear relationships. These models are used to perform static
trim calculations, conduct simulations, and generate linear state models at specified
operating points. These particular formulations produce a well-structured state vector
consisting of q(t), the rigid and elastic modal coordinates; q(t), the corresponding rates;
and w (t), the unsteady aerodynamic states due to wind.
6
In modeling the airplane, an approximate transformation from frequency- to time-domain
representations of the unsteady aerodynamic forces, except for forces due to gusts, is
accomplished with a least-square fit of a second-order polynomial in the Laplace variable
s, resulting in steady and unsteady aerodynamic forces as functions of displacements and
the corresponding first- and second-order time derivatives. The unsteady effects
associated with gust inputs are approximated with Kussner lift-growth functions. The
outputs of these become states of the system. The state model of the flexible airplane
takes the form
x.(t) = A x (t) + B u(t) +r w (t)
 m
d c l d . a . d . E \ l J
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where
xa(t) =
wg(t)
is the airplane state vector, u(t) is the control vector, and w (t) is the gust velocity input
o
vector.
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1 1 . 1 .2 OUTPUT MODEL
The needed outputs are the displacements, velocities, accelerations, and loads at various
stations on the airf rame. The first three items are related to the modal coordinates, q(t),
and the mode shape matrix, 0.
The displacement, velocity, and acceleration measurements and the loads are all
expressed in a general form of the state model output equation
y(t) = C x (t) + D u(t) + E w (t)
do. d. d. (2)
where y(t) is a vector of measurements and loads. The detailed development of the output
equations is shown in Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.I. 3.
H.1.3 ACTUATOR MODEL
Only linear actuator models have been considered in this study. They are expressed as
state models in the standard controllable form
x6 (t) =
1
r o i
0 0
• '
-a -a •
— ~O 1
...0
...0
11
...-J
i
n- 1 — •
-Q -
0
f
a
_ 0 _
6 r ( t ) (3)
where 8 (t) is the ith control surface command, S^t) is the ith control surface position,
X5-(t) is the state vector of the actuator, and aQ,
the actuator transfer function.
j are the coefficients of
The general form of the model for the complete actuation system is
xu(t) = Auxu(t) * Buuc(t)
u(t) = Cuxu(t)
(4)
(5)
where x is the state vector for all actuators, u (t) is the command vector for all
actuators, and u(t) is the control vector for all surfaces.
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11.1.4 WIND MODEL
Because of its simplicity, the Dryden turbulence model for vertical gusts was selected to
represent gust disturbances. In state variable form this becomes
V*) = \vxw(t) + Bwwc(t) (6)
Wg(t) =
where x is the wind state vector, w (t) is a white noise input vector, and w (t) is the
W v- ^
vector of vertical gust velocities at various airframe stations. The input is white noise,
and the outputs are correlated gust velocities having the Dryden power spectral density.
11.2 MODAL ANALYSIS
The stability and response characteristics of a linear aeroelastic system represented by a
state model are completely described by the associated eigenvalues, eigenvectors, and the
input and output distribution matrices. From Subsection 11.1, the state model general
form is
x(t).= Ax(t) + Bu(t) + T w (t) (8)
O
y(t) = Cx(t) + Du(t) + Ew (t) (9)
o
The eigenvalues of the system are the values of X. (i = l,n) that satisfy the equation
det(Xl-A) = 0
where I is the identity matrix and det(-) means the determinant of the argument.
The eigenvectors v. (i = l,n) of the system are defined by the relation
Av j - X j V j (i = l,n)
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If X. is a complex eigenvalue, then the corresponding eigenvector Vj is also complex.
Because the state matrix A is real, it can be shown that complex eigenvalues and
eigenvectors always occur in conjugate pairs. The complete eigensystem consists of n
eigenvalues and the corresponding n eigenvectors.
It can be shown that there exists a similarity transformation
x(t) = Tz(t)
such that the preceding system of equations can be reduced to block diagonal form in
terms of the modal coordinate vector z(t):
z(t) = (T"1AT)z(t) + (T^BMt) + (T'1 DW (t) (10)
O
y( t ) = (CT)z(t) + Du(t) + Ew (t) ( 1 1 )
O
11.3 RESPONSE CALCULATIONS
11.3.1 COVARIANCE ANALYSIS
The frequency-domain power-spectral-density technique has been widely used to compute
steady-state gust responses. This requires determination of a complex frequency response
matrix relating gust-velocity inputs to output response variables and computation and
integration of a large number of power and cross spectra. For a flexible airplane with a
large number of lightly damped modes that are subjected to distributed random-gust
inputs, these calculations may be costly and inaccurate. In this work, this technique has
only been used to compute the output power spectral density for a limited number of
parameters. For most gust response calculations, the total root-mean-square (rms)
responses are of primary interest. These are obtained by using a new approach for
computing the steady-state response correlation matrices of a dynamic system subjected
to random inputs. This method avoids the computational difficulties and inaccuracies
associated with lightly damped modes, with approximate gust penetration effects, and
with the finite frequency range of integration. The calculations are performed using
time-domain state-space representation of the airplane model. A transformed covariance
matrix is obtained by computation of convolution integrals. The values of the integrals
can be evaluated in closed form for white and Dryden spectra, among others. Gust
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penetration effects as the airplane traverses the field of atmospheric turbulence are
modeled by pure time delays, avoiding the use of Fade approximations. The algorithm
computes the steady-state gust response correlation matrices for the states and outputs
and the corresponding rates with the state model in block diagonal form.
11.3.2 LINEAR SIMULATION
Simulations are performed using a block diagonal discrete-time state transition model.
This model is derived from continuous-time state variable form
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (12)
y(t) = Cx(t) + Du(t) (13)
where y(t) is the vector of output response variables, and the state vector x(t) consists of
the rigid and flexible airplane modes, actuator states, and controller states. The elements
of the input vector, u(t), are the pilot commands and gust inputs.
The system represented by these equations is transformed to block diagonal form using
the similarity transformation as described in Subsection 11.2. Assuming a constant value
for input u(t) over an interval t to t + At, the transition of the system model response in
that time interval can be expressed as
z(t -t- At) = 0z(t) + 0"u* (14)
where u* is a value of u(t) in the interval It, t + Atl , 0 is the modal state transition
matrix, and 0 is the integral of the modal state transition matrix over the interval
[t, t + AtJ multiplied by the modal input distributions matrix B. The output vector is
expressed as
y(t) = C'z(t) + Du* (15)
If the responses of the original state vector x(t) are required, they are simply included in
the output vector. For an nth-order system, the total number of operations required at
each integration step is at most 2n multiplications and additions plus n multiplications and
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additions for each input. This compares with n and n, respectively, for a system that is
not block diagonalized. For high-order systems where the number of states is
substantially higher than the number of outputs, there is a significant reduction in the
computational time.
11.* MODEL REDUCTION
The open-loop dynamic model of a flexible airplane must be simplified before the design
of a practical controller. Also, any high-order Kalman filter that has been synthesized
based on either a full-order or reduced-order open-loop model must, in most cases, be
simplified before it is implemented in the flight computers. In both cases, the purpose is
to reduce the order to a level consistent with computational capabilities while preserving
the significant dynamic characteristics relative to the control objectives. Many
techniques are available, but none will consistently produce accurate and meaningful
results without a good understanding of the inherent physical relations behind the control
task. The most suitable approach to the design of a low-order controller has not been
resolved in this work. However, two methods and their particular application will be
described.
11.4.1 DELETION OF NONESSENTIAL STATES
Figure 121 illustrates this method. The dynamic model is reduced in size by deleting rows
and columns from the state model matrices. If the full model is of order n, and m states
are deleted, the reduced model is of order n - m. This method is suitable for deleting
nonessential states, such as airplane rigid-body displacement states that do not produce
forces and moments or states associated with weakly coupled modes. For example, the
phugoid mode can be eliminated from the model with insignificant impact on the
remaining short-period and structural modes by deleting the forward velocity and pitch
angle states.
11.4.2 MODAL RESIDUALIZATION
This method for model reduction is suitable for systems that include fast dynamics that
are not significant with respect to the control task or that have uncontrollable or
unobservable modes. This is typical for flexible airplanes that may have a large number
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Figure 121.'. Deletion of Nonessential States
of stable high-frequency modes and a number of weakly controllable or weakly observable
modes. The high-frequency modes are generally not modeled very accurately and in most
cases need not be controlled to meet the closed-loop design objectives, except that the
control loop gain at high frequency must be sufficiently low so as not to destabilize any
high-frequency mode.
The flexible airplane is represented by a linear time-invariant system described by
equations (10) and (11) in modal form. The state model is partitioned into two sets of
modes, Zj ( t ) and z2(t), as shown in Figure 122. Having ordered the modes so that the
upper partition contains low-frequency modes and all unstable modes and the lower
partition contains high-frequency stable modes, it is assumed that the modes z7(t) respond
much faster than the modes z,(t) and that only the dynamics of z,(t) are important with
respect to the control task. If z_(t) consists of i modes, the original nth-order system has
been reduced to an (n - i)th-order system. The eigenvalues of the system are simply those
of the retained modes, and the controllability and observability of these are unchanged
from the original full-order model. The steady-state effects from the deleted modes z_(t)
are included in the outputs y(t) through additional input terms.
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• Full-order model (in block diagonal form)
wg
• Assumption:
z2 ~ 0
• Reduced-order model*
Z2 = ~^2~1 B 2U ~ ^2 ^ 2wg
y=C' 1 z 1 +(Da-C'2A2"1B'2)u + (Ea-C'2A2"1r'2) wg
Figure 122. Modal Residualization
11.4.3 LEAST-SQUARE ERROR MINIMIZATION
This method is used to approximate the frequency response characteristics of a low-order
system to that of a high-order system. The technique is based on curve-fitting single-loop
frequency responses against a specified model system over a finite range of frequencies.
For example, suppose it is desired to approximate the ijth control loop transfer functions
G(s) using a low-order model with transfer function G(s,p). The vector p contains the
parameters of the low-order system. A fit error function, E(p), is defined as the integral
of the squared error between the actual system and the modeled system. The transfer
function parameters p are determined from the minimization of this error function. This
is accomplished by a modified conjugate gradient search to minimize the error function.
Constraints are imposed on the parameters to ensure consistent phase and gain
characteristics and to maintain stability requirements.
This procedure can be applied to integrate filters of different order. It is achieved by
curve-fitting the filter frequency responses at different design points with a common
filter form whose parameters are scheduled as a function of flight condition.
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11.5 OPEN-LOOP ANALYSIS
For the open-loop analysis, state models of the airplane and actuation systems are needed.
All models are full order except for the deletion of nonessential states. These two models
are combined and are expressed in the form
x(t) = A x(t) + B u ( t )+rwe( t ) (16)O O C Ob
y(t) = C0x(t) + Eaw (t) (17)
where the matrices and vectors are defined in Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.5.1.
11.5.1 OPEN-LOOP STABILITY
The stability of the airplane rigid and flexible modes is determined by computing the
eigenvalues of the dynamic models. This is done for several flight conditions and airplane
mass distributions. The effect of selected parameters, such as dynamic pressure, altitude,
or true airspeed, is evaluated by determining the range of values for which the system is
stable.
11.5.2 OPEN-LOOP RESPONSE
For flight conditions at which the open-loop airplane is stable, the steady-state gust
response correlation matrices for the state, modal state, measurements and performance
parameters (such as bending moments, torsional moments, accelerations, etc.), and the
output power spectra of selected performance parameters are computed. The transient
responses due to discrete gusts and elevator commands are obtained by simulations.
Because the load equations are based on a truncated set of modal coordinates, the
absolute magnitudes of the loads are not correct. However, because all modes that are
significant with respect to the control task are included, these approximate load
calculations are sufficient for evaluating the relative merits of various control laws.
For the various correlation matrices, the diagonal elements represent the variances of the
gust response and the offdiagonal elements represent the cross-variances of the gust
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response. The output power spectral density of selected gust loads is used to determine
the significant frequency content.
11.5.3 CONTROLLABILITY
The initial open-loop airplane model contains a selection of several possible control
surfaces that may be suitable for the control task. One or more of these will be selected
for the final design. Two criteria are used in this selection process: mode controllability
and performance parameter controllability.
The relative controllability of a given mode by the various elements of the control vector
can be obtained by transforming the state equations into block diagonal form and by
appropriate scaling of the control vector.
Inspection of the columns of the transformed control matrix
B' = T-1B T
o o u
will show the coupling of each control into the various modes. T is a diagonal scaling
matrix with elements corresponding to the maximum allowable control deflections. To
assess the relative effectiveness of the controls in controlling a particular mode, it is
necessary only to examine the corresponding row (or two rows, if the mode is oscillatory)
of the matrix B' . The column with the largest absolute value will identify the most
effective control.
The concern is also with control of certain performance parameters such as bending
moments, torsional moments, accelerations, etc., at various airplane stations. These are
represented by the state model output equation (17). The relative controllability of these
can be assessed by computing the steady-state output response correlation matrices given
an appropriately scaled white noise input at the individual control actuators. Consider the
state model given by equation (16) with a single input u (t) where u (t) is a scalar input
Ci Ci
corresponding to the ith control and is stationary white noise with intensity corresponding
to the appropriate element in the matrix T .
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The steady-state response correlation matrix is computed for the output vector y(t),
equation (17). This is repeated for all control inputs u (t) (i = l,m). For given
performance parameter y.(t), there will be a set of m variances (one for each control)
i (i- l ,m)
t*-ool ' ' jl1
where m is the number of controls. The most effective control, u (t), with respect to the
performance parameter, y-(t), is identified by the largest variance V.. The mode
controllability and performance parameter controllability described previously only assess
relative effectiveness and do not guarantee that the selected controls are adequate to
perform the control task. However, evaluating the closed-loop control surface responses
of a full-state design will determine whether or not a given choice of controls is adequate
for the control task.
11.5.* OBSERVABILITY
The initial open-loop model contains measurement equations for sensors placed at a
number of possible locations. One or more of these will be selected for the final design.
Two criteria are used for this selection: mode observability and performance parameter
observability.
The relative observability of the rigid and flexible modes from measurements at the
various airplane stations can be obtained by transforming equation (17) into block diagonal
form. Consider a set of like measurements, y(t) at all possible sensor locations, and
expressed in terms of the block diagonal coordinate, z(t), as
y(t) = CQTz(t) + Ea wg(t) (18)
Inspection of the columns of the transformed measurement matrix
C' - C T
o o
shows the relative observability of the system modes from measurements at the various
locations. The row containing the largest absolute value identifies the most suitable
location for that particular type of sensor.
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The concern is also with the observation of certain performance parameters, such as
bending moments, torsional moments, accelerations, etc., that are excited by the random-
gust inputs but that cannot be measured directly. Consider the state model represented
by equations (16) and (17). In this case the output vector, y(t), consists of various
performance parameters that are not directly measurable, as well as a set of measure-
ments at all possible sensor locations. The steady-state gust response correlation matrix
for the complete output vector, y(t), is computed. For a given performance parameter,
y.(t), a set of p cross-variances is obtained
V . =
where p is the number of sensor locations. The most suitable sensor location is identified
by the largest absolute value of the cross-variance V... For a given performance,
magnitudes of the cross-variances depend on the correlation between y (t) and the
measurement y.(t) and the magnitude of the measurement variance V... Thus, using the
magnitude of the cross-variance as a basis for sensor selection ensures the best
combination of sensor-to-performance criteria correlation, as well as sensor output
signal-to-noise ratio.
11.6 CONTROL LAW SYNTHESIS
Control law synthesis consists of formulation of a linear small-perturbation state model
for synthesis, modified linear quadratic regulator design, modified Kalman state estimator
design, and controller simplification. The first three items have been addressed
extensively during this study and will be described here in some detail. Controller
simplification will be the subject of future work; however, a general approach will be
described here.
The state model for control law synthesis comprises the airplane dynamic model,
actuation system model, and the wind disturbance model and is expressed by
x(t) = A x(t) + B u (t) + r w (t) + B d(t)
o o (_ o C S
y(t) = C s x( t )+ Fv(t)
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where the matrices and vectors are defined in Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.6.1.
This model represents the dynamic characteristics of the airplane for small-perturbation
motion around a trim point. In the absence of external disturbances, the airplane is in
steady unaccelerated flight at the trim point.
The linear regulator provides optimum closed-loop response with respect to release from
initial conditions and with respect to random input disturbances that have a flat power
spectrum over the range of frequencies characteristic of the airplane. The power
spectrum of turbulence is not flat over the range of rigid and structural mode frequencies
of a transport airplane. Thus, it is necessary to augment the synthesis model with a model
of the atmosphere that has white noise as inputs and the gust velocities with the desired
power spectra as outputs. This implies that for an optimal gust-load alleviation (GLA)
control law, it is necessary to feed back the gust states. These states are observable from
acceleration sensors.
11.6.1 LINEAR REGULATOR DESIGN
The application of optimal control theory furnishes direct synthesis of the structure and
gains of a control law. Optimal control is based on the minimization of a cost functional,
subjected to the constraints of the equations of motion. To meet the closed-loop
requirements of an active control transport, three methods have been adopted for directly
incorporating specific design criteria in the optimal control law synthesis. The first
method is the usual quadratic cost penalty on specific performance criteria such as
deflection, velocity, acceleration, or load. The second method is implicit model-
following, which is used to structure the cost function so that the dynamic response of the
closed-loop system approaches that of the model. This is a suitable method for
incorporating handling qualities criteria or other transient and steady-state response
specifications. The third method is specification of a minimum degree of stability. This
will ensure that all closed-loop eigenvalues will be placed to the left of a line parallel to
the imaginary axis.
Apart from implicit model-following, another approach for incorporating command
response criteria into the linear regulator design is explicit model-following. This method
was found to be very useful in the synthesis of control laws that produced good pitch-rate
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and normal load factor responses. The method consists of placing an ideal model of the
airplane to be controlled in the 'forward path of the control loop.
The mathematical development of the linear regulator design and the appropriate
equations are presented in Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.6.2.
11.6.2 MODIFIED KALMAN FILTER DESIGN
After solving the control problem using the modified linear quadratic regulator design
outlined previously, it is necessary to construct a state estimator. The usefulness of state
estimators has been limited by the sensitivity of the closed-loop performance to
parameter variations. The modeling of a process is never exact, and because the design of
a system is based on an approximate model, the design must be insensitive to modeling
uncertainties, in particular with respect to the stability of the system. Optimal control
with full-state feedback offers a gain of -6 to + <» dB and +60-deg phase margins in all
control loops. When a Kalman filter is inserted into the loop to estimate state variables,
the stability margins shrink, sometimes drastically. To alleviate this problem, a method
has been used that allows the increase of stability margins in each control loop at the
expense of filter performance when parameters are at their nominal values. A brief
description is given in Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.6.3.
11.6.3 CONTROLLER SIMPLIFICATION
The Kalman filter will have the same dynamic order as that of the open-loop model used
for the synthesis. In the case of a flexible airplane model that contains a large number of
structural modes, the high order of the filter imposes an excessive and unnecessary
computational burden on flight computers. The most suitable approach to the design of a
low-order suboptimal filter has not been determined during this study. However, a
preliminary approach will be outlined here. The first task is to establish the minimum
bandwidth of the controller. The actuation bandwidth is set by the highest frequency
mode that must be controlled. In the case of flutter suppression, it is set by the highest
frequency mode that contributes significantly to the gust loads. The latter is easily
determined from cumulative power density plots of the appropriate performance
parameters such as bending moments, torsional moments, accelerations, etc., at various
airplane stations. A third factor that must be considered is the increasing uncertainty in
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the dynamic model with increasing frequency. Above a certain frequency, the modeled
dynamics in terms of frequencies and mode shapes are at best suspect. The controller
bandwidth must be limited such that at these higher frequencies the closed-loop system
has sufficiently large stability margins.
The modal residualization technique can be used to eliminate filter modes that are outside
the required actuation bandwidth. The reduced filter may still be too complex for
practical implementation on flight computers. Further reduction may still be possible
without any significant loss in closed-loop performance. Again, the modal residualization
technique can be used to eliminate filter modes that are within the actuation bandwidth
but that are associated with weakly observable or weakly controllable airplane modes or
with airplane modes that are not observable from the cost function.
In the preceding discussion, it was assumed that the Kalman filter was synthesized using a
full-order airplane model and that the lower order suboptimal filter was obtained by the
reduction of this full-order filter. However, another approach would be to reduce the
open-loop model using the modal residualization technique, leaving only the modes
considered essential to the control task. A suboptimal filter (with respect to the full-
order model) would then be synthesized using the lower order airplane open-loop model.
Still another approach would be to use the full-order Kalman filter to define the required
control-loop frequency responses over the actuation bandwidth and to design lower
response characteristics. This could involve least-square fitting, other optimization
techniques, or simply trial-and-error design.
11.7 CLOSED-LOOP ANALYSIS
The closed-loop analysis consists of evaluating the performance of full- and partial-state
feedback designs and full- and reduced-order Kalman filter designs in terms of gust
response and stability margins. This analysis is an important part of an iterative design
procedure that is divided into two parts: the control problem is solved by synthesizing and
analyzing the closed-loop performance of full- or partial-state feedback designs. After
the proper cost function and associate state feedback gain matrix have been determined,
the Kalman filter is synthesized and inserted in the control loop, and the closed-loop
performance is evaluated. The performance of various reduced-order filters is evaluated
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until one is found that gives close to the optimum closed-loop performance with adequate
stability margins and without imposing excessive computational burden on flight
computers. The formulation of the models used for closed-loop analyses is given in
Volume II, Appendix E, Subsection E.7.1.
11.7.1 CLOSED-LOOP STABILITY
The closed-loop stability analysis consists of computing eigenvalues, gain and phase
margins in all control loops, and the range of values of key parameters such as dynamic
pressure, for which the closed-loop system remains stable. The various closed-loop
control laws are evaluated based on location of closed-loop poles and the margins of
stability as a function of frequency.
If the synthesis model has full order, then the full-state feedback system is optimal with
respect to the cost function, stable if all unstable open-loop modes are controllable, and
robust with respect to parameter variations in the control loops. Similarly, the closed-
loop system with the full-order Kalman filter is always stable provided that all unstable
open-loop modes are controllable and observable. With the Kalman filter inserted into the
control loop to estimate the states, the good stability margins of the full-state feedback
design may shrink, sometimes drastically. For the closed-loop system with reduced-order
filter, there is no guarantee that the system is stable even at the nominal gain and phase.
11.7.2 CLOSED-LOOP RESPONSE
The steady-state gust response correlation matrices for the states, modal states,
measurements and performance parameters (such as bending moments, torsional moments,
accelerations, etc.), and the output power spectral density of selected performance
parameters are computed. The transient responses due to discrete gusts and elevator
commands are obtained by simulations. Because the load equations are based on a
truncated set of modal coordinates, the absolute magnitudes of the loads are not correct.
However, because all modes that are significant with respect to the control task are
included, and the same truncated model has been used to compute the gust loads of the
open-loop airplane, these approximate load calculations are sufficient for evaluating the
relative merits of various control laws. The closed-loop gust response is evaluated in
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terms of the relative reduction in the related performance parameters and the peak and
rms deflections and rates of the control surfaces.
11.7.3 EVALUATION OF STATE FEEDBACK DESIGNS
The closed-loop analysis of the state feedback design is part of the iterative design cycle
to solve the control task. Full-state feedback designs are evaluated until the proper cost
function and control surfaces have been selected. The evaluations are based on gust-load
reductions, control surface activities, and closed-loop eigenvalues.
Because the control law includes feedback of control surface states, the optimal linear
regulator can be used to determine whether or not the control surface actuators have
sufficient bandwidth. If there is a significant change in the actuator closed-loop
eigenvalues from their nominal open-loop values, it will be necessary to increase the
actuation bandwidth.
The trade between closed-loop performance and actuation bandwidth can be determined
by considering the cumulative power-spectral-density plots of the open-loop and full-state
closed-loop gust responses of the various performance parameters. The effects of
eliminating modes from the feedback can be determined by evaluating the closed-loop
performance with the appropriate columns in the optimal gain matrix set equal to zero.
11.7.* EVALUATION OF KALMAN FILTER DESIGNS
The closed-loop analysis of the Kalman filter designs is part of the iterative design cycle
to solve the state estimation problem. Full-order Kalman filters are evaluated until the
closed-loop performance and stability margins meet or exceed the design requirements.
The key design parameters evaluated are types, numbers, and locations of sensors and the
trade between gust response and stability margins. This same iterative analysis is used to
evaluate reduced-order filters.
323
12.0 CONTROL LAWS FOR FMC AND GLA
Constant gain control laws for suppression of a symmetric flutter mode and reduction of
loads due to vertical gusts have been synthesized at eight flight conditions for the Initial
ACT Airplane. They correspond to four speed conditions identified as VR, VMQ, VQ, and
1.2VD and two mass distributions as indicated in Table 36. The first four are used for
gust-load alleviation (GLA) design, while the latter four are used for flutter-mode control
(FMC) design.
12.1 DYNAMIC MODEL DESCRIPTION
At each flight condition, the flexible airplane is represented by a set of constant
coefficient second-order differential equations modified by the addition of first-order lag
terms that represent the effects of unsteady aerodynamics associated with gust inputs.
Table 36. Flight Conditions for Dynamic Models of the Initial ACT Airplane
Flight
condition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Speed
condition
VB
VB
VMO
VMO
VD
VD
1.2VD
1.2VD
Equivalent
airspeed, m/s
(kn)
142 (276)
142 (276)
176 (341)
176 (341)
214 (416)
214 (416)
262 (508)
262 (508)
Mass
condition
0.8F
MZFW+F
0.8F
MZFW+F
0.8F
MZFW+F
0.8F
MZFW+F
Altitude,
m(ft)
10668 (35000)
10668 (35000)
7 833 (25 700)
7833 (25700)
4968 (16300)
4968 (16300)
1 890 (6 200)
1 890 (6 200)
Pressure,
N/m2 (Ib/ft2)
12344 (258)
12344 (258)
18846 (394)
18846 (394)
28049 (586)
28049 (586)
41 887 (875)
41 887 (875)
• Symmetric model 768-103
• Mach number M = 0.86
• Mass = 122 470 kg (270 000 Ib)
• 0.8F = 80% fuel (including full reserve tanks) plus payload to
maximum gross weight resulting in aft center of gravity (0.46c)
• MZFW+F = Maximum zero fuel weight plus fuel (including full reserve tanks)
to maximum gross weight resulting in forward center of gravity (0.226)
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The development of these equations is described in Section 11.0 and in more detail in
Volume II, Appendix E. The model has 2 rigid and 19 flexible body modes. The latter
range in frequency from approximately 11 to 302 rad/s. The lag and scaling constants in
the three Kussner lift-growth functions (fig. 120) were computed assuming an infinite
aspect-ratio wing (ref 8) and expressed as
= 0.058 l^- = 0.236
do = 0.364 \r^ c9 = 0.513 (19)
d3 = 2.42 Vrf/ c3 - 0.171
where V is the true airspeed (see table 36) and c is the characteristic chord length
c = 6.03m (237.4 in).
The dynamic models of the actuators for the elevator and the outboard aileron are shown
in Figure 123. Originally, these were represented by second-order dynamics; however, an
additional lag filter with a time constant of 0.001 sec was added. This was done to avoid
the explicit dependence of acceleration measurements on actuator commands. Another
approach would be to include sensor dynamics in the model.
The output models for measurements and loads are described in Subsection 11.1.2. The
elements of the mode shape matrix for pitch-rate measurement at the center of gravity
and vertical acceleration measurement at the wing tip are listed in Volume II, Appendix F,
Elevator:
8 x 1 0
(s + 20) (s + 40) (s+1000)
Outboard
aileron1
8x 10
(s + 20) (s + 40) (s+1000)
Figure 123. Control Surface Actuator
Dynamics
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for the two airplane mass conditions. Table 37 lists the rigid- and flexible-body free-
vibration modes. The measurements were transformed from inertial axes to body-fixed
axes. Elements of the load distribution matrix are also referenced to body-fixed axes.
The six load equations represent the bending moment, torsional moment, and shear at an
inboard (TJ = 0.25) and an outboard (TJ = 0.75) wing station. Details are shown in Volume II,
Appendix F.
The wind disturbance model is based on the Dryden spectrum for a vertical gust with a
turbulence scale length of 533.4m (1750 ft).
Table 37. Description of Airplane Rigid and Flexible Modes
Modes
91
92
93
94
q5
96
q7
98
q9
910
911
912
fl ft.q13
9l41 *T
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
Symbol
u
w
q
Units
in/s
in/s
rad/s
Description
Fore and aft velocity of center of gravity
Vertical velocity of center of gravity
Pitch rate
Forebody vertical bending deflection
First aft-body vertical bending deflection
Second aft-body vertical bending deflection
First vertical tail vertical bending deflection
Second vertical tail vertical bending deflection
First horizontal tail vertical bending deflection
Second horizontal tail vertical bending deflection
Horizontal tail torsion deflection
First wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing vertical bending deflection
for 0.46 c condition
First wing fore and aft bending deflection
for 0.225 condition
First wing fore and aft bending deflection
for 0.465 condition
Second wing vertical bending deflection
for 0.225 condition
First wing torsion deflection
Third wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing fore and aft bending deflection
Second wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing torsion deflection
Nacelle side bending deflection
Nacelle vertical bending deflection
Nacelle roll deflection
Sign convention
+ forward
+ downward
+ nose up
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The elements of the state vector for the combined airplane actuation system and wind
model are listed in Table 38.
Table 38. Description of the System State Vector
Modes
X1
x2
X3
x4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28
Symbol
u
w
q
Units
in/s
in/s
rad/s
rad
Description
Fore and aft velocity of center of gravity
Vertical velocity of center of gravity
Pitch rate
Pitch angle
Forebody vertical bending rate
Forebody vertical bending deflection
First aft-body vertical bending rate
First aft-body vertical bending deflection
Second aft-body vertical bending rate
Second aft-body vertical bending deflection
First vertical tail vertical bending rate
First vertical tail vertical bending deflection
Second vertical tail vertical bending rate
Second vertical tail vertical bending deflection
First horizontal tail vertical bending rate
First horizontal tail vertical bending deflection
Second horizontal tail vertical bending rate
Second horizontal tail vertical bending deflection
Horizontal tail torsion rate
Horizontal tail torsion deflection
First wing vertical bending rate
First wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing vertical bending rate
Second wing vertical bending deflection
First wing fore and aft bending rate
First wing fore and aft bending deflection
First wing torsion rate
First wing torsion deflection
Sign convention
+ forward
+ downward
+ nose up
+ nose up
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Table 38. Description of the System Vector (Continued)
Modes
X29
X30
X31
X32
X33
X34
X35
X36
X37
X38
X39
X40
x41
X42
X43
x44
X45
X46
X47
X48
X49
X50
X51
X52
X53
Symbol
\
*E
5E
«A
*A
5A
Units
rad/s2
rad/s2
rad
rad/s2
rad/s
rad
Description
Third wing vertical bending rate
Third wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing fore and aft bending rate
Second wing fore and aft bending deflection
Second wing vertical bending rate
Second wing vertical bending deflection
Second wing torsion rate
Second wing torsion deflection
Nacelle side bending rate
Nacelle side bending deflection
Nacelle vertical bending rate
Nacelle vertical bending deflection
Nacelle roll rate
Nacelle roll deflection
First Kussner lift-growth state
Second Kussner lift-growth state
Third Kussner lift-growth state
Elevator acceleration
Elevator rate
Elevator deflection
Outboard aileron acceleration
Outboard aileron rate,
Outboard aileron deflection
First Dryden gust model state
Second Dryden gust model state
Sign convention
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12.2 SELECTION OF CONTROL SURFACES
Seven control surfaces have been considered for the control task: inboard and outboard
elevators, complete elevator, inboard and outboard segments of the outboard aileron,
complete outboard aileron, and inboard aileron. The suitability of these control surfaces
has been analyzed as outlined in Subsection 11.5.3. The relative controllability of the
flutter mode at flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8 is shown in Volume II, Appendix F,
Table F-3. Among the surfaces considered and with the specified control authorities, the
outboard aileron is most suitable for FMC. However, the outboard portion of the outboard
aileron is also suitable for this task, having relative controllability of about 0.70 at these
flight conditions.
Tables F-^f through F-7 (vol. II, app F) show the relative root-mean-square (rms) load
responses to white noise inputs at the actuators for flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The relative rms load response is defined as the ratio between the actual
rms load response and the maximum rms load response (from the set of all control
surfaces). If the relative rms load response is 1.0, then the associated surface is the most
effective surface for controlling that particular load (shear, bending, or torsion). Among
the surfaces considered and with the specified control authorities, the outboard aileron
and elevator are most suitable for controlling the wing loads.
In addition, safety, actuator installation, and other design requirements must be
considered. A small control surface with limited control authority that is dedicated to
automatic control functions will have obvious advantages with regard to failures and
actuator bandwidth and resolution. The location of the control surface may affect other
design requirements that have not been considered in the analysis of the open-loop
airplane. For example, using the elevator to control the loads at the wing root may
adversely affect the ride and handling qualities of closed-loop airplanes. Thus, the final
selection of control surfaces should only be done after the analysis of the closed-loop
performance of various control surface configurations. The open-loop analysis described
in Subsection 11.5.3 should primarily be used to identify all control surface configurations
that are possible candidates.
The control law synthesis performed in this study used the combination of the elevator
and the outboard aileron for control.
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12.3 SELECTION OF SENSORS
Sensor selection criteria are described in detail in Subsection 11.5.4. The two criteria
used are mode observability and performance parameter observability. The first is
important in the selection of sensors for FMC, and the second is important in the
selection of sensors for GLA. Three sensors have been selected: one pitch-rate gyro at
the center of gravity will be used to observe the short-period mode and two vertical
accelerometers located symmetrically (one in each wing) will be used to observe the
structural modes of the wing. The subsequent analysis was only concerned with finding
the best location for the wing-mounted accelerometers.
The sensor locations considered in this study are shown in Figure 124. Each location is
identified by a number between 1 and 27. The locations are distributed spanwise along the
elastic axis and the rear spar of the wing. The relative observability of the two modes
involved in the flutter of the wing was determined for flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8. The
sensor-to-flutter mode coupling is explained in Subsection 11.4. Plots presented in
Volume II (app F) show these values normalized to the coupling at sensor location 27.
Sensor location 27, on the rear spar and at the wing tip, is most suitable for flutter
suppression using vertical accelerometers.
Sensor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Figure 124. Candidate Wing Accelerometer Locations
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The output gust response correlation matrices for the open-loop airplane were computed
as described in Subsections 11.3 and 11.5. These data illustrate the relative cross-
variances between accelerometer outputs and bending moments, the results being
normalized with respect to the rms level of the bending moments. Similar data were
obtained for the closed-loop airplane. In this case, a full-state feedback control law is
assumed. Detailed data are presented in Volume II, Appendix F.
Sensor position 27 was selected for the subsequent Kalman filter designs for the following
reasons: high flutter-mode observability, high rms output, and good correlation with the
inboard wing bending moment, which was selected as the main gust-load parameter to be
reduced by feedback control (see subsec 12.4).
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12.* GLA DESIGNS
Several intermediate designs were synthesized before selecting a final design for gust-
load reduction. Table 39 lists designs used, and Figure 125 contains a flow chart of the
approach followed in the design for each flight condition. Figure 126 shows how the eight
flight conditions were integrated into the final design. Results at each of the inter-
mediate design steps will be discussed to show how the final design was reached.
Full-state feedback design (design A) is the initial step in the design process for gust-load
reduction. The design is determined by the values selected for the parameters in the cost
function
J = dt (20)
where
Kl /y Imax
2max
3max
Table 39. Design Types
Type Name
A
B
C
D
E
G
H
Full-state feed back
Nominal Kalman filter
Robust Kalman filter
Reduced-order Kalman filter
Reduced-order Kalman filter with gain reduction
in one or both control loops
Integrated 8th-order filter for flight conditions
1, 2, 3, and 4
Integrated 10th-order filter for flight conditions
5, 6. 7. and 8
Final 8th-order filter integrated for all flight
conditions
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Open-loop
model
Full-state
design
Performance
satisfactory?
Full-order
Kalman
filter
Stability
margins
satisfied? Robust
Kalman
filter
Reduce order
(by modal
residualization)
Stability >.
 No
margins
satisfied? Reduce
appropriate
loop gains
No sS Performance
satisfactory?
Design
completeDesign E
Design C
Design E
Figure 125. Design Process for All Flight Conditions
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1
1
Four gust-load
alleviation
(GLA) designs
^
""
Design E
1
1
Four flutter-
mode control
(FMC) designs
^
—
-
Select critical
G LA design
Select critical
FMC design
Evaluate at
other G LA
conditions
1
Evaluate at
other FMC
conditions
Design F
Stability
margins
satisfied?
Reduce
appropriate
loop gains
Stability
margins
satisfied?
Design G
Curve fit
with GLA
design
A L
Final
integrated
design
Design H
Figure 126. Integration of Designs From All Flight Conditions
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R = 1.0/6E2
max
R = 1.0/6A2
max
and
y. = wing bending moment at the inboard station (TJ = 0.25)
y_ = wing torsion at the inboard station (i? = 0.25)
y, = wing bending moment at the outboard station (TJ = 0.75)
y^ = wing torsion at the outboard station (17 = 0.75)
6p = command input to the elevator
c
8. - command input to the outboard aileron/\
c
In selecting appropriate values for the cost function parameters, their relative weighting
is of prime consideration. However, to achieve a reasonable first guess, the following
values were assumed as representative:
S E = 3 d e g
max
6A = 15 deg
max
y. = corresponding open-loop load (i = 1,4)
1
 max
K. = 1 (i = 1,4)
In all the full-state designs, 6p and 5. were not changed. Although the
max max
correlation between changes in particular loads and control surface activity varies,
generally an increase in value of one or more of the K. results in a decrease of the
corresponding load and an increase in the remaining loads and control surface activity.
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Full-state design objectives included reducing bending moment loads and avoiding an
increase in torsion loads while keeping the aileron rate within approximately 1.5-deg/s
rms for a gust intensity of 0.305 m/s (1 ft/s). Gust response calculations used the Dryden
spectrum with a turbulence scale length of 533.4m (1750 ft).
Gust loads were reduced in design A for flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 by incorporating a
combination of four cost function parameters: inboard bending moment, inboard torsion,
outboard bending moment, and outboard torsion. The combination and relative weighting
varied with flight conditions, although the penalty on inboard bending moment predomi-
nated. However, to illustrate the effects of changes in the cost function, flight condition
3 was considered with different penalty weights on inboard bending moment and inboard
torsion. Figures 127 and 128 show the changes in loads and control surface activity as the
penalty on both loads is increased proportionately.
Note that although the control surface activity increases as the penalty on loads
increases, the changes in loads are less predictable. The design corresponding to a factor
of ju = 4 was selected because it provided good reduction in the bending moments with
reasonably low control surface activity.
Table 40 shows the weighting factors of the cost functions selected for the final full-state
designs of each flight condition. The resultant performance in load reduction and control
surface activity for flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 is given in Tables 41 through 44.
Power-spectral-density (PSD) plots illustrating the load reduction and corresponding
control activity provided by design A are given in Volume II, Appendix F. Note that, as
expected, the short period is predominant in all loads and that inboard torsion is
influenced by the flutter mode and first structural mode due to engine inertia response.
The first structural mode also contributes to the outboard bending moment. Elevator
activity is primarily in response to the short period and first structural mode, while
aileron activity is dominated by the first structural and flutter modes. The open-loop and
closed-loop poles tabulated in Volume II, Appendix F, for each of the four flight conditions
show that damping ratios for phugoid, short-period, and first structural modes were
significantly increased by design A.
Design B resulted from combining a Kalman state estimator with the full-state feedback
design. The process and sensor noise characteristics used in the estimator design are
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Cost function
Parameter Weighting 'factor
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
R1
R2
Inboard bending moment (3.17 x 10~14) x nf(N-m)2
((2.48 x 10'12)xAt/(in-lb)2)
Inboard torsion (1.79x 10~13) x M/(N-m)2
((1.40 x 10'11)xM/(in-lb)2)
Outboard bending moment 0
Outboard torsion 0
Elevator deflection 364.76/(rad/s)2
2
Aileron deflection 14.59/(rad/s)
Symbol
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A
A
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a
o
c
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Figure 127. Load Reduction for Full-State Feedback Designs at Flight Condition 3
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Cost function
Parameter Weighting factor
Q1 Inboard bending moment (3.17 x 10"14) x M/(N-m)2
Q2 Inboard torsion
03 Outboard bending
Q4 Outboard torsion
^1 Elevator deflection
f*2 Aileron deflection
Elevator rate
Aileron rate
((2.48 x 10"12)xAt/(in-lb)2)
(1.79x 10'13)xjU/(N-m}2
(1.40x10'11)xju/(in-lb)2)
moment 0
0
364.76/(rad/s)2
14.59/(rad/s)2
_
-
Symbol
•
A
O
A
a2
tu
u(0
I
8
vt
QC
200
175
150
125
100
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50
25
• Flight condition 3
9 Response to 5.40-m/s (21-ft/s) rms gust
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full-state design
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U
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O
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Figure 128. Control Surface Activity for Full-State Feedback Designs
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Table 40. Cost Function Parameters in
Full-State Designs
Flight
condition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Inboard
Bending
moment
Q1
0.904
0.859
0.990
0.616
0.390
0.0167
0.376
0
Torsion
Q2
12.6
0.675
5.58
0
1.38
1.64
1.20
0
Outboard
Bending
moment
Q3
23.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Torsion
Q4
0
177.0
0
49.5
0
30.6
24.5
16.7
,-13All values above multiplied by 10'
R1 = 364.8 and R2 = 14.59 for all flight conditions
Table 41. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 1
Design
A
B^
cl2>
D£>
Ed>
F,H^
Filter
order
-
53
53
8
8
8
Load reduction, percent of open loop
Inboard
Shear
84.2
87.0
87.1
87.4
89.0
85.6
Bending
moment
57.1
67.5
eao
68.2
80.9
75.9
Torsion
97.2
91.5
92.5
99.6
92.8
89.7
Outboard
Shear
21.0
40.5
41.3
40.9
72.1
65.6
Bending
moment
29.3
33.0
33.6
32.5
68.5
62.6
Torsion
93.4
92.3
93.0
93.2
87.3
84.4
Rms control surface activity [}^ >
Elevator
Deflec-
tion,
deg
1.20
0.888
0.798
0.738
0.688
0.950
Rate,
deg/s
8.40
7.20
6.26
7.48
5.80
7.76
Outboard aileron
Deflec-
tion,
deg
5.14
4.06
4.02
4.08
1.60
1.79
Rate,
deg/s
43.2
45.0
44.0
43.4
16.6
17.9
Response to 8.53-m/s (28-ft/s) rms gust intensity
DRO gain and phase margin requirements not satisfied
6|i gain reduced to 0.56, 6A gain reduced to 0.26
Design for flight condition 3 with 6A loop gam reduced to 0 63
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Table 42. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 2
Design
A
B^>
D^>
ES>
F,Hfe>
Filter
order
-
53
8
8
8
Load reduction, percent of open loop
Inboard
Shear
74.0
76.7
77.7
79.1
76.6
Bending
moment
56.2
63.5
63.7
71.8
68.5
Torsion
94.3
87.7
96.0
91.8
87.4
Outboard
Shear
48.6
57.9
58.2
69.7
65.6
Bending
moment
40.7
43.7
43.3
67.1
61.9
Torsion
99.7
93.3
93.7
83.5
84.7
Rms control surface activity (J^ >
Elevator
Deflec-
tion,
deg
1.38
1.16
1.10
1.11
1.27
Rate,
deg/s
9.90
8.36
8.54
8.66
8.82
Outboard aileron
Deflec-
tion,
deg
3.60
3.06
3.04
1.55
1.79
Rate,
deg/s
33.4
36.6
38.1
17.8
20.0
Response to 8.53-m/s (28-ft/s) rms gust intensity
DRO gain and phase margin requirements not satisfied
gam reduced to 0.79; 6A gam reduced to 0.37
Design for flight condition 3 with 5A loop gam reduced to 0 63
Table 43. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 3
Design
A
B^>
c£>
D^
ECL>
F,H^
Filter
order
-
53
53
8
8
8
Load reduction, percent of open loop
Inboard
Shear
91.3
91.9
92.6
92.3
90.7
90.6
Bending
moment
66.7
75.3
78.4
78.9
79.5
79.5
Torsion
89.8
81.4
83.5
92.9
91.4
91.3
Outboard
Shear
34.4
50.9
56.5
55.0
62.2
62.8
Bending
moment
48.5
49.9
52.3
47.1
56.5
57.4
Torsion
103
96.3
96.6
96.9
91.6
91.2
Rms control surface activity (Jl>
Elevator
Deflec-
tion,
deg
1.25
0.980
0.758
0.684
0.799
0.788
Rate,
deg/s
10.4
9.23
7.06
6.78
7.71
7.79
Outboard aileron
Deflec-
tion,
deg
3.65
2.76
2.48
2.52
1.91
1.86
Rate,
deg/s
33.8
34.8
30.3
29.7
23.2
22.7
Response to 6.40-m/s (21-ft/s) rms gust intensity
• DRO gain and phase margin requirements not satisfied
6 A gain reduced to 0.71
6 A gain reduced to 0.69 for compatibility with flight condition 4
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Table 44. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 4
Design
A
B^
D^
E
F.H&->
Filter
order
—
53
8
8
8
Load reduction, percent of open loop
Inboard
Shear
83.1
84.7
86.4
86.3
84.8
Bending
moment
68.8
73.9
74.1
74.8
73.7
Torsion
95.4
90.6
95.3
96.9
92.0
Outboard
Shear
62.0
68.7
68.9
70.8
69.3
Bending
moment
53.9
55.5
55.4
63.1
59.8
Torsion
99.2
93.4
93.5
89.8
90.8
Rms control surface activity {£>•
Elevator
Deflec-
tion,
deg
1.03
0.869
0.854
0.914
1.02
Rate,
deg/s
8.51
7.29
7.58
8.13
9.05
Outboard aileron
Deflec-
tion,
deg
2.34
2.07
2.18
1.74
1.86
Rate,
deg/s
25.1
26.9
29.7
23.7
18.0
Response to 6.40-m/s (21-ft/s) rms gust intensity
DRO gain and phase margin requirements not satisfied
6A gam reduced to 0.75
Design for flight condition 3 with 6A loop gam reduced to 0.69
given in Table 45. The Kalman filter introduced more reduction in performance than any
other step in the design process. For flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, inboard bending
moment increases averaged 8%; outboard bending moment increases averaged over 2%.
Torsion loads decreased nearly 4%. Elevator rates decreased slightly with moderate
increase in the aileron rates when compared with design A. Results of these comparisons
are summarized in Tables 41 through 44 for flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Closed-loop
controller poles are tabulated in Volume II, Appendix F.
Design B introduced deficiencies in phase and gain margin performance predominately in
the aileron loop, at all four flight conditions. Margin requirements, which vary with flight
condition, are summarized in Table 46. These phase and gain requirements are displayed
graphically on a Bode plot by a band around -180 deg and 0 dB, respectively. For example,
a phase margin of 60 deg is defined by lines at -120 deg and -240 deg. The phase margin is
defined at points of 0-dB gain to be the difference between the actual phase and -180 deg.
Consequently, if the phase curve is within the region bounded by -120 deg and -240 deg at
a point of 0-dB gain, the phase margin of 60 deg is not met. An analogous definition
applies to gain margin.
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Table 45. Plant Process Noise and Sensor Noise Characteristics
Used in Kalman Estimator Designs
Wind disturbance
intensity
4.267 m/s (14.0 ft/s)
Pitch-rate sensor noise
intensity
0.15deg/s
Wing-tip accelerometer
sensor intensity
0.05g
Note: Gaussian power density function,
one standard deviation
Table 46. Stability Margin Requirement
Frequency
range, rad/s
Low
frequency
Medium
frequency
High
frequency
Flight condition
1,2
0<co<0.5
±4dB ±15deg
0.5<co<11
±6dB ±45 deg
11.0<co
±12dB ±180deg
3,4
0<co
±4dB
<0.5
±15 deg
0.5 < to < 13.4
±6dB ±45 deg
13.4 < co
±12 dB ±180 deg
5,6
0<co<0.5
OdB Odeg
0.5 < co < 14.3
±4dB ±20 deg
14.3 < co < 39.5
±12dB
J
±60 deg
39.5 < co
±12dB ±180 deg
7,8
0<co<0.5
OdB Odeg
0.5<co<13.4
OdB 0 deg
1 3.4 < co < 40.6
±6dB ±45 deg
40.6 < co
±6dB ±180 deg
Points at which gain or phase margin is checked are indicated by vertical bars on the Bode
plot. A vertical bar intersects the phase region at points of 0-dB gain and the gain region
at points of -180-deg phase. If the vertical bar fails to intersect the gain or phase curve
at one of these critical frequencies, the stability margin is satisfied.
Stability margin deficiencies for design B in flight conditions 1 and 3 were considered
serious enough to warrant a robust Kalman filter (design C). Values of input noise
covariance used for these robust designs are shown in Table 47. Stability margins
improved with a slight degradation in performance. All low- or mid-frequency margin
deficiencies are eliminated by the robust design procedure.
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Table 47. Input Noise Covariance in Robust
Kalman Filter Designs (Design C)
Flight condition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
Elevator, rad
0
0
3.25
0
0.197
0
0
0
Q
Aileron, rad
7.84
0
25.8
0
6.80
40.3
0
0
Modal residualization was used to reduce the 53rd-order Kalman filters of flight
conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 to 8th-order filters (design D). Modes selected for retention in
the reduced filter were those with frequencies below 10 rad/s (which is within the control
design bandwidth). Attempts to use this technique for further reduction resulted in
unstable closed-loop designs for some flight conditions. By eliminating the dynamic
contribution at the higher frequency modes, gain rolloff was experienced in the high-
frequency mode for the aileron loop, which resulted in a significant improvement in the
stability margins for flight conditions 1, 2, and 3. The inboard torsion load (which has
been significantly reduced in design A at the flutter-mode frequency) increased an
average of over 7% due to this gain rolloff. Little change resulted in other performance
parameters (see tables 41 through 44).
Design D did not satisfy stability margins in either loop for flight conditions 1 and 2 nor in
the aileron loop for flight conditions 3 and 4. Table 48 gives the values used to reduce the
appropriate loop gains to satisfy the margin requirements. Although the gain reductions
for flight conditions 1 and 2 resulted in bending moment increases of 12% and 8%,
respectively, the reduction prior to these changes in loop gains was much greater for
flight conditions 1 and 2 than 3 and 4.
Results were similar for outboard bending moment loads, although the changes were more
dramatic. Tables 41 through 44 give the performance data for design E. Bode plots
showing the stability margins for the preceding controller designs are included in Volume
II, Appendix F (figs. F-47 through F-81).
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Table 48. Loop-Gain Reduction Factors in Design Cases E, F,
and H at All Gust-Load Conditions
Flight condition
1
2
3
4
Design E
Elevator loop
0.56
0.79
1.0
1.0
Aileron loop
0.26
0.37
0.71
0.75
Designs F and H
Elevator loop
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
Aileron loop
0.63
I
0-63
0.69
0.69
The final design step for GLA was to integrate the four E designs representing flight
conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Although this could have been accomplished using the curve-
fitting technique described in Subsection 11.4.3, it was found that design E from flight
condition 3 actually reduced both inboard and outboard bending moment loads at other
gust-load conditions more than the level provided by the design E developed individually
for each of those flight conditions.
In addition, control surface activity and torsion loads were generally lower. Slight gain
reductions in the aileron loop were required to meet margin requirements (table 48). The
lower of the loop gains required for flight conditions 1 and 2 (and separately for flight
conditions 3 and 4) was used so parameter scheduling in the final design would only be a
function of speed and independent of mass distribution. Tables 41 through 44 show the
performance changes resulting from the integrated design F. Note the final integrated
design H is the same as design F for flight conditions I, 2, 3, and 4, but it also integrated
flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The unexpected load reduction phenomena can be partially explained by the significant
performance degradation experienced between designs D and E (tables 41 and 42) resulting
from the loop gain reductions shown in Table 48. The improved performance of design F
over design E is greatest in flight conditions 1 and 2 because of the major changes in loop
gain at these conditions.
PSD plots of design H for the bending moment and torsion at flight conditions 1,2, 3, and
4 are shown in Volume II, Appendix F (figs. F-14 through F-29). Although the rms inboard
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torsion loads are significantly reduced from design A to design H, the reduction near the
flutter mode (approximately 20 rad/s) is less for design H because control filter modes
above 10 rad/s were eliminated in the reduction to an 8th-order filter. This is also
reflected in the PSD plots (also in vol. II, app F), which show the aileron activity.
Satisfactory stability margins were also achieved.
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12.5 FMC DESIGNS
Development of the FMC designs paralleled that of the GLA designs discussed in
Subsection 12.4. For the full-state design, the cost function used was similar to that
given in equation (20). FMC is achieved by satisfying the structural damping requirements
of f = 0.015 for flight conditions 5 and 6 and f= 0 for flight conditions 7 and 8. These
requirements reflect an allowance for structural damping of £ = 0 at flight conditions 5
and 6 and f = 0.015 at flight conditions 7 and 8. Other full-state design objectives
included moderate rms aileron rate limits of 50 deg/s (flight conditions 5 and 6) and 75
deg/s (flight conditions 7 and 8) for a gust intensity of 4.27-m/s (14-ft/s) rms.
As reflected in the cost function parameters shown in Table 40, torsion was more of a
problem than it was in the gust-load designs. Tables 49 through 52 list control surface
activity and the damping ratio of the flutter mode.
The flutter mode, caused primarily by coupling between wing vertical bending, wing
torsion, and nacelle strut vertical bending, occurs at approximately 20.1 rad/s.
For flight conditions 5, 6, and 7, design A significantly increases the short-period
frequency while it decreases the phugoid frequency. In addition to stabilizing the flutter
mode in all four flight conditions, damping ratio also increases significantly for a
Table 49. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 5
Design
Open loop
A
8
c [E^>
D |jF>.
G
H
Filter
order
53
53
10
10
8
Rms control surf ace activity |lJHl>
Elevator
Deflection,
deg
0.665
0.536
0.513
0.524
0.309
0.013
Rate,
deg/s
5.21
4.77
4.50
5.25
3.18
0.165
Outboard aileron
Deflection,
deg
2.08
1.89
1.81
1.51
1.36
1.36
Rate,
deg/s
31.6
28.1
26.6
20.1
24.7
24.5
Damping
ratio
-0.002
0.080
0.080
0.080
0.023
0.020
0.019
Frequency,
rad/s
19.8
19.2
19.2
19.2
19.9
20.6
20.5
Response to 4.27-m/s (14-ft/s) rms gust intensity
DRO gain and phase margin requirements not satisfied
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Table 50. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 6
Design
Open loop
A
B jj^>
c (Ji5>
D. G
H
Filter
order
53
53
10
8
Rms control surface activity L^^ >-
Elevator
Deflection,
deg
0.615
0.537
0.506
0.477
0.057
Rate.
deg/s
4.44
4.26
3.98
3.69
0.209
Outboard aileron
Deflection,
deg
1.77
1.49
1.43
1.46
1.49
Rate,
deg/s
40.7
27.9
25.9
273
27.2
Flutter-mode
characteristics
Damping
ratio
-0.005
0.074
0.074
0.074
0072
0.027
Frequency,
rad/s
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
20.0
20.3
Response to 4.27-m/s (14-ft/s) rms gust intensity
DRO gam and phase margin requirements not satisfied
Table 51. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 7
Design
Open loop
A
B
D
G
H
Filter
53
10
10
8
Rms control surface activity *
Elevator
Deflection,
deg
0.192
0.168
0.162
0326
0.017
Rate,
deg/s
1.85
2.21
2.13
427
0416
Outboard aileron
Deflection,
deg
2.64
2.46
245
1.93
1.87
Rate,
deg/s
76.3
58.9
54.6
50.6
45.5
Damping
ratio
-0.014
0055
0.055
0.016
0.014
0.011
Frequency,
rad/s
20.5
21.3
21.3
20.5
20.2
202
h
 Response to 4.27-m/s (14-ft/s) rms gust intensity
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Table 52. Root-Mean-Square Gust Response, Flight Condition 8
Design
Open loop
A
eH>
D
G
H
Filter
order
53
10
10
8
Rms control surface activity li-"^
Elevator
Deflection,
deg
0.091
0.094
0.081
0.530
0.057
Rate,
deg/s
3.34
3.30
2.57
5.40
'0.437
Outboard aileron
Deflection,
deg
2.07
2.15
2.00
2.14
2.11
Rate
deg/s
74.2
69.2
58.7
57.3
52.7
Flutter-mode characteristics
Damping
ratio
-0.011
0.022
0.022
0.025
0.040
0.032
Frequency,
rad/s
20.3
20.2
20.2
20.1
20.0
19.9
Flight condition 8
^^> Response to 4.27-m/s (14-ft/s) rms gust intensity
[^ ^> DRO phase and gain margin requirements not satisfied
structural mode of 25.7 and 27.8 rad/s of flight conditions 7 and 8, respectively. This
mode appears to consist primarily of the first two wing bending modes and the aft-body
bending mode. Open-loop poles for these conditions are tabulated in Volume II,
Appendix F (figs. F-17 through F-20).
The nominal Kalman filter (design B) resulted in a significant reduction in aileron rate for
flight conditions 6 and 7 and a slight decrease in damping ratio for flight conditions
5 and 7. Due to weaker requirements (table 46), stability margins were Jess constraining
than in flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, it might be expected that stability
margins would be inadequate near the flutter mode because of the high gains required to
stabilize the airplane. Although this was the case for flight conditions 5 and 6, design B
provided satisfactory phase and gain margins for flight conditions 7 and 8. Bode plots and
closed-loop controller pole tabulations are shown in Volume II, Appendix F, for these
conditions.
Because design B provided satisfactory stability margins for flight conditions 7 and 8, the
robust Kalman filter was used only for flight conditions 5 and 6. Design C provided some
improvement in phase and gain margins with a slight reduction in surface activity.
The procedure to reduce the order of the Kalman filter was identical to that used in the
gust-load designs. However, in addition to the lowest frequency modes that provided an
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eighth-order filter, it was also necessary to retain a complex filter mode at the flutter
frequency. The resulting lOth-order filter (design D) satisfied the stability margin
requirements at flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8. The improved phase margins in the
aileron loop were due to a combination of two tendencies at the flutter frequency caused
by the filter reduction: sharper peaks in the gain curve and less lag in the phase.
Design D also resulted in some reduction in the aileron rate and damping ratio for flight
conditions 5, 7, and 8, while the opposite effect was observed for flight condition 6. The
damping ratio was significantly reduced in flight conditions 5 and 7 but showed little
change in flight conditions 6 and 8.
Because all stability margins were satisfied, it was not necessary to reduce the loop gains
as was done in flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and <4. The four flutter designs were integrated by
selecting the critical design. Only design D at flight condition 6 provided satisfactory
flutter damping at flight conditions for which it was not designed; thus it was used as the
integrated flutter design G for flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The final step in the design procedure was to integrate the 8th-order design F (which
provided satisfactory performance for flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4) with the lOth-order
design G for flight conditions 5, 6, 7, and 8. These designs were integrated by curve-
fitting an eighth-order filter with selected poles and zeros fixed from the gust-load design
in each of the four control loops. Three pairs of poles were taken from the gust-load
design; the fourth pair (at a frequency of 19.4 rad/s) was included to control flutter.
Approximately one-half of the zeros were free to minimize the error between the original
curve and the fitted curve. Figures 129 through 132 show the frequency response in each
sensor to control surface loop of the lOth-order filter (design G) and the 8th-order fitted
filter. The resulting curve fit is good, especially in aileron loop near the flutter
frequency.
The integrated eighth-order filter resulting from the curve-fitting technique was
expressed as a matrix transfer function. Realization in the time domain was necessary to
compute rms performance. This resulted in a 16th-order filter, which was reduced to
8th order by retaining only the static portion of the pitch rate to elevator loop and the
wing-tip accelerometer to aileron loop. Elimination of nonessential control loops
decreased elevator activity and slightly decreased damping ratio of the flutter mode.
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Figure 129. Integrated Flutter-Mode Control Design,
Pitch Rate to Outboard Aileron Loop
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Pitch Rate to Elevator Loop
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Figure 132. Integrated Flutter-Mode Control Design,
Wing-Tip Acceleration to Outboard Aileron Loop
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The final integrated design satisfied stability margin requirements at all four flutter
flight conditions. Tables 49 through 52 show a slight improvement in control surface
activity from design G, as well as a further decline in damping ratios. However, all
remained well above minimum acceptable levels and wing loads were essentially
unchanged. Activity for both elevator and aileron predominates at a frequency of 20
rad/s for all flight conditions. In addition, the aileron has significant activity above 20
rad/s for flight conditions 7 and 8.
Figure 133 is a block diagram of the final integrated filter and gives the parameter gain
schedule as a function of speed. Note that only four parameters change between VQ and
VMO
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Parameter
P!
P2
a1
a2
a3
a4
b1
b2
b3
b4
Flight condition
1,2,3,4
10.69
30.69
13.64
50.98
2.053
8.18
19.6
121.0
-0.156
-1.24
5,6,7,8
2.638
376.4
4.127
5.789
-3.22
432.6
14.59
45.67
-126.0
-0.909
Parameter
b5
C1
c2
C3
d1
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6
Flight condition
1,2,3,4
1.20
16.93
89.3
-0.284
10.14
51.12
0.5335
0.07673
5.38
-0.0468
5,6,7,8
0.1217
10.61
674.2
-1.515
11.96
324.4
-1.139
1.765
0.2025
0.2025
Parameter
k1
k2
k3
k4
Flight condition
1,2
38.8
7.37
-1.42x 10~7
(-4.65X10"7)
5.01 x 10~7
(1.64x10~6)
3,4
38.8
8.03
-1.42x10~7
(-4.65 x 10~7)
5.46 x 10~7
(1.79x10~6)
5,6,7,8
3.78
0
0
2.77 x 10'7
(9.08x10'7)
k5
k6
k7
k8
Flight condition
1,2
36.5
-10.9
-3.01 x 10~6
(-9.88 x 10~6
9.24 x 10"6
(3.03 x 10'5)
3,4
36.5
-11.9
-3.01 x 10~6
(-9.88x 10~6)
1.01 x 10~5
(3.30x10~5)
5,6,7,8
0
0
6.64x10'6
(2.18 x10"5)
f) J
Note: Dimensions are in units of m/s (ft/s ) and deg/s
Figure 133. Block Diagram of Final Integrated Active Control Law Design
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12.6 RESPONSE DUE TO DISCRETE GUSTS
Time history simulation was performed to evaluate the effects of actuator nonlinearities
on gust-load reduction. Ordinarily, substantially more computation is required for
nonlinear simulation. However, due to a unique formulation of the nonlinear actuator
model, it was possible to use the efficient linear simulation algorithm of Subsection 11.3.2
for the nonlinear as well as the linear simulation.
12.6.1 LINEAR SIMULATION MODELS
The models used for linear simulation are derived from the continuous time models used
for gust covariance analysis. The closed-loop linear equations consisting of the airplane,
actuator, and eighth-order control law are
x(t) A + BFRC BGR
SRC R
x(t) + BFRE
SRE
where x(t) is the airplane state vector and z (t) is the filter state vector.
The random gust w is replaced by a discrete (1-cos) gust, which is given by
o
wg(t) = ^-(l-cos (21)
where a , is the discrete gust intensity, t is time, V is true airspeed, and c is the
characteristic chord length. Table 53 defines the discrete gust parameters at each flight
condition.
The output equation is given by
[c i 0) x(t)~ + Dwg(t) (22)
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Table 53. Discrete Gust Characteristics
Flight
condition
1,2
3,4
5,6
Gust intensity, a .,
true airspeed
28.4 m/s
(93.4 ft/s)
20.9 m/s
(68.4 ft/s)
9.8 m/s
(32.2 ft/s)
Duration
0.591 sec
0.568 sec
0.547 sec
As described in Subsection 11.3.2, the system is block diagonalized and subsequently
converted to a set of difference equations of the form
z(t+At) = 0wg(t) (23)
y(t) - Cz(t) + Dw_(t) (24)
where z(t) is a set of modal coordinates. Note the gust input is assumed to be constant in
the time interval between t and t + At. This model is then used by the algorithm of
Subsection 11.3.2 to compute time histories of selected performance criteria.
12.6.2 NONLINEAR SIMULATION MODELS
The airplane, control law, and discrete gust models used for nonlinear simulation are
identical to those of Subsection 12.6.1. However, the actuator model for each control
surface was removed from the system matrix and modified to include the nonlinearities of
position limit, rate limit, and hysteresis.
The nonlinear actuator was represented by two linear models. The linear actuator of
Figure 123 and given in block diagram form by Figure 134 is used when the actuator rate
is below the specified rate limit. Whenever the rate exceeds the rate limit, the actuator
model is changed from that shown in Figure 134 to the model shown in Figure 135. The
latter is a linear model that approximates the characteristics of a rate-limited actuator.
The effects of the rate limit are obtained by feeding back the actuator rate with a very
high gain (1000 times that of the nominal model).
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Figure 134. Actuator in Linear Range
Bias
Figure 135. Actuator in Rate-Limited Range
To ensure a smooth transition from one model to another, a bias input is used as shown in
Figure 135. This bias is simply the value of the rate limit multiplied by the gain in the
additional rate feedback loop. When a transition is made from the rate-limited actuator
(fig. 135) to the linear actuator (fig. 13^), the bias is removed.
A position limit and hysteresis were included at the command path to the actuator. The
position limit is incorporated by simply limiting the command from the controller to the
actuator. Figure 136 is a block diagram of the algorithm that implemented the model of
the nonlinear actuator. The hysteresis effects in deflection (+0.25 deg) were modeled
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Figure 136. Nonlinear Actuator Model
by a typical hysteresis algorithm. Table 5k lists the nonlinear parameters used for each
actuator during the nonlinear simulation.
The two nonlinear actuators were then combined with the airplane and control law as
shown in Figure 137. The complete nonlinear simulation functions as three separate
coupled linear simulations with a delay between the airplane-controller simulation and the
actuator simulations. A small time step ensures that the error introduced by this
temporal decoupling is insignificant.
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Table 54. Nonlinear Actuator Parameters
Position limit
Rate limit
Hysteresis
Elevator
±10.0 deg
40.0 deg/s
±0.25 deg
Outboard
aileron
±7.5 deg
55.0 deg/s
±0.25 deg
«E (^
(t-At)
6*E (t-At)
5
 A (t-At)
6A(t-At)
A(t-At)
Wind (t-At)
1
Airplane Controller
Wind (t)
1
Airplane
„ *
R
H
J I
Controller
6E (t+At)
c
5A (t+At)
5P (t-At) Elevator
actuator
5E( t ) , Elevator
actuator
5
 E (t+At)
6 p (t+At)
6
 E (t+At)
6A (t-At)Ac Outboard aileron
actuator
6A( t ) ,
5A(t)
6A(t)
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(t+At)
5A (t+At)
5
 A (t+At)
1
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Time
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Figure 137. Nonlinear Simulation Diagram
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12.6.3 SIMULATION RESULTS
Time history simulations were performed to evaluate the wing loads and control surface
activity in response to a discrete (1-cos) wind gust at flight conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
(Table 36 defines the various flight conditions.) Wing loads include shear, bending
moment, and torsion at inboard (i? = 0.25) and outboard (TJ = 0.75) stations. All loads
evaluated are incremental from the nominal steady-state loads in Ig flight. Control
surface activity includes the elevator and outboard aileron rate and deflection.
At flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, the airplane is stable and the primary consideration in
the design process was load reduction. Incremental wing loads and control surface
activity are shown for these flight conditions. At flight conditions 5 and 6, the
unaugmented airplane is unstable and only control surface activity is shown.
Time histories of the wing-load response parameters and control surface activity are
shown in Volume II, Appendix F, for all conditions investigated. Each chart superimposes
open-loop airplane response, response of the closed-loop system with a linear actuator,
and closed-loop response with a nonlinear actuator.
The actuator nonlineanty had little effect on inboard loads; however, outboard bending
moment reduction was significantly affected. Load reduction benefits were reduced from
approximately 32% for the linear actuator to approximately 25% with the nonlinearities
for flight conditions 1 and 2 and from approximately 40% to 30% for flight conditions 3
and 4. Effects on outboard shear were less pronounced. The torsion load increases that
accompany bending and shear load reduction were, as would be expected, slightly reduced
by the actuator nonlinearity.
For flight conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4, elevator peak command did not exceed the limit of 10
deg. The elevator peak rate command varied from 49 to 59 deg/s compared to the limit
of 40 deg/s. The outboard aileron peak command was approximately 3 deg above the limit
of 7.5 deg, while the corresponding command peak rate was nearly double the limit of 55
deg/s.
In flight conditions 5 and 6, the nonlinear actuator limits imposed a very slight constraint
on system performance. Only the outboard aileron peak rate command exceeded the
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specified limit. With such low elevator activity, hysteresis was a more significant
nonhnearity than the aileron rate limit. Performance data for the six flight conditions
are summarized in Tables 55 through 60.
To better study the effects of actuator nonlinearities on system performance, nonlinear
simulations were performed for a range of gust intensities. Even with gust intensities at
three times the nominal level, some load relief was experienced. Inboard at approx-
imately 35% to 45% of the bending moment, reduction experienced at the nominal gust
intensity was lost. Outboard, where the load reduction was much greater at the nominal
level, approximately 65% of the benefit was lost. The decreased benefit of higher gust
levels caused torsion loads to decrease toward open-loop levels.
Although load reduction was not the primary objective of the flutter suppression designs
for flight conditions 5 and 6, the system robustness was checked at these flight conditions
to determine the effect of actuator nonlinearities on stability. At greater than three
times the nominal gust intensity, no adverse stability effects were observed.
Table 55. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 1
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Inboard, T7 = 0.25
Shear
105.0
105.0
Bending
moment
91.1
92.1
Torsion
106.0
105.0
Outboard, T? = 0.75
Shear
73.1
78.4
Bending
moment
68.7
75.4
Torsion
108.0
107.0
(b) Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, deg
6.52
6.53
Rate, deg/s
55.6
40.0*
Outboard aileron
Deflection, deg
10.3
7.5*
Rate, deg/s
104.0
55.0*
• Gust shape = (1 - cos)
• Gust intensity = 28.5 m/s (93 4 ft/s)
'Limit value
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Table 56. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 2
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Inboard, 7? = 0.25
Shear
102.0
102.0
Bending
moment
90.2
91.5
Torsion
107.0
105.0
Outboard, 17 = 0.75
Shear
84.5
87.1
Bending
moment
67.0
74.7
Torsion
111.0
109.0
(b) Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, deg
8.29
8.06
Rate, deg/s
58.7
40.0*
Outboard aileron
Deflection, deg
10.6
7.5*
Rate, deg/s
106.0
55.0*
• Gust shape = (1 - cos)
• Gust intensity = 28.5 m/s (93.4 ft/s)
*Limit value
Table 57. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 3
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Inboard, T? = 0.25
Shear
109.0
108.0
Bending
moment
95.7
96.0
Torsion
110.0
108.0
Outboard, rj = 0.75
Shear
67.2
73.6
Bending
moment
60.9
69.5
Torsion
115.0
113.0
(b) Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, deg
5.07
5.38
Rate, deg/s
49.3
40.0*
Outboard aileron
Deflection, deg
10.1
7.5*
Rate, deg/s
104.0
55.0*
Gust shape = (1 - cos)
Gust intensity = 20.9 m/s (68.4 ft/s)
'Limit value
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Table 58. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 4
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Inboard, 17= 0.25
Shear
106.0
105.0
Bending
moment
95.0
95.5
Torsion
112.0
110.0
Outboard, 17 = 0.75
Shear
86.9
89.2
Bending
moment
60.1
69.6
Torsion
118.0
115.0
(b) Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, deg
6.73
6.88
Rate, deg/s
52.7
40.0*
Outboard aileron
Deflection,deg
10.4
7.5*
Rate, deg/s
107.0
55.0*
Gust shape = (1 - cos)
Gust intensity = 20.9 m/s (68.4 ft/s)
*Limit value
Table 59. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 5
Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, deg
1.21
1.06
Rate, deg/s
12.3
11.1
Outboard aileron
Deflection, deg
5.12
5.04
Rate, deg/s
58.6
55.0*
• Gust shape = (1 - cos)
• Gust intensity = 9.8 m/s (32.2 ft/s)
*Limit value
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Table 60. Discrete Gust Response for Flight Condition 6
Peak Control Surface Activity
Actuator
Linear
Nonlinear
Elevator
Deflection, cleg
1.71
1.56
Rate, deg/s
14.3
13.2
Outboard aileron
Deflection, deg
4.73
4.64
Rate, deg/s
60.2
55.0*
• Gust shape = (1 - cos)
• Gust intensity = 9.8 m/s (32.2 ft/s)
*Limit value
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12.7 COMPARISON WITH CURRENT TECHNOLOGY CONTROL LAWS
Classical techniques were also used to synthesize control laws for flight conditions
1 through 8. Performance data will be shown to compare the classical and optimal designs
for flight conditions 2, 4, and 6. The results used for comparison are based on rms
response to a von Karman gust and simulation with a discrete (1-cos) gust.
Several distinctions should be noted regarding the two designs:
• The optimal controller is designed as an integrated multiloop filter that addresses
the functions of GLA, FMC, and pitch-augmented stability (PAS). The classical
approach relies on single-loop design techniques, which results in a separately
designed filter for each function. In addition to GLA, FMC, and PAS, the classical
design also incorporated maneuver-load control (MLC).
• The optimal design used the outboard aileron as one surface, together with the
elevator, for all control tasks. In the classical design, the outboard aileron was split
into an inboard section and an outboard section. FMC was accomplished by the
inboard section, while the outboard section was dedicated to load reduction. The
elevator was used primarily for PAS.
• Both designs use two sensors: a pitch-rate gyro at the airplane center of gravity and
a wing accelerometer. The classical design used sensor 11, which is somewhat
inboard from the wing-tip accelerometer (sensor 27) of the optimal design (fig. 12^).
• The classical design was evaluated using the von Karman turbulence model. The
optimal controller was designed to provide optimum performance to Dryden turbu-
lence and was evaluated using both Dryden and von Karman models.
The classical design is shown in Figure 138. For comparison, the optimal design is shown
in Figure 133.
The performance of both designs is summarized for flight conditions 2, 4, and 6.
Tables 61, 62, and 63 show the response to a random gust. The classical control law
performance is shown in response to a von Karman wind model. The response of
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optimal design to both Dryden and von Karman turbulence is shown. Had the optimal
controller been designed for the von Karman spectrum, its performance would likely be
better.
In achieving similar load reduction for flight conditions 2 and 4, the classical design
required significantly greater aileron activity (particularly in aileron rate) and somewhat
less elevator activity than the optimal design. For both designs, the elevator activity is
modest when compared to the aileron activity. The FMC design for flight condition 6
showed similar results for control surface activity. Both designs exceeded the damping
ratio requirement for the flutter mode of f > 0.015.
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Figure 138. Block Diagram of Classical Control Law Design
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Table 61. Random Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 2
(a) Incremental Load Reduction (Percent of Open Loop)
Design
Optimal
Classical
Gust
Von
Karma n
Dryden
Von
Karman
Inboard bending
moment, rj = 0.25
71.2
68.5
70.4
Outboard bending
moment, r? = 0.75
65.6
61.9
61.9
Inboard torsion,
7? = 0.25
91.2
87.4
101.0
(b) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Gust
Von
Karman
Dryden
Von
Karman
Elevator
deflection,
deg
1.25
1.27
1.00
Elevator rate,
deg/s
9.90
8.88
6.16
Outboard aileron
deflection , deg
1.88
1.79
5.29a
4.53b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
24.1
20.0
71.0a
33.6b
aInboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard aileron
• Gust intensity = 8.5 m/s (28 ft/s)
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Table 62. Random Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 4
(a) Incremental Load Reduction (Percent of Open Loop)
Design
Optimal
Classical
Gust
Von
Karman
Dryden
Von
Karman
Inboard bending
moment, 77 = 0.25
76.7
73.7
81.3
Outboard bending
moment, 77 = 0.75
63.2
59.8
63.4
Inboard torsion,
r? = 0.25
92.7
92.0
89.3
(b) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Gust
Von
Karman
Dryden
Von
Karman
Elevator deflection,
deg
1.03
1.02
0.802
Elevator rate,
deg/s
10.5
9.05
6.32
Outboard aileron,
deflection, deg
1.99
1.86
5.26a
4.13b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
31.0
25.2
79.9a
31. 1b
alnboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard aileron
• Gust intensity = 6.4 m/s (21 ft/s)
Table 63. Random Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 6
(a) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Gust
Von
Karman
Dryden
Von
Karman
Elevator deflection,
deg
0.438
0.443
0.318
Elevator rate,
deg/s
4.23
3.70
2.84
Outboard aileron
deflection, deg
1.68
1.44
11. Oa
3.70b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
33.0
27.0
250.0a
33.0b
(b) Damping Ratio of Flutter Mode
Optimal
design
Classical
design
0.027
0.022
alnboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard aileron
• Gust intensity = 4.3 m/s (14 ft/s)
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Comparisons provided in Tables 64, 65, and 66 show the response of each design to a
discrete gust. As in the case of random gust response, the classical design requires
considerably higher aileron deflection and rate to achieve comparable load reduction.
Similarly, the optimal design requires greater elevator activity. However, in both cases
the control demand on the elevator is considerably less than the demand on the aileron.
Table 64. Discrete fJ-cos) Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 2
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Design
Optimal
Classical
Inboard bending
moment, T? =0.25
90.2
85.4
Outboard bending
moment, 77 = 0.75
67.0
70.3
Inboard torsion,
17=0.25
107.0
116.0
(b) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Elevator deflection,
deg
8.29
5.30
Elevator rate,
deg/s
58.7
35.1
Outboard aileron
deflection, deg
10.6
21. 9a
21.6b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
106.0
175.03
142.0b
alnboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard
• Gust intensity = 28.5 m/s (93.4 ft/s)
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Table 65. Discrete (1-cos) Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 4
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Design
Optimal
Classical
Inboard bending
moment, 17 = 0.25
95.0
96.7
Outboard bending
moment, 77 = 0.75
60.1
69.2
Inboard torsion,
77 =0.25
118.0
120.0
(b) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Elevator deflection,
deg
6.73
4.36
Elevator rate,
deg/s
52.7
33.6
Outboard aileron
deflection, deg
10.4
18.4a
18.8b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
107.0
1 74.0a
112.0b
alnboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard aileron
• Gust intensity = 20.9 m/s (68.4 ft/s)
Table 66. Discrete (1-cos) Gust Response Comparison, Flight Condition 6
(a) Incremental Load Reduction at Peak (Percent of Open Loop)
Design
Optimal
Classical
Inboard bending
moment, 77 = 0.25
104.0
109.0
Outboard bending
moment, TJ = 0.75
81.3
65.1
Inboard torsion,
n = 0.25
111.0
149.0
(b) Control Surface Activity
Design
Optimal
Classical
Elevator deflection,
deg
1.71
1.01
Elevator rate,
deg/s
14.3
6.73
Outboard aileron
deflection, deg
4.73
32.6a
11. 7b
Outboard aileron
rate, deg/s
60.2
120.0a
75.9b
alnboard segment of outboard aileron
Outboard segment of outboard aileron
• Gust intensity = 9.8 m/s (32.2 ft/s)
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13.0 PITCH AUGMENTATION CONTROL LAWS
The pitch-augmented stability (PAS) system was designed using modern optimal control
theory. Full-state feedback systems were designed for two flight conditions.
Subsection 13.1 describes the state models for the airplane, actuator, Dryden wind model,
and ideal airplane model used for the control design and then describes the formation of
the composite state model incorporating all four of the separate state models.
In Subsection 13.1, time responses for step elevator commands are shown for the unstable
open-loop airplane at the two flight conditions. The full-state design process using linear
quadratic regulator theory with explicit model-following is described in Subsection 13.3.
This subsection presents closed-loop analysis of selected feedback controllers and the
resulting closed-loop poles. Time responses to step elevator commands as well as gust
covariances are shown. Subsection 13.4 compares the performance of the optimal control
design with the classical control design.
13.1 DYNAMIC MODEL DESCRIPTION
This subsection describes the state models and output models used for analysis and
simulation.
13.1.1 STATE MODELS FOR AIRPLANE
Full-state feedback designs were completed for two flight conditions designated as flight
conditions 58 and 97, respectively. These flight conditions and the corresponding state
models are defined as follows.
Flight Condition 58—This is at high altitude with an aft center of gravity and is defined by
the following parameters:
Altitude, h = 11 125m (36 500 ft)
Mach number - 0.65
Speed, V = 192 m/s (629 ft/s)
Gross mass (weight) = 122 000 kg (270 000 Ib)
Center of gravity =
373
The state model, in stability axes, is given by the following equation:
u
a
q
_ 0-
+
-5.04 x 1(T3 12.85 0.422 -32.2
-1 .85xlO~ 4 -0.388 0.996 1.88 xlO"5
-5.39 x 10~4 0.413 -0.276 0
L 0 0 1.0 0
6.31 x 10~3
-2.2 x 10~2
-1.16
0
u
a
q
_ 0 _
5E
(25)
where 5p is the elevator angle.
The eigenvalues are:
0.367
-1.1 x 10~3 + i3.17 x 10"2
-0.973
Flight Condition 97—This is a flaps-down approach condition with the following
parameters:
Altitude, h
Mach number
Speed, V
Gross mass (weight)
Center of gravity
= 10 668m (35 000 ft)
= 0.378
= 112 m/s (368 ft/s)
= 90 720 kg (200 000 Ib)
The state model, in stability axes, is given by the following equation:
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-2.16x JO"2 20.87
-4.76x 10~4 -0.348
-2.3 x ID'2 -32.2
0.994 -5.87 x 10~6
-7.13 x 10~5 1.95x10-2-0.256
6 ;88x 10~4
-2.21 x ID"2
-0.56
0
0 1.0
0
0
(26)
The eigenvalues are:
0.0763
-0.128 + 10.126
-O.W
13.1.2 ACTUATOR MODEL
The model for the actuator is given in transfer function form as
1G(s) = (s/20 + 1) (s/40 + 1) (27)
This is a second-order model with poles at 20 and 40 rad/s and is essentially the same
actuator used for the flutter and gust analyses (see fig. 123). The state model selected to
represent this transfer function in the time domain is
where
(28)
V
«E
=
-40 0
20 -20
V
5E -
40
0
= elevator angle
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6p/ = intermediate state variable
6p = elevator command to actuator
c
A block diagram for this model is shown in Figure 139. The nomenclature that will be
used to describe this model as part of the combined state model is
r40 0
Au = 20 -20
40
0
so that equation (28) can be written compactly as
(29)
(30)
(31)
The matrix C referred to in the simulation sections is defined as
(32)
(33)
13.1.3 DRYDEN WIND MODEL
This subsection briefly describes the Dryden wind model used for flight conditions
58 and 97. The wind model is described in greater detail in Volume II, Appendix E,
Subsection E.I.5.
1
s/40 + 1
5E. 1
s/20 + 1
'
E
 1
Figure 139. Cascade Representation of Transfer Function
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For flight condition 58, the model is
"V
Xw2
w§_
=
+
"-0.629 0 0
0 0 -0.396
0 1 .26
1.12 0
0 0.499
0 1.37
~
ug "
Xw2
wag
un
_
w n _
(34)
where
g
w
n
w
= longitudinal gust velocity
= intermediate state for vertical gust velocity
= vertical gust velocity
= white noise input for horizontal gust
= white noise input for vertical gust
For flight condition 97, the model is
""g"
Xw2
w
*= _
=
+
'-0.377 0 0 ~
0 0 -0.142
0 1.0 -0.754
_
"0.434 0
0 0.231
0 1.06
~
ug
Xw2
W0g
[ u n~
|_wn_
The wind model equation can be written compactly as
(35)
w (36)
w (37)
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where
w
w
VTyw
T _
[u g x w 2 w g ]
= [ u n w n ]
=
 [ u g w g ]
1 0 0
0 0 1
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
13.1.4 IDEAL AIRPLANE MODEL FOR EXPLICIT MODEL-FOLLOWING
The philosophy and procedure of explicit model-following is described in Sub-
section 13.3.1.
For full-state feedback design, the model equations can be summarized in the form
m (42)
where A is the 4 x 4 coefficient matrix. The elements of A are discussed in Sub-m m
section 13.3.1.
The state vector x ism
'm
(43)
where
m
*m
qr
er
incremental forward velocity of model
incremental angle of attack of model
incremental pitch rate of model
incremental pitch angle of model
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13.1.5 COMBINED STATE MODEL
The airplane model, actuator model, wind model, and ideal airplane model are combined
to form one large state model with 13 state variables. The state vector, x, is defined as
T
 = ]
T
 = fu, a, q ,0 , 5E', 5E, ug, xw2, wg, um ,am ,qm , 6m J
(44)
The state equations can be written compactly as
x = Ax -I- B ju c + (45)
The system coefficient matrix, A, is defined as
A =
"
Aa
0
0
0
Bacu
A..u
0
0
r ca w
0
Aw
0
0
0
0
Am _
(46)
where 0 represents a zero matrix, and T is a matrix of coupling coefficients representing
cl
the effect of wind on the airplane states. Also,
0]
T
= [0 0 Bj]
(47)
(48)
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The A matrix for flight condition 58 is
-504x lO~ 3 1285 0422 -322 j 0 6 3 1 x l O ~ 3 j -504xlO"3
- I S S x l O - 4 -0388 0996 ISSx lO ' 5 | 0 -2 2 x 10~2 | -1 85 x IO"4
-539XIO"4 0413 -0276 0 J O -116 j -539x10-*
0 0 1 0 0 ] 0 0 : 0
| -40 0 | 0
j 200 -200 | 0
j -0629
o i °
i o
0
0 2 0 4 x 10~2
0 -k I7x IO-4
0 6 5 7 x 10""
0 0
 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 -0 396
10 - 1 26
-504x IO"3 1285 0422 -322
-1 85x IO"4 -0388 0996 0
-1 57 x I0~4 -0464 -0863 0
0 0 1 0 0
(49)
The A matrix for flight condition 97 is
- 2 1 6 x 10- 2 2087 - 2 3 x 1(T2 -322
-416x10"* -0348 0994 - 5 8 7 X I Q - 6
-7 13 x ICT5 1 95 x IO"2 -0256 0
0 0 1 0 0
0
0 6 8 8 x lO"4 | -2 16 x 10" 2 0 5 67 x 10" 2
0 - 2 2 X I C T 2 J - 4 7 6 X I O " 4 0 -9 46 x 10"4
0 -056 | - 7 l 3 x l O " 5 0 S l x l O - 5
0 0 : 0 0 o
H
-400 0 : 0 0 0
2 0 0 - 2 0 0 | 0 0 0
i -0377 0 0
J O 0 - 0 1 4 2
i 0 1 0 -0 754
0
....
-4
-7
- 2 l 6 x l O " 2 2087 - 2 3 x l O ' 2 -322
-  76 x 10-4 -0 384 0 994 0
-7 I3x ICT5 -0 148 -1 152 0
0 0 1 0 0
(50)
13.1.6 OUTPUT MODEL
The output model serves two purposes: (1) provides variables to be used as criteria in the
quadratic cost performance function and (2) provides output variables needed for
simulation.
The variable selected for the cost performance index was a. , defined as
awe V m (51)
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The output variable used in the simulation was the normal acceleration, n , defined as
nz = w - Vq
nz - V ( a - q )
(52)
The ideal model vertical acceleration, n , was also used for simulation, n is defined
as
n
zm = V (53)
The C matrix is the matrix of coefficients such that
y =
"we
n.
zm
= Cx (54)
For flight condition 58
c =
0
-0 116
0
1 0
-2440
0
0
-27
0
0 0
1 18 x 1(T2 0
0 0
0
-139
0
0
0
0
0 I 59 x ICT3
0 0
0 0
0 -10 0 0
0 0 0 0
-0 116 -2440 -27 1 18 x 10'2
(55)
For flight condition 97
0
-0 175
0
1 0
-128.0
0
0
-232
0
0 0
-216x lO ' 3 0
0 0
0
-8 I I
0
0
0
0
0 2 7 2 x ID'3
0 0
0 0
0
0
-0 175
-1 0
0
-1280
0 0
0 0
-232 -2.16 x 10~3
(56)
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13.2 OPEN-LOOP ANALYSIS
This subsection presents the characteristics of the unaugmented airplane at flight
conditions 58 and 97. Root locations and time responses are shown.
13.2.1 ROOT LOCATIONS
The eigenvalues for the unaugmented airplane presented in Subsection 13.1.1 are shown
graphically in Figures 140 and 141.
13.2.2 TIME RESPONSES
A block diagram of the unaugmented airplane is shown in Figure 142. The response to a
step column command at flight condition 58 is shown in Figures 143 through 148. Note
the rapid divergence due to the unstable short-period root. The response to a step
elevator command at flight condition 97 is shown in Figures 149 through 154. Note the
slow divergence due to the unstable root.
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to
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Real axis, rad/s
Figure 140.\ Eigenvalues of Unaugmented Airplane, Flight Condition 58
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Figure 141. Eigenvalues of Unaugmented Airplane, Flight Condition 97
(a) State Variable Formulation
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Figure 142. Block Diagram of Unaugmented Airplane for Simulation
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Figure 143. Velocity Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 144. Angle-of-Attack Response to Step Column Command,
Sc = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 145. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
Sc = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 146. Pitch-Angle Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 147. Normal Acceleration Response to Step Column Command,
dr = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 148. Elevator-Angle Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Open Loop
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Figure 149. Velocity Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 97, Open Loop
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Figure 150. Angle-of-Attack Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 97,- Open Loop
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Figure 151. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
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Figure 152. Pitch-Angle Response to Step Column Command,
8 = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 97, Open Loop
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13.3 CONTROL LAW SYNTHESIS
Linear quadratic regulator theory was used to produce a full-state feedback design. The
methodology of linear quadratic design, discussed in Volume II, Appendix E, Section E.6.0,
requires the selection of penalty weighting matrices Q and R in the cost function
J = f [yc TQyc + uTRu] dt (57)
where y = vector of criteria variables. Selecting as criteria variables states or linear
combinations of states such as normal acceleration may not always produce the best
system designs. In the design process for the PAS system, traditional criteria did not
produce acceptable designs for the two flight conditions in question. For that reason,
explicit model-following was used to obtain acceptable performance.
13.3.1 EXPLICIT MODEL-FOLLOWING
The technique of explicit model-following not only produces criteria for the quadratic
cost function but also directly produces a feedforward control law.
The method consists of placing an ideal model of the plant to be controlled in the forward
path of the control loop, as shown in Figure 155.
Disturbances
1
Scalar signal
Vector signal
Actuator
xu ,
•^
1
^
Airplane
A.
xa ,
^M H^HM
"1
Figure 155. System Using Explicit Model-Following
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The ideal model is a fourth-order model of the airplane with the desired response
characteristics. Its state vector, x , is given by
m
m
am (58)
and its state equation is
(59)
The result of this formulation is that a control command at the column is fed to a filter
that produces an ideal response, x . The rest of the system attempts to follow this
response by minimizing the difference between x and x . In effect, the system is taking
x as a command and is minimizing certain components of (x - x ) depending upon howm a m
the cost criteria are defined. The ideal model, shown in Figure 155 and defined by
equation (59), acts as a feedforward filter in the control system.
Formulating the system in this way also reduces sensitivity of the airplane to turbulence,
as the ideal model is not disturbed by the wind; the regulator action of the system thus
acts to keep the components of x near their nominal values.a
The criterion variable used in the quadratic cost function was a. , defined asM
 we
w
awc (60)
The sum a + w /V is the actual airplane angle of attack relative to the air, and a is the
angle of attack of the ideal model. Linear quadratic regulator design produces a
controller that will attempt to minimize a. during flight. The two state variables that
primarily affect the short-period response are a and q. It was found that penalizing the
difference between the actual a and a produced the best time responses.
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The ideal model consists of the equations
m
<*m
J m l l
fm41
am!4
Jm44
~
um~
«m
°lm
j>m_
+
~
bmf
bm2
bm3
_
bm4_
(61)
or, in vector notation
(62)
The input matrix B is taken to be the same as B in equation (25) to have the model
m a
respond to the command input in a manner analogous to the response of the airplane to
the elevator angle. In other words, the lags produced by the elevator actuator are ignored
in the model. This is no real limitation, as the elevator bandwidth is much higher than
that of the airplane.
The design process concentrated on the subsystem
^
=
^22 am23
am32 am33_
°Ttl
£lm_ -
bm2
bm3
(63)
to optimize the short-period response.
The short-period approximation has a transfer function with a first-order numerator and a
quadratic denominator. Because the pitch-rate response to column commands is of
primary concern, the pitch-rate transfer function was developed from equation (63) and is
A ( s ) (64)
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where Q (s) and A (s) are the Laplace transforms of q (t) and 8 (t), respectively.
Comparing this transfer function with a general one of the form
(0)2 /a) (s+a)
G(s)= -5-7 T" (65)
it develops that
am22 = ~a (66)
am23 = 1 (67)
am32 = "n2 [f2(20-02)-l] (68)
am33 = tf-2)fton (69)
where
0 - a/fwn (70)
The selection of a _, = 1 does not arise from equation (65) but arises from flight
dynamics considerations. In fact, a ->., was taken to be equal to the actual values of a.-,.,
for the two flight conditions, these values being very nearly 1. The purpose of this
formulation is to select physically reasonable values of a ~2' a 23' a 32' ancl a 33 tnat
produce a desirable pitch-rate response.
Values of |3, f, and a? were selected from standard curves relating these parameters to
percent overshoot of the response to a step input and damping and natural frequency
requirements of the design requirements and objectives (DRO).
The remaining elements of A , relating to the phugoid response, were taken equal to
those of A .
a
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13.3.2 IDEAL MODEL FOR FLIGHT CONDITION 58
Flight condition 58 is a high-altitude, cruise-phase portion of the flight envelope. Under
these conditions, it is considered desirable for the pitch-rate response to be underdamped
and for the normal acceleration to be approximately critically damped. The pilot
perceives the response of the airplane to column commands in terms of normal
accelerations at this type of flight condition.
The ideal model was chosen to produce approximately a 50% overshoot for q . Param-
eters that produce this response are
= 0.62 (71)
= 0.7 (72)
- 0.89 (73)
The values of f and GO fall within the DRO requirements
0.35
0.8 < oj < 5.0
(74)
(75)
for this flight condition.
The ideal model matrix for flight condition 58 is
Am =
-5.04x 10"3
-1.85 x 10~4
-1.57 x 10~4
0
12.85
-0.388
-0.464
0
0.422
0.996
-0.863
1.0
-32.2
0
0
0
(76)
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The responses of q and n to a step command 6 = 0.1 rad are shown in Figures 156
m zm C-
and 157.
13.3.3 DESIGN FOR FLIGHT CONDITION 58
A large portion of the design process consisted of the analysis described in Sub-
section 13.3.2. The remainder of the design process consisted of selecting the cost
weighting matrices Q and R to be used in the cost function given in equation (57).
The value for R was arbitrarily taken to be 1.0, and Q(a ) was varied to produce
different feedback designs. The criteria used to judge the quality of the designs were:
• Closed-loop root locations
O Feedback gain magnitudes
• Response to step column command
• Intensity of airplane response to transverse random turbulence
0.090 i—
u
i
10 15
Time, sec
Figure 156. Pitch-Rate Response of Ideal Model,
8 = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 58
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Figure 157. Normal Acceleration Response of Ideal Model,
5- = 0. 7 rad, Flight Condition 58
Figure 158 shows a root locus of the closed-loop phugoid roots, and a locus of the closed-
loop short-period roots is given in Figure 159.
Gain matrix elements for different values of Q(a ) are shown in Table 67. Table 68
shows the responses of system variables to 3.28-m/s (1.0-ft/s) root-mean-square
transverse random turbulence for the different values of Q(a ).
The design selected for flight condition 58 is that for which Q(a ) = 5. The responses of
pitch rate and normal acceleration to a step column command of 0.1 rad are shown in
Figures 160 and 161, respectively. The elevator response is shown in Figure 162. It can
be seen that the shapes of the pitch-rate and acceleration responses are almost identical
to those of the ideal model shown in Figures 156 and 157.
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Table 68. Root-Mean-Square Responses to Transverse Random Turbulence of3.28-m/s (1.0-ft/s)
RMS, Flight Condition 58
Q
'«*wc>
1
2
3
5
7
10
u, m/s (ft/s)
1.3 x 10~1
(4.26 x 10~1)
1.51 x 10"1
(4.95 x 10"1)
1.65 x 10'1
(5.42 x 10~1)
1.84 x 10~1
(6.05 x 10'1)
1.97 x 10"1
(6.47 x 10"1)
2.11 x 1CT1
(6.92 x 10'1)
a, rad
5.57 x 10~4
5.89 x 10~4
6.15 x 10~4
6.54x 10~4
6.83 x 10~4
7.16 x 10"4
q, rad/s
2.56 x 10'4
2.59 x 10'4
2.80x 10"4
3.29 x 10~4
3.75 x 10~4
4.36 x 10"4
0. rad
1.26x 10"3
1.34x 10~3
1.42x 10~3
1.54x 10"3
1.62x 10~3
1.72x 10~3
6g, rad
3.62 x 10~4
4.69 x 10"4
5.62 x 10"4
720x 10"4
8.54 x 10"4
1.03x 10~3
6 ^ , rad/s
1.66x 10'3
2.44 x 10"3
3.11 x 1CT3
4.29 x 10"3
5.32 x 10"3
6.69 x 10~3
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Figure 160. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
f>c = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Closed Loop
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Figure 161. Normal Acceleration Response to Step Column
Command, 5C = 0.7 rad. Flight Condition 58,
Closed Loop
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Figure 162. Elevator-Angle Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Closed Loop
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13.3.* IDEAL MODEL FOR FLIGHT CONDITION 97
Flight condition 97 is a flaps-down approach portion of the flight envelope. Under these
conditions, it is considered desirable for the pitch-rate response to be much less
underdamped than for a cruise condition. The pilot perceives the response of the airplane
to column commands in terms of pitch rate at this type of flight condition.
The ideal model was chosen to produce approximately a 10% overshoot for q
Parameters that produce this response are
m
0.5
1.0
0.768
(77)
(78)
(79)
This low value of cj was required to produce the desired response. Even though this
value for the model is below that required for the airplane, it produces acceptable short-
period roots for the closed-loop airplane.
The ideal model matrix for flight condition 97 is
2 .16x lO- 2 20.87 -2 .3x lO~ 2 -32.2
4.76 x 10~4 -0.384 0.994 0
7.13 x 10~5 -0.148 -1.152 0
0 1.0 0 0
(80)
The responses of q and n to a step command 8 =0 .1 rad are shown in Figures 163 and
164.
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Figure 163. Pitch-Rate Response of Ideal Model,
8C = 0.1 rad, Flight Condition 97
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Figure
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164. Normal Acceleration Response of Ideal Model,
5C = 0. 7 rad. Flight Condition 97
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13.3.5 DESIGN FOR FLIGHT CONDITION 97
As for flight condition 58, the value of R was taken to be 1.0, and Q(a ) was varied to
produce different feedback designs. A root locus of the closed-loop phugoid roots is given
in Figure 165, and a locus of the closed-loop short-period roots is given in Figure 166.
Gain matrix elements for different values of Q(a ) are shown in Table 69. Table 70
shows the responses of system variables to 3.28-m/s (1.0-ft/s) root-mean-square
transverse random turbulence for the different values of Q(a ).
The design selected for flight condition 97 is that for which Q(a ) = 10. The responses
of pitch rate and normal acceleration to a step column command of 0.1 rad are shown in
Figures 167 and 168, respectively. The elevator response is shown in Figure 169.
Q(a w c )=1
100
-2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0
Real axis, 10~2 rad/s
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Figure 165. Phugoid Roots as a Function of Q (awc). Flight Condition 97
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Figure 166. Short-Period Roots as a Function of Q
Flight Condition 97
405
§c
<3
a^
C
.O
'<5
co
C
I
.C
<5
CD
oj
CO
I
•—- ~n
E ra
ca -fe
— "O
0 2
- <
11
_C7 \
CD ro
— ^T3
S -t
— -DO 2
~c> •£
3 — ^^~" "O "O
•n CD (Q
_ ^5
gCT-l ^
o Si
^_: CMCM"~
— 73 "5
0 2 2
'
s01^ T5
0 2S
— ^  TJ
UJ ro
o "s
~ "D
UJ ro
to -i^
O 2
. T3
— at
S- ~^
"roO i_
"^ _^
0 2 2
_ -o
S "^
O 2
•o
_* ro
3 -il
— "D
53
O
CM
b
r—
X
CO
CO
CO
in
r--
co
o
'
CO
CO
CO
o1
CO
b
X
—
'o
x
O>
CO
°b
x
CO
CN
^
"o
X
CM
CM
b
x
O>
CM1
CM
b
X
£
•~
CM
b
x
o^
CO
in
o
•-
cn
CO
Tt
o
"o
X
g
CM
-
*r
b
H
in
X^
in
"o
x
T—
TO
x
T0
X
r-»
CM
b
•~
X
CO
CO
CM
COin
Q
'
r^
CM
CO
o
CO
b
X
g
CN
b
X
s
CO
CO
b
x
COin
CO
CO
b
X
8
1
CN
b
X
s
CO1
CM
b
X
o
cn
T
CM
b
x
CO
f-
C^O
*~
CO
o
CO
b
x
o
CO1
CM
•f-
b
X
CM
CO
r*-
b
X
inin
CM
b
x
cn
cn
^-
b
Xg?
mi
b
x
in
CO
1
CM
bT—
x
,_
o
«?
in
o
Q
'
S
o
CO
b
X
CM
cn
CM
Cfc>
X
s
°b
X
m
•b
X
CM
b
X
5
,3-
1
CN
b
X
CM
CN
CM
b
X
in
co
CO
O)in
*~
CM
O
*•
"o
CO
CO
^~
o
1
00
?0
X
^a-
"°
X
CM
TO
X
rP
0
CM
b
X
LOin
m
o
CM
o>
o
0
,_
'
CO
b
x
in
CO
CO
b
x
S
CN
°b
x
CN
i
CM
b
x
CO
in1
CM
b
x
in
CO
CM
CM
b
x
CM
O
CO
oi
*-
5
—
"b
1
*
CO
°
X
o
—
^~
x
CO
"o
CM
CO
T0
1
"o
a
CM
b
x
m
CM
m
*
,_
i
g
,_
'
CO
b
X
Ol
CO
CO
b
X
S
CM
b
X
r-
CM
CO
b
x
r-
CM
COi
CM
b
x
s
CO
CM
b
X
CO
cn
CM
CM
b
X
CO
CD
in
in
CM
CO
«-
CO
b
X
r-
CO
b
X
o
CM
—
co~
b
X
g
b
X
CO
CO
b
x
cn
cnt
co~
b
X
s
CM
b
X
CO
cn
f
CN
CO
*—
1
o>
CO
,_
1
CO
b
x
CO
*
CO
b
X
CO
CO
CM
1
O
X
g
CO
b
X
r-.
CO
CN
b
x
s
CD
1
CM
b
X
CO
CO
CO1
CM
b
X
CD
CM
in
r^
CM
in
CM
CO
b
x
in
CO
i
o
CO
b
x
in
CO
—
b
x
CO
b
X
in
^
co~
b
x
CO
co~
b
X
CO
CM
b
r—
X
(^
^
t
CO
,_
1
n
cn
CM
'
CO
o
X
in
'o
x
2
'b
x
S
CM
CO
b
*rt
CM
b
x
CO
CO
CO1
CM
b
X
CO
CM
T
CM
b
X
in
CO
"•
CO
o
CO
CO
CM
CO
CO
b
int
S
co~
°
X
-
"o
X
COin
CO
"o
X
CM
CO
C0~"
b
t
C^P
b
i
CN
b^
X
C^M
T
CM
CM
'
in
COi
CO
o
X
CD
°0
X
CO
CO
°0
X
r\i
b
X
CO
't
CN
b
X
in
CO
en
CM
b
x
CO
T
CM
b
x
CO
CO
"•
CMin
CO
cn
o
*
"o
X
CO
CO
CO
o
CO
cT
2
X
-
"o
X
P-»
^
"o
X
r^
"o
x
fv.
CO
^
"b
X
CM
^
CM
b
*—
x
o
o
f
IS
CM
1
cn
o
in
1
CO
o
X
CO
^
'o
"U
CM
'o
^
CO
b
x
«?
CD
Ol
CN
b
x
S
ini
CM
b
X
o
«—
*•
in
•*
CO
in
CO
b
I
g
CO
2
x
CO
£!i
"o
X
*
"b
X
s
CO
'o
X
1
co~
b
S
CN
bi—
X
f>.
r^
CO
CD
CD
CO
o
CO
r*.i
CO
b
£
CO
*b
x
o
°b
X
S
CO
CO
b
x
r^
O
001
»3-
o1
CM
b
x
in
cn
<?
CM
b
X
CN
CO
CO
CD
in
CO
o
CO
"o
X
cn
o
o
co~
2
X
£i
\
X
CM
°£
X
r^
< —
~"
co~
b
X
5?
CM
1
"o
X
CM
406
Table 70.' Root-Mean-Square Responses to Transverse Random Turbulence of 3.28-m/s (1.0-ft/s)
RMS, Flight Condition 97
Q<awc>
1
2
3
5
7
10
20
30
50
100
u, m/s (ft/s)
1.44x 10" 1.
{4.73 x 10'1)
1.94 x 10~1
(6.35 x 10"1)
2.18 x 10"]
(7.14x 10"1)
2.39 x10"1
(7.83 x 10~1)
2.47 x 10~1
(8.09 x 10"1)
2.50 x 10~1
(8.19 x 10"1)
2.44 x 10"]
(8.01 x 10"')
2.37 x 10~1
(7.76 x 10"1)
2.24 x 10"1
(7.36 x 10~1)
2.07 x 10"1
(6.79x 10~1)
a, rad
1.76x 10"6
1.76 x 10~6
1.83 x 10"6
1.95x 10"6
2.05 x 10"6
2.17x10~6
2.46 x 10~6
2.66 x 10~6
2.92 x10"6
3.29 x 10"6
q, rad/s
1.89x 10"7
2.72 x 10~7
3.26 x 10~7
4.05 x 10~7
4.68 x 10"7
5.48 x 10~7
7.64 x 10"7
9.42 x 10"7
1.23x10"6
1.78x10"6
6. rad
6.99 x 10"6
9.71 x 10~6
1.11 x 10~5
1.23x 10"5
1.29x 10"5
1.32x 10"5
1.32x 10"5
1.30x 10"5
1.27x 10"5
1.22x 10"5
5g, rad
1.67x 10"7
3.40 x 10"7
5.35 x 10"7
9.79 x 10"7
1.47x 10"6
2.27 x 10"6
5.21 x 10~6
8.30 x 10"6
1.46x 10"5
3.01 x 10"5
5
 E, rad/s
8.42 x 10"7
3.44 x 10~6
7.39 x 10'6
1.83x 10~5
3.22 x 10"5
5.71 x 10~5
1.64x 10"4
2.92 x 10~4
5.91 x 10~4
1.46x 10"3
£
u
0032 i-
0.028
0.024
0.020
0.016
0.012
0.008
0004
0
10
Time, sec
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Figure 167. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 97, Closed Loop
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Figure 168. Normal Acceleration Response to Step Column
Command, f>c = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 97,
Closed Loop
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Figure 169. Elevator-Angle Response to Step Column Command,
8C = O.J rad. Flight Condition 97, Closed Loop
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13.4 COMPARISON WITH CURRENT TECHNOLOGY CONTROL LAWS
Comparison of the system designed using modern control theory and that designed using
classical methods shows that both methods produce acceptable responses to column
commands. The responses of the classical system for flight conditions 58 and 97, shown in
Figures 170 and 171, are rapid and have no overshoot. Comparison of Figure 170 with
Figure 160 indicates that the optimal system has a faster rise time and reaches steady
state more rapidly for flight condition 58. The optimal system has about a 50% overshoot,
which was designed to produce rapid normal acceleration response.
Comparison of Figure 171 with Figure 167 indicates that the two systems have approx-
imately the same speed of response at flight condition 97; the optimal system has a small
overshoot.
An advantage of the optimal control method is that it allows the type of response desired
to be directly selected by specifying an ideal model having that response. The optimal
control design process then directly produces the feedback gains required to cause the
augmented airplane to behave similar to the ideal model. The method allows the designer
to design for acceptable responses to command inputs as well as turbulence inputs.
TD
CT
0.4
0.3
H 0.2
I
0.1
10
Time, sec
20
Figure 170. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
6C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 97, Classical Feedback
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Figure 171. Pitch-Rate Response to Step Column Command,
8C = 0.1 rad. Flight Condition 58, Classical Feedback
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14.0 1990 ACT SYSTEM STUDY SUMMARY
This section assesses the effect of advancing technology in the electronic and automatic
control areas on the cost of ownership of an Active Controls Technology (ACT) airplane.
More specifically, the effects of the technology advances associated with the implemen-
tation of an ACT system that embodies properties and characteristics expected to be
available for a circa 1990 commercial airplane are evaluated. Additional information is
contained in Volume II, Appendix G, "Alternative Implementation of ACT."
Figure 172 shows the study tasks that comprise the advanced technology ACT system
definition. A familiarization phase was followed by a flight control system element study.
This study examined the technology developments in various automatic flight control
areas and projected the developmental status to the late 1980s. Based on these
projections, a study of alternative systems was begun. Three alternative systems were
defined and examined qualitatively for their advantages. Actuation studies were
conducted separately to define actuators that would be used with the final system.
Familiarization
and data
assembly
\
• Baseline Configuration
• ACT system
Flight control
system element
study
\
• Sensors
• Actuators
• Computer hardware
• Computer software
Alternative
systems study
•
• Low-risk system
•Medium-risk system
• High-risk system
Hydraulic actuation
Electromechanical actuation
\
1990
implementation
of IA AC
• System definition
• Cost-of-ownership parameter
determination
Figure 172. Advanced Technology ACT System Study Elements
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Following the alternative systems study, a 1990 implementation of ACT was defined based
on the previous work. Flight safety reliability was predicted, and cost-of-ownership
parameters were estimated. These parameters were then entered into the Boeing cost
model, and fuel savings (during the system payback period) and return on investment (ROI)
were calculated. The advanced technology system provides an ROI to the airlines of
34.9% compared to a maximum ROI of 27.6% for current technology systems (see
subsec 14..5.4).
14.1 FAMILIARIZATION AND DATA ASSEMBLY PHASE
A familiarization phase was required for the Honeywell engineers involved in the project
so that they could learn how past work applied to the Advanced Technology ACT Control
System Definition. ACT functions were defined during this phase, including input signal
requirements, control laws, and surfaces to be controlled. The control-surface hinge
moments, maximum deflections, and rates were defined as were the dynamic response
requirements for the actuators. Slats, flaps, and spoiler control and actuation were
separated from the advanced technology ACT study because no change is required of
these characteristics from the Baseline definition. Fly-by-wire (FBW) control was defined
as an option for the 1990 ACT system, but any associated effect on cockpit controls,
including the angle-of-attack limiting function actuator, was not addressed to avoid
dilution of the basic 1990 ACT study effort. The aircraft electric and hydraulic systems,
as modified for ACT (subsecs 8.5 and 8.6), were prescribed as applicable to the 1990 ACT
system.
14.2 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ELEMENT STUDY
Applicable developments were surveyed, and forecasts were prepared to better identify
elements appropriate to a 1990 operational system. Sensors, computers, servoactuators,
and software design and validation were the areas surveyed.
14.2.1 SENSOR SURVEY
The sensor survey included air data, angular rate, and acceleration sensors. Based on the
sensor requirements of the ACT system, it was concluded that air data information should
be obtained from the aircraft air data system and that three digital air data computers
(DADC) should be required. Data obtained in this manner are adequate in the area of
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performance. Triplex sources of air data information provide adequate functional
reliability. This is the most economical manner of acquiring the required air data because
the DADCs also are required for other aircraft avionic subsystems.
When angular rate sensors were surveyed, many present and evolving concepts were found
to be satisfactory in performance and reliability. The ring laser gyro is recommended for
the ACT application because there is no mechanical wear associated with the gyro and
because this type of gyro will be required aboard the aircraft for the triplex inertial
reference system (IRS) function.
The IRS accelerometer output signals are recommended for the required normal acceler-
ation signal. The piezo-resistive strain gage is recommended for wing-mounted acceler-
ometers required for flutter-mode control (FMC) and wing-load alleviation (WLA). These
accelerometers are relatively low cost and have a high dynamic response. Filters can be
applied to limit the bandwidth of the signals.
The roll attitude signal required for lateral/directional-augmented stability (LAS) is
satisfactorily obtained from the triplex IRSs.
14.2.2 AIRBORNE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
A dramatic increase of capability will be experienced in computing over the next several
years. This will be due mainly to very-large-scale and very-high-speed integrated circuit
developments.
Ultrareliable central processing components will be available in the late 1980s to meet
the needs of digital calculations for flight controls. This reliability will be the result of
increased integration. Chip counts and connections between chips will be significantly
reduced. Fault-tolerant and self-testing mechanisms will be included in the chips. The
size, weight, and power requirements of the systems will no longer be significant
considerations, and costs will be reduced to relatively unimportant levels.
Standardization of instruction sets will permit accumulation of software support systems
and development tools so that software development for flight control calculations will be
economical and certifiably reliable. This will be enhanced by the trend to use hardware
rather than complicated software for fault tolerance and self-checking.
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The input/output (I/O) functions, already the main part of the system design problem, will
become even more dominant as the central computing structures become routine.
Multiplexed busing of sensor data and actuator commands will present the critical
technical problems. Fault-tolerant components, which will provide more capability than
is necessary for flight controls, will be used in these systems because of large production
runs and experience in similar systems.
14.2.3 ACTUATORS
Actuation concepts were reviewed and compared to requirements, which resulted in the
conclusion that conventional hydraulic actuation concepts should be applied for the 1990
ACT system. The alternatives included various higher efficiency techniques such as
servopumps, which were questionable in performance for the applications of the ACT
configuration.
Electromechanical actuators (EMA) were identified as the type to be used for flaperon
control. They use electric input power and thus minimize the difficulty of transmitting
power across the flap-wing interface. EMAs were not considered for other applications
because so much effort would have to be expended to properly consider them due to their
overall effect on the aircraft electric and hydraulic power systems. Although it is beyond
the scope of this study, the impact that EMAs have in these specific areas is being studied
in other programs.
14.2.4 SOFTWARE DESIGN
As a result of examining software design developments, it is projected that methodologies
will be available by 1990 so that software can be designed and validated for flight control
applications and can be certified to be error free. Flight controls have a regular structure
that can be the basis for specification, design, coding, verification, and validation. Many
variants of a systematic methodology can be shaped about this structure. It will be
possible to develop flight control software that is certifiably free of technical software
errors and performs according to precisely defined specifications.
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14.3 ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM CONCEPTS
14.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Three alternative advanced technology ACT system configurations were developed. They
differ in the assumed technology risk, but the ACT requirements and functions are
identical for all three configurations. The alternatives are characterized as having low,
medium, and high risk associated with system implementation by 1990. Three alternatives
of varying risk were formulated so that a single alternative could be selected with
awareness of the likelihood of the implementation being advanced in concept and yet
realizable by 1990.
The three systems have different approaches to the computational elements of the
systems and the data busing concepts. The sensor sets and actuator approaches are nearly
the same for each with the exception of an additional pitch-rate sensor requirement for
the low-risk system.
The low-risk system follows the developments of the 1970s in that redundant computers
are run in a macrosynchronized manner. Data are exchanged between the redundant
computers via dedicated serial buses. Computations are bit-for-bit identical between
computers because of the redundancy management approach used and the data exchange
qualities. Sensor and servo interfaces are primarily analog. Only moderate technology
growth is assumed, and minimal use of integrated circuit advances is required.
The medium-risk system uses multiple microprocessors in each computing channel.
Computer channels operate asynchronously. Serial digital data busing is used extensively
for both sensor and actuator interfaces. Objectives were to create an increased number
of success paths for flight safety and dispatch reliability and to reduce software
complexity and preparation costs.
The high-risk system capitalizes on recent and projected advances in self-testing digital
circuitry and in integrated circuit technology. The computational segment of the system
builds on, and extends, the concepts used in the fault-tolerant multiple processor (FTMP)
and software-implemented fault tolerance (SIFT) architectures. It consists of four self-
checking computer modules composed of multiple microprocessors. Each module is 100%
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self-checking; it does not require cross-channel comparison of the computers. The
computers run asynchronously, and the system relies on ultrareliable self-checking bus
adapters and controllers.
A derivative of the medium-risk system was selected for further evaluation and cost-of-
ownership analysis. The system is discussed in Subsection H.5. Additional information on
the ACT system configurations is in Volume II, Appendix G.
14.3.2 DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
This subsection describes the three alternative forms of the advanced technology ACT
system and presents comparative data in tabular form.
14.3.2.1 Low-Risk System
The low-risk system is based on the principle of digital FBW control developed during the
1970s. Moderate extension of large-scale integrated circuit technology is projected.
The low-risk system is an integrated one in that the crucial pitch-augmented stability
(PAS) functions are accomplished by the same computers as the critical functions. This is
also true of the medium- and high-risk systems. Because the pitch axis is already
dependent upon crucial electronics due to the short-period PAS function, pitch axis
control can be made FBW without additional risk.
Figure 173 shows the essentials of the low-risk system architecture. The quadruply
redundant computers are state-of-the-art uniprocessors. All processing is run in the ACT
computers. Sensor data are input to the ACT computer in digital and analog form. The
IRS and DADC inputs are via a serial digital Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC)
t+29 bus. All other sensor inputs and the pitch-rate gyro signals from the IRS are
hardwired analog. Outputs to both the triple and quadruple servos and actuators are also
hardwired analog. Servo-loop electronics are contained in the computer.
The sensor set consists of rates and accelerations from the strapdown IRS, air data from
the DADC, accelerometers mounted in the wings for gust-load alleviation (GLA) and
FMC, the pilot input transducer, and an additional pitch-rate sensor. All sensors are
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tripled with the exception of pilot inputs and pitch rate, which are quadrupled. The
quadruple pitch-rate configuration is achieved by using three IRS gyros and an additional,
separate pitch-rate sensor.
The computers are frame synchronized. Each cycle of computation is initiated
simultaneously by all computers as a result of the "halt-release" implementation used.
Data are exchanged between computers via a dedicated serial data bus. Sensor data are
exchanged and monitored. Signals are related in such a way that control law
computations are identical in each computer. Each computer has an analog reversion
mode that allows continued safe flight after loss of all digital computing capability.
Failure management is accomplished with comparison monitoring. The required reliability
for the crucial PAS system is achieved through the additional (fourth) pitch-rate sensor.
Digital serial
-;
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— *
— *
-±
- w
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- ^-
Secondary
actuators
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• Rudder
Elevator
actuators
Electromechanical
actuators
^-
Power
units
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Figure 173. Low-Risk System
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14.3.2.2 Medium-Risk System
The medium-risk system (fig. 174) uses extensive busing and multiple microprocessors.
All axes are FBW. The system assumes projections of software and integrated circuit
technologies that have a reasonable probability of being available for system realization
by 1990.
The sensor set is the same as for the low-risk system except that no separate pitch-rate
sensor is provided. A Luenberger observer is used to estimate pitch rates if two of the
three identical IRS rate gyros fail. Thus, the fourth pitch-rate sensor required for the
low-risk system can be eliminated.
The computer architecture differs significantly from the low-risk system in that it is a
multiple-microprocessor-based system. Each of the four channels, which operate
asynchronously, has several microprocessors. Each processor performs a specific function
and each has low loading and simplified software. The sensor processors, located one to
each sensor, perform analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion and data preparation for insertion
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on the digital bus. The I/O processor (one to each ACT computer) performs the basic
sensor failure management. The I/O processor also outputs the control commands on the
output data buses. The control law processor does the control computations, and the
output monitor processor (OMP) performs downstream checks on control command
validity and failure management of the servos.
The architecture uses digital serial data buses extensively. There is a set of four buses
from the sensor processors to the I/O processor, four buses from the I/O processors to the
OMPs, and three buses from the OMP to the servoprocessors.
14.3.2.3 High-Risk System
The high-risk system, shown in Figure 175, is characterized by a quadruple bus set that
carries both sensor and actuator data.
All the circuits within the ACT computer are 100% self-checking. With the projected
processor speed, there is adequate throughput in each computer to perform the ACT
functions. Redundancy management is simplified as a result of the self-checking
capability.
The low-, medium-, and high-risk systems are compared in Table 71.
Left and right
WLA and FMC
accelerometers
L
L
ACT
computers
Quadruple system bus
Figure 175. High-Risk System
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Table 71. Alternative System Comparison
Characteristics
• Sensor set
• Sensor input approach
• IRS 1
•DADC J
• Others
• Failure management
•Critical functions
• Crucial functions
• Bus structure
• Computer system
•Redundancy
•Architecture
• Synchronization
• Failure management
• Analog backup
• Servos and actuators
• Servo-loop electronics
• Command output
approach
• Failure management
• Software charac-
teristics
• Reliability assessment
(probability of failure
per 1-hr flight for sens-
ing and computing.
actuators neglected)
System features
Low risk
•Three IRSs
•Three DADCs
•Three sets of accelerom-
eters for WLA and FMC
• Four pilot input
transducers
•One pitch-rate sensor
• Serial digital bus
to the ACT computer
• Hardwired analog
to the ACT computer
• Majority vote and
comparison monitoring
• Same with fourth
pitch-rate sensor
• Two bus systems
• ARINC 429 from
IRS and DADC to
ACT computer
• Serial digital data
exchange between
computers
• Quadruple
• Uniprocessors
• Frame synchronized
• Self-check and bit-by-bit
comparison monitor
• Yes
• In ACT computers
• Hardwired analog
•Monitored in ACT
computer
• Hardwired fault correction
•Complex, 1980
technology
• 4 x 10~12*
Medium risk
• Same as the low-risk
system without
pitch-rate sensor
• Serial digital bus
to I/O processor
• Same as the low-risk
system
• Same with Luenberger
observer to estimate
q from n and other
signals
• Three bus systems
•Quadruple sensors
to I/O processor
•Quadruple I/O pro-
cessor to output
monitor processor
• Triplex, output
monitor processor
to servos
• Quadruple
• Multi microprocessors
• Sensor
•I/O
• Control law
• Output monitor
• Servo
• Asynchronous
• Output monitor
processor, comparison
• No
• In dedicated servo
microprocessor
• Serial digital buses
•Quadruple to OMP
• Triplex OMP to servo
• Monitored in OMP
• Fault correction via
serial bus
• Simplified, segmented
into microprocessors
by function, reduced
redundancy manage-
ment required
• < 10"12*
High risk
• Same as the medium-
risk system
• On common serial
digital bus
• Same as the low-
risk system
• Same as the
medium-risk
system
• One universal quadruple
bus system
• Self-checking
•Quadruple
• Self-checking
computing modules
composed of multiple
processors
•Asynchronous
•Completely self-
checking, no comparison
• No
• Incorporated in
multiprocessor
• On common serial
digital bus
• Monitored in ACT
computer
• Fault correction via bus
• More simple because of self-
checking autonomous chan-
nels, highly reliable through
advanced verification and
validation
• Not assessed
'Assumes software reliability and coverage generally equal to 1 0
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l*.«f ACTUATION STUDIES
Studies were conducted to define the actuators to.be used with the 1990 ACT system. An
EMA was defined for control of the flaperons. An active, online form of integrated
hydraulic actuator was defined for each of the other actuation requirements.
14.M ELECTROMECHANICAL ACTUATOR
Figure 176 shows the electromechanical flaperon hinge-line actuator. Two dual-wound
motors power the actuator. The two dual-wound, brushless, permanent magnet motors
drive a differential gear set that sums the positions of each motor to determine the
output.
Flap spar
Power
cable
Signal
connector
Compound
differential
planetary
Dual-winding
servomotor
Quadruple
position
sensors
Design characteristics
• 0.76m (30-in) long, 0.1m (4-m) diameter
• 22-kg (48-lb) actuator assembly
• Dual-dual motors, velocity summed
• Dual, power off, brake
• Passive thermal mass temperature
control
• 270V dc power
• 12A (6 each) at stall
• 1A (0.5 each) at no-load maximum
rate
Flaperon
structure
attach points
Performance capability
• 4240-N-m (37 500-in-lb) minimum stall
torque with two of four channels
• 80-deg/s no load with two motors
• Capability to hold stall continuously
• 40-rad/s minimum bandwidth
• Two-channel fault tolerance
• +120° to -68°C (+250° to -90°F)
operational environment
Figure 176. Electromechanical Flaperon Hinge-Line Actuator
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The actuator is controlled by two servodrive electronics units (SDEU) that are sized so
they may be located within the flap. The SDEUs:
• Interface with actuator buses
• Compare actuator deflection with that commanded
• Commutate the field windings to achieve the desired response
• Convert 115V, 3-phase ac power to 270V dc power
• Monitor the actuator performance and correct for faults
• Report fault status to ACT computer via actuator buses
The redundancy management enables two failures in any one actuator to be tolerated
without loss of function so that reliability in excess of the minimum required is achieved.
14.4.2 ACTIVE, ONLINE INTEGRATED HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR
The active, online integrated actuator is shown in Figure 177. An integrated actuator was
selected instead of a secondary actuator and power control unit combination because of
lower cost, lighter weight, and higher reliability for this FEW application. The active,
online approach was preferred to alternative integrated actuator concepts for the same
reasons. Figure 177 illustrates the simplicity of the actuation concept. Three actuators
operate each elevator control surface where fail-operational/fail-operational controls are
'desired. One of the three is designated as the active cylinder. The other two also follow
the position command. However, the difference in the cylinder pressures between the
active cylinder and the online cylinders is fed back to equalize the force outputs.
Because the equalizing feedbacks are limited to small values, any failure transients are
almost immediately opposed. Computer monitoring of the actuators bypasses the faulty
cylinder and redesignates the active channel as necessary.
Other surfaces are driven by two appropriately sized actuators. The operation is similar
except that only fail-operational performance is achieved.
14.5 1990 ACT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A derivative of the medium-risk system described in Subsection 14.3.2.2 was selected for
further evaluation and cost-of-ownership analysis. It is called the 1990 ACT system and
has the following features:
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• Redundant buses are used for sensor-computer and computer-actuator interfaces.
This saves weight and cost by marked reduction of aircraft wiring and makes all
sensor data available to all computing channels.
• Computing is asynchronous between channels and is compartmented such that
separate microcomputers perform I/O processing, control law computations, and
redundancy management. This avoids monolithic software structure and results in
lower costs of software design, validation, and verification.
• Sensors and actuators have self-contained electric power supplies and bus interface
circuits.
• Crucial control law computation load is assumed by the I/O microcomputer if the
control law microcomputer fails. This adds redundancy and reliability to the crucial
functions.
14.5.1 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The 1990 ACT system is integrated; all functions are performed by each of a central set
of four ACT computers. Sensors and control surface actuators are shared between
functions to the extent allowed by the control laws.
Airplane primary control is FEW; all control surface actuators are signaled electrically,
and there is no mechanical control system.
The system architecture is shown in Figure 178. A set of four buses interfaces the sensors
with the ACT computers. Similarly, a set of four buses interfaces the ACT computers
with the surface actuators. The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer, warning
electronics module, and dedicated ACT panel also interface with the computers via the
same set of four buses associated with the surface actuators.
The DADC and IRS are airplane sensors that interface with the ACT computers via buses,
as defined for the aircraft as intersystem buses. The IRS can interface with the ACT
system via the quadruple intrasystem buses and the intersystem buses. This is necessary
because the pitch-rate and acceleration signals, used for crucial functions, need to be
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Figure 178. 1990 ACT System Architecture
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obtained more reliably and faster than is possible with an intersystem bus presumed to be
of the ARINC 429 type.
Each sensor contains bus interface electronics. The interface electronics include an A/D
converter, an asynchronous serial I/O communications circuit, and the logic required to
recognize a data request and format the data response for transmission to the computers
on the sensor bus. Each response includes data, label, and a parity bit.
Each hydraulic servoactuator contains electronics to receive and decode the serial data,
convert the command to an analog signal, demodulate the feedback signals required for
servo control, and close the servo loop. The servoelectronics also transmit signals on the
bus in response to ACT computer requests, which include the feedback signals required for
monitoring of the servo.
The EMAs associated with the flaperons similarly interface with the ACT computers.
However, each EMA has two SDEUs. Two are needed because the control electronics
required for the EMAs are considerably more elaborate than those required for the
hydraulic servos. Much of the EMA monitoring and redundancy management is done in
SDEUs.
The ACT Maintenance and Display Computer interfaces with the actuator buses. It
receives data from the ACT computers indicating the failure state of the active control
system and provides fault annunciation messages and signals to the caution and warning
system.
The ACT discrete display also interfaces with the actuator buses and provides an
independent source of system failure status information to the crew. The caution and
warning system discrete displays also interface with the actuator buses.
14.5.2 FAILURE MANAGEMENT
Figure 179 is a simplified diagram illustrating the redundancy management used in the
1990 ACT system. Quadruple (or triple), sensors interface with quadruple ACT computers
through a set of sensor data buses so that each ACT computer has access to all the
redundant sensor data. The sensors are monitored, and the actuator commands are
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computed in ACT computers operating asynchronously with one another. The actuator
commands are output on quadruple actuator buses to hydraulic actuators and EMAs at the
control surfaces. Monitor processors contained within the ACT computers monitor
actuator commands and actuator performance and effect fault correction as appropriate.
The sensor bus transmits multiplexed sensor data to the four ACT computers. There are
approximately 20 data inputs to these buses. The transfer rate will approximate 500
samples per second per sensor.
Each of the ACT computers includes a bus controller that controls one of the buses. The
bus controller is dependent only on the computer power supply and clock for its proper
operation. Loss of a bus or of a controller results in loss of data from sensors on that bus.
Therefore, highest reliability for each bus and bus controller is of paramount importance.
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Figure 179. 1990 A CT System Simplified Redundancy Managemen t Block Diagram
427
A dead controller or a dead terminal (located with each sensor) will be detected by sensor
comparison monitoring within the ACT computers and by watchdog timer checks
associated with the bus controller.
Parity bit errors will be used to reject specific faulty data transmissions.
Certain sensor data, typified by air data signals, are transmitted to the ACT computers by
ARINC ^29 buses. Each of the A, B, and C computers receives data from one of the three
DADCs in this manner at a relatively low sample rate. These data are output on the
sensor buses by the ACT computers at a rate of 500 samples per second so that each
computer has access to all three sets of air data.
The midvalue of the redundant sensor data is determined in each of the four ACT
computers. The midvalue of four signals is the average of the two middle signals. When
only two sensors are valid, their average is determined in lieu of a midvalue.
These sensor data are compared across channels. Discrepancies are used to detect sensor
failures and isolate the fault whenever possible. When a discrepancy between two valid
sensors occurs, fault isolation is not attempted in the case of most sensors. Both sensors
are presumed failed, and the ACT system continues to function in a degraded state,
normally discontinuing the function associated with the failed sensor type. The pilot
command transducer and pitch-rate signals, which are essential to safe flight, are treated
somewhat differently.
If faults occur in the quadruply redundant pilot command transducers so that a
discrepancy between the only two remaining signals occurs, a sensor validity signal is used
to identify the good sensor. Safe flight is continued using this single good sensor. The
sensor validity signal is obtained by means of circuitry that takes the sum and difference
signals formed when the linear variable differential transducer (LVDT) secondary center
tap is grounded. The difference signal is proportional to the transducer signal; the sum
remains nearly constant for a properly functioning transducer.
The pitch-rate signal is compared not only with the other pitch-rate signals but, following
a sequence of failures, is compared with an estimated pitch-rate signal based on normal
acceleration.
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The control laws compute the servoactuator commands in each ACT computer. Because
an asynchronous computation is involved, the servocommands computed by the four ACT
computers will not agree precisely. Channels are equalized by noting the difference
between a particular ACT computer servocommand and that associated with the active
channel.
Each ACT computer is assigned a particular bus on which it outputs the servocommands.
The monitor processor compares the servocommands as issued on each bus. Faulty
servocommands are detected and isolated by the monitor processor using comparison
monitoring techniques. If three computer failures ever occur, the third computer failure
is isolated by the computer self-test. The computer self-test confidence is greater than
95%. Single-channel operation is permitted following a third computer failure because
there is no apparent better alternative.
14.5.3 FUNCTIONAL RELIABILITY
The probability of the FBW, crucial PAS system failing to function during a 1-hr flight
7 x
,-7
-12
was calculated as 1.   10 . The probability of loss of any critical ACT function was
calculated as 2.7 x 10
Both estimates are more than an order of magnitude less likely than the functional failure
-9 -5probability goals (less than 10 for crucial functions and less than 10 for critical
functions). However, these predictions assume that software reliability and coverage are
generally equal to 1.0.
1*.5.4 COST-OF-OWNERSHIP EVALUATION
Cost of ownership for the 1990 ACT system was analyzed and compared with the current
technology systems. Because cost of ownership depends upon the airplane configuration,
and the most complete data are available for the Initial ACT Configuration (ref 2), the
external aerodynamic characteristics and active control functions and surfaces of that
airplane were assumed. This means that flaperons were not included in the cost-of-
ownership evaluation. Analysis for the 1990 ACT system was performed based on
increments from the current technology Selected System, which was analyzed earlier.
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The 1990 ACT system differs basically from the Selected System as follows:
• All mechanical connections and components connecting the cockpit flight controls
to the actuator servovalves are deleted.
• Mechanical servo feedback to hydraulic power control unit (PCU) servovalves is
deleted.
• All ACT secondary servos and two FMC servos are deleted, and their functions are
assumed by the generally more expensive (but lighter weight) FBW PCUs listed in
Table 72.
• Four flight control computers (see table 72) replace the three primary and four
standby short-period PAS computers of the Selected System.
Table 72. Advanced Technology Fly-by-Wire Line Replaceable Unit
Nomenclature, Weight, and Quantity Per Aircraft
Component
ACT computer
Sensors
• Control position transducer
• Pitch
• Roll
• Yaw
• Accelerometer, wing FMC
• Accelerometer, wing WLA
Servos
• Electrohydraulic
Outboard aileron inboard
Elevator
Rudder
Outboard aileron outboard
Inboard aileron
Quantity per
shipset
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
6
4
4
4
LRU
weight, kg (Ib)
5.4 (12.0)
0.9 (2.0)
0.9 (2.0)
0.9 (2.0)
0.9 (2.0)
0.9 (2.0)
5.1 (11.2)
4.7 (10.4)
8.0(17.6)
2.8(6.1)
3.4 (7.6)
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• Sensors peculiar to the Selected System (and not included in the Baseline) are
replaced by the more expensive sensors shown in Table 72, which can communicate
directly to the digital data bus used for signal transmission. The digital sensors
added for stabilizer, flap, and slat position have not been included because this
information is hardwired to the electronics bay in the Baseline Aircraft.
• All autopilot and yaw damper actuators are replaced by the primary FBW actuators.
• Because insufficient definition was available and data buses are used for all signal
communication, a wiring weight estimate was not included.
The cost-of-ownership parameters in Table 73 were based on estimates of line replaceable
unit (LRU) cost, weight, and maintenance cost for the 1990s time frame. Computer
analysis showed some significant differences from the Selected System, which are
discussed as follows:
• Incremental Airplane Cost—Most of the cost reduction is due to the deletion of the
thousands of parts inherent in the mechanical transmission of pilot's control signals.
Deleting all autopilot actuators also contributes.
• Maintenance Manual Cost—This cost was estimated differently than the Selected
System cost. Total cost of developing and printing maintenance manuals was
estimated to be $547 000. Cost for a 30-aircraft fleet was determined by dividing
the total cost by the estimated production run of 300 airplanes and multiplying by
30. This cost is more than the Selected System cost (based on typical autopilot cost)
because of FBW in all axes. Some reduction might be expected from deleting
mechanical controls, but this has not been considered in this preliminary analysis.
Maintenance manual cost is, in any case, a low-leverage parameter.
• Maintenance Cost per Flight Hour—Major reductions here stem from the deletion of
all mechanical connections between the cockpit and the control surface servos.
Deletion of all autopilot actuators is a contributor of almost equal importance.
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Table 73. Cost-of-Ownership Results for Various ACT Systems
Parameter
incremented
Aircraft purchase cost per aircraft
(in dollars)
Maintenance manual cost per
30-aircraft fleet (m dollars)
Test equipment cost per
30-aircraft fleet (in dollars)
Spare inventory initial cost per
30-aircraft fleet (in dollars)
Maintenance cost per aircraft
flight hour (in dollars)
Departure delay and cancellation
cost per aircraft flight hour (in dollars)
Change in system weight
relative to integrated ACT
Fuel saving per flight hour at 863 km
(466 nmi)
Payback period in years
Incremental return on investment to airline
Current technology
Integrated
274K
21K
22.5K
250K
4.18
0.54
0
160kg
(352 Ib)
2.83
25.1%
Segregated
390 2K
31.4K
44 .9 K
356K
4.91
0.45
+ 114kg
(+252 Ib)
146kg
(322 Ib)
4.14
22.1%
Selected
297. 1K
26. 1K
33.6K
271. 1K
4.22
0.19
+ 14 kg
(+30 Ib)
160kg
(352 Ib)
2.98
24 6%
Selected +
pitch FEW
207 K
26 1K
33.6K
271 1K
3.98
0.12
-156kg
(-345 Ib)
172kg
(379 Ib)
2.02
27.6%
Advanced
technology
1990 ACT
98.8K
54.7K
10.0K
221 1K
-0.59
0.54
-629 kg
(-1386 Ib)
212kg
(468 Ib)
<2.0
34.9%
Maintenance manual cost = $547K total, which gives ——— x 30 = $54.7K for 30-airplane fleet
Departure Delay and Cancellation Cost per Flight Hour—Because inadequate data
and resources were available to perform a detailed analysis, the 1990 FBW system
was judged to be the same as the Integrated System, as it is a four-computer
integrated system. However, FBW in all axes will require careful reliability analysis
before an acceptable minimum equipment list can be defined and a detailed
departure reliability predicted.
Change in System Weight—This very significant [628.7 kg (1386 lb)| weight reduction
(compared to Integrated) was largely due to the deletion of mechanical flight
controls, but deletion of all autopilot actuators and lower weight for the FBW
surface control actuators J112.9 kg (249 lb)l also contributed.
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• Fuel Savings per Flight Hour—This significant change is due to the weight savings of
628.7 kg (1386 Ib).
• Return on Investment and Payback Period—The large improvements for full FBW are
largely due to the reduction in first cost and fuel burn obtained from weight
reduction.
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15.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results to date of the IAAC Project work indicate that the concept of an Active
Controls Technology (ACT) airplane, designed as such from the beginning, will indeed
yield an important saving in fuel over a similar commercial transport airplane without
active controls. The results of the current and advanced technology ACT control system
work presented in this report indicate that it is feasible to support such an active controls
airplane with a control system that meets all reliability and availability requirements,
assuming fault-free software and coverage approaching 1.0. The results also indicate that
this can be done at a cost that enables a suitable return on investment for the operators.
The Current Technology ACT Control System Definition Task had two primary objectives.
The first objective was to define a digital ACT control system architecture, using digital
flight control system elements currently being used or considered in commercial jet
transports, that exhibits high reliability and low cost. The second objective was to
identify the major concerns and unresolved issues relative to the use of such a control
system. The technical approach was to develop two extreme forms of system
architecture and then select a system architecture for the ACT control system that uses
the best features of these extreme forms. The major conclusions of this work are as
follows:
• All three of the control systems studied meet the reliability requirements of the
design requirements and objectives, if software reliability and coverage are assumed
equal to 1.0. The Segregated System is predicted to be the most reliable, followed
in order by the Selected and Integrated Systems.
• The Integrated System, with its single set of redundant digital control computers, is
the most efficient of the three systems. It satisfies function and reliability
requirements at the lowest cost.
• The Segregated System failed to show the expected major improvement in
reliability. Overall system reliability is principally a multiple-function loss
probability and is dependent primarily upon the digital air data computers and
inertia! reference systems.
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• The Segregated System cost is unacceptable, being 30% greater than the Selected
System cost and 40% greater than the Integrated System cost. Although the
individual control computers specified for the Segregated System are based upon
microprocessor technology, the resulting reduction in unit cost, compared to the
Integrated System computers, is not sufficient to compensate for the large
number (19) of computers required for the Segregated System.
• The Selected System shows a decided reliability improvement over the Integrated
System with a small increase in cost.
The major concerns that arise from review of these results center around system
complexity and the ever-present question of system reliability in the operational
environment. The hardware reliability predictions are based on the assumption of
software reliability and coverage equal to 1.0. Although the absolute values of the
resulting reliability predictions may be suspect, their use as one relative figure of merit is
considered well founded. There is no generally accepted method to prove software
reliability equal to the required level. However, 15 years of Boeing experience in
engineering real-time digital control systems has shown that a process that begins with
careful functional analysis and leads through requirements, design, coding, verification,
validation, exhaustive testing, configuration control, and careful documentation can
produce highly reliable real-time control software. Therefore, it is concluded that the
ACT systems can be implemented using currently available technology and software
design processes.
The objectives of the Advanced Technology ACT Control System Definition Task were to
(1) determine the benefits of synthesizing ACT control laws using optimal control and
estimation theory, (2) determine the effects of actuation system nonlinearities on gust-
load alleviation and flutter suppression effectiveness, and (3) identify advanced flight
control system implementation concepts as an alternative to the current technology
implementation of ACT control functions.
The technical approach to the synthesis evaluation objective was to synthesize control
laws, using these techniques, to equal or exceed the performance of the systems
synthesized using classical techniques. The actuator nonlinearities were examined by
introducing representative position and rate limits and output hysteresis into the
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mathematical model and comparing load reduction in the presence of discrete gusts. The
alternative implementation objective was met by determining the system components
(e.g., sensors, computers, actuators, and fiber optics) that would probably be available in
1990 for use on commercial transports. Using these components, three systems-with
various risk levels—were formulated to meet the same design requirements and objectives
that the current technology system was designed to meet. The best of these systems was
examined further.
The major conclusions of this work are as follows:
• The analysis procedures presented in this document offer systematic methods for
selecting the proper control surfaces, actuation bandwidths, and sensor locations and
for evaluating open- and closed-loop stability and gust responses for an ACT
airplane.
• Design procedures based upon time-domain optimal control theory offer a direct and
systematic method to derive multiloop control laws that satisfy typical active
control design requirements.
• The synthesis procedure using optimal control theory created a pitch-augmented
stability control law that produced augmented airplane behavior similar to an ideal
model directly and systematically.
• The medium-risk 1990 technology ACT system design is a quadruply redundant
integrated system combined with fly-by-wire (FBW) primary controls in all three
axes. Its architecture is strongly oriented toward digital buses and multiple
microprocessors, using quadruple input buses coupling digital sensors to the four
central control computers and quadruple output buses feeding servoelectronics units
incorporating digital-to-analog conversion. The resulting predicted system
reliability is appropriate for an ACT flight control system, even though fault-free
software and coverage approaching 1.0 were assumed.
The encouraging results of the control system work, and important unresolved issues,
emphasize the desirability of proceeding with the planned laboratory tests and flight
demonstration. Thus the plan is to continue the NASA-Boeing IAAC Project activity
according to the project plan.
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